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KHAMIDINOYATOV

CENTRAL ASIA
AND
KAZAKHSTAN
BEFORE
AND
AFTER
THE
OCTOBER
REVOLUTION

(Reply to Falsifiers of History)

EX LIBRIS

EMMET D. HURLEY, IR. ESQ.

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PROGRESS PUBLISHERS

Moscow

TRANSLATED FROM THE RUSSIAN BY D. FIDLON EDITED BY D. SKVIRSKY

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ОТВЕТ ФАЛЬСИФИКАТОРАМ ИСТОРИИ СОВЕТСКОЙ СРЕДНЕЙ АЗИИ И КАЗАХСТАНА

На английском языке

First printing 1966

Many books on the post-Revolution history of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have appeared in the West after the Great October Socialist Revolution and especially after World War II. Most of them present a distorted picture of Soviet reality, misrepresenting, in particular, the national policy of the Communist Party.

Khamid Inoyatov, Doctor of History, uses facts from Soviet and foreign sources to knock the bottom out of these fabrications. He shows that the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan were active in the October Revolution and the Civil War, and describes the role played by them in peaceful socialist construction and their accession as equal members to the fraternal family of the peoples of the Soviet Union.

He gives an over-all picture of the national statehood and the flourishing economy and culture of the peoples of Central Asia.

CONTENTS

PREFACE	7
PRE-REVOLUTION TURKESTAN AS A COLONY OF TSARIST	
THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE MASSES IN THE VICTORY OF SOVIET POWER IN TURKESTAN	32
LENINIST NATIONAL POLICY AND THE NATIONAL STATEHOOD OF THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN	
ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL BURGEONING OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND KAZAKHSTAN.	
Economic Development	101
Economic Development	101
Cultural Development	124
CONCLUSION	148

PREFACE

In the relatively brief period that has elapsed since the Great October Socialist Revolution, the most backward developed into prosperous Soviet republics, into beacons of socialism in the East. How this came about is still a riddle to historians abroad, and no wonder that they are trying to socialist construction in Central Asia have been published in the capitalist countries in recent years by both progressive and reactionary writers.

The former-historians, journalists, members of foreign delegations and numerous tourists who visited Central Asia and Kazakhstan-impartially describe the nature of the October Revolution and socialist construction in the Central Asian republics. They include Dr. L. Delgado, Andrew Rothstein, Corliss Lamont, W.P. and Zelda K. Coates, George Morris, Maulyana Badayuni, Victor Perlo, Joseph North, Holland Roberts, Marcel Egretaud* and many other progressive journalists and scholars in Britain, the U.S.A. and other countries. Their works, whether extensive research papers,

^{*} Dr. L. Delgado, "Soviet Central Asian Republics", Eastern World, Vol. XII, 1958, March; A. Rothstein, A History of the U.S.S.R., London, 1951, and other works; C. Lamont, The Peoples of the Soviet Union, New York, 1944, "Uzbekistan Impressions", New World Review, 1959, Asia, London, 1951, and other works; G. Morris, "Uzbek Textile, Machine Plants", The Worker, Vol. XXIV, 1959, May 3, 18; Muhamrachi, 1958; Victor Perlo, U.S.A. and U.S.S.R. The Economic Race, New York, 1960, and other works; Holland Roberts, Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Stan-Ouzbékistan-Kirghizie-Tadjikistan-Turkménistan-Azerbaidjan, Paris, 1959.

magazine or newspaper articles, or travel notes, as well as oral statements, give the truth about the way of life, the level of education, culture and science, and the position of women, in brief, about all the big changes that have taken place in Central Asia and Kazakhstan in Soviet years.

The latter-Olaf Caroe, Walter Kolarz, Alexander Park, Richard Pipes, Richard Pierce, P. Urban, Charles W. Hostler, Geoffrey Wheeler and other bourgeois ideologists*-distort Soviet reality, try to disparage the October Revolution and traduce the road traversed by the world's first socialist state. The so-called historical works of Mustafa Chokaev, Zaki Validov, Rajab Baisuni and other whiteguard émigrés, or traitors like Baymirza Hayit, are filled with malicious and slanderous fabrications about the October Revolution, the Soviet national policy and the present status of the Central

The colossal achievements of the formerly oppressed Asian peoples.** nationalities of Russia powerfully influence the peoples of the world, especially of the East, and cause profound alarm in the imperialist camp. The ideas of socialism, peace, friendship, equality and happiness are penetrating into the East and accelerating the disintegration of the colonial system. Hence the incessant false, revisionistic propaganda from capitalist countries aimed at undermining the prestige of the Soviet Union and sustaining the doomed colonialist

positions.

** Mustafa Chokaev, "Turkestan and the Soviet Regime", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, 1931, October, and other articles; A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugunku Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47; Abdullah Racep Baisuni, The National Movement in Turkestan, Istanbul, 1945; Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt, 1956, and other works.

The bourgeois ideologists are afraid of the impact that the formerly oppressed nations of Russia, who have attained a high level of development within the lifetime of a single generation, are making on the peoples of other countries. This viewpoint, expressed by the prominent U.S. millionaire Averell Harriman in Peace with Russia?, gives no rest to the ruling circles of the capitalist countries and to their ide-

With complete disregard for the works of Soviet historians, who exhaustively showed that the non-Russian peoples fought to establish Soviet rule and took an active part in the building of socialism, bourgeois authors strive to prove the opposite. Defying facts and logic they allege that the non-Russian peoples stood aloof from the October Revolution, that Soviet rule was alien to them and was artificially implanted by the Russians, that the peoples of Central Asia, or Turkestan as they still call it, supported bourgeois governments, in particular, the Kokand Autonomous Government, which was set up after the October Revolution by the national bourgeoisie, feudal and clerical elements and Russian white-

Bourgeois historians question the facts cited by Soviet scholars in books on the history of the October Socialist Revolution in the Central Asian republics. They hold that the role of the Communists and the support given to them by the local population are exaggerated, and belittle the part played by the local "opposition" movements, to quote their

Hackneyed ideas based on the allegation that the Soviets colonised Central Asia and that its peoples have no political rights are prevalent in reactionary bourgeois historical

Some writers, ignoring facts, draw an "analogy" between the current policy of the Soviet Government and the colonial policy of tsarist Russia in Central Asia, under which the working people were oppressed both by the tsarist officials

^{*} Olaf Caroe, The Soviet Empire. The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, London, 1953, and other works; Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, London, 1953, and other works; Alexander Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957; Richard Pipes, The Formation of the Soviet Union: Communism and Nationalism, 1917-1923, Cambridge, 1954, and other works; Richard Pierce, Russian Central Asia, 1907-1917, A Study in the Colonial Rule, Berkeley, 1960, and other works; P. Urban, Orientalistik und Asienpolitik der Sowjets, Ost Europa, München, 1958, Nr. 12, and other articles; Charles W. Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, London, 1957; Geoffrey Wheeler, Racial Problems in Soviet Muslim Asia, London, 2nd ed., 1962, and other works, mainly articles.

^{*} See surveys on works by Central Asian historians under the heading "The Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R.", published as a series since 1959 in the British Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society. This idea is stressed in the review on Khamid Inoyatov's The October Revolution in Uzbekistan, Moscow, 1958 (see April 1959 issue of above journal, Vol. XLVI, Part II, p. 160).

and the local rich. They equate the tsarist policy of national oppression with the Soviet Government's Leninist national policy. Founded on equality, friendship and mutual aid of the peoples of the Soviet Union, the Leninist national policy has enabled the economy and culture of Central Asia to flourish and brought all the oppressed peoples national Soviet state-

Other bourgeois writers seek to convince the reader that hood. there is economic and political discrimination against the Central Asian peoples, that they are treated as inferiors. Still others say that the Soviet system has features of colonialism; another group questions the participation of women in state administration; and there are those who talk of the Russification and assimilation of Central Asian peoples, the eradication of their culture and traditions, and so forth.

Calumniators use diverse methods of falsification. They shut their eyes to facts and base their writings in magazine and newspaper articles on unverified arguments dealing with historic events. Some writers openly adulterate history, while others camouflage this adulteration with a show of impar-

In many histories of Central Asia distorted facts are lent tiality. the appearance of authenticity by references to the authority of persons notorious for their prejudice against the Soviet Union. Histories of this kind are usually written by bourgeois nationalists, who were routed and driven out of the U.S.S.R., whiteguard émigrés and war criminals.

The third group of falsifiers are bourgeois historians whose works are ostensibly scientific. They fill their long-penned manuscripts with footnotes and references to make them appear argumentative and mask their anti-Soviet tenor.

Bourgeois pseudo-historians base all their arguments on the concoctions of bourgeois ideologists working on orders from their bosses. Anti-Soviet writers quote falsehoods. This method of fabricating "historical documents" and drawing on them is currently the most popular. A favourite trick is to publish some of Soviet documents referred to in their books. But, as a rule, these documents are deprived of their essence by the omission of vital facts. Moreover, these authors present the particular for the general and the irregular for the regular.

Reactionary bourgeois authors frequently quote from Soviet critical literature, mainly from newspaper articles, topical satire and news items censuring shortcomings and harmful survivals which the Soviet people are relentlessly

There are many other ways by which reactionary bourgeois historians fabricate falsehoods about the Soviet Union and

In this book the author exposes the fabrications of reactionary falsifiers from positions of Marxist-Leninist method-

PRE-REVOLUTION TURKESTAN AS A COLONY OF TSARIST RUSSIA

Under tsarism, when Russia was a great-power monarchy, Central Asia and Kazakhstan had all the features of colonies. After annexing Turkestan, Russia gave it the status of a colony and treated its people accordingly. The tsarist officials regarded the non-Russian peoples as belonging to an inferior race and tyrannised them with greater political and social oppression than they had ever experienced. With regard to the peoples of Turkestan, the policy of the Russian bourgeoisie and landowners was "to stifle all rudiments of statehood, cripple their culture, check the development of their language, keep them in ignorance and, finally, Russify them as much as possible".*

Under this policy of national oppression the tsarist colonialists deliberately kept the peoples of Central Asia in a state of political, economic and cultural backwardness and

The allocations for public education were miserably small illiteracy. in the country as a whole, but in the non-Russian territories they were reduced to almost nothing. In 1913, for example, the Turkestan Territorial Administration appropriated only 1.8 per cent of its budget funds for education, designating at the same time approximately 65 per cent for the maintenance of the army and the police. Moreover, only a quarter of that 1.8 per cent went for the upkeep of the so-called Russiannative schools, which trained mostly personnel for the local administration. The remainder was utilised solely for the cultural requirements of the exploiter sections of the Russian

* The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Russ. ed., Part I, Moscow, 1954, p. 559.

part of the population. No funds whatsoever were allocated for the upkeep of the local schools or maktabs, where studies were conducted in the languages of the local non-Russian peoples. These schools were run on the initiative and donations of the local population. The result was that almost the entire population of pre-Revolution Turkestan was illiterate. Less than two per cent who were literate belonged mainly to the richer sections of the urban population.

This policy pursued the aim of assimilating the weak and oppressed peoples of the non-Russian territories, and the development of their languages was deliberately impeded as "being unsuitable". Consequently, Russian was made the

compulsory official language.

The Russian Black Hundreds* unconditionally subscribed to the firmly established opinion of tsarist Russia's exploiter classes that all nationalities should be subordinated to the Russian nation, and would not mind, as Lenin put it, "having the 'local lingoes' banned, although they are spoken by about 60 per cent of Russia's total population".**

This vicious abuse of the national languages and cultures of Turkestan checked the development of literature, arts and

Local language books, newspapers and magazines had a very limited circulation. The only newspaper to be published regularly was the Turkiston Viloyatining Gazetasi, mouthpiece of the Turkestan Territorial Administration. Its editor was a rabid colonialist, named N. Ostroumov.

The native population was not represented in the administration. The administrative apparatus-the Governor General, Military Governors, the regional and district chiefs, the local police officers, the gendarmerie and so forth-consisted entirely of tsarism's henchmen and had unbounded and uncontrolled authority over the population. The so-called native administration was "elected" without the participation of the working people. It consisted solely of representatives of the local exploiter classes who, finding themselves in power, zealously enforced the tsarist colonial policy.

The only local interests protected by the tsarist govern-

** V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Moscow, Vol. 20, p. 71.

^{*} Armed gangs of pogrom-makers formed in 1905-07 by the police and by monarchist organisations to fight the revolutionary movement, assassinate progressive leaders and perpetrate mass pogroms.

ment in Turkestan were those of the *bais*, traders, usurers and other exploiters. The rest of the population, whom the colonialists contemptuously called "aliens", had no one to turn for protection against exploitation and oppression.

"In no country in the world," Lenin wrote in 1915, "are the majority of the population oppressed so much as in Russia; Great Russians constitute only 43 per cent of the population, i.e., less than half; the non-Russians are denied all rights."*

The tsarist colonial policy led to the impoverishment of the working people, who languished under the double yoke of brutal exploitation by the local rich and by the Russian landowners, capitalists and officials.

Before the Revolution, Turkestan was a purely agrarian country. In 1916, 79.6 per cent of the population lived in villages, and of this number 60-80 per cent were poor or not very rich middle peasants.

The life of the peasants or *dekhans* in the cotton and grain districts, the nomad cattle-breeders, the handicraftsmen and the workers in the towns was full of hardship.

Their lot was no better in the neighbouring Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate that were typically Asian despotic states. As vassals of tsarist Russia, Khiva and Bukhara were, as Lenin said, "something like colonies".** The Khan and the Emir were loyal servants of the tsar and were given a free hand only in internal affairs.

The despotic regime with its brutal exploitation, hunger, poverty and social diseases reduced the people to abject slavery. Not only the lot and property of the people, but also their lives hung on the whims of the Emir and the Khan, who, on their part, had complete disregard for them. That is evident from the Emir's reply to an inquiry by the commander of the Russian garrison in Kerki concerning the sinking of a barge with 300 passengers on board. He said: "The general need not worry because the Emir does not count his population and a few persons more or less makes no difference for him."

The peoples of Khiva and Bukhara were extremely backward politically, economically and culturally. Out of the state revenues, derived from taxation and outright plunder, huge

* V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 306.

** Ibid., Vol. 25, p. 27.

sums were used to satisfy the whims of the Emir and the Khan and not a single kopek was spent on the needs of the population.

In Turkestan almost all the land with its irrigation ditches, orchards and vineyards was owned by the government, powerful feudal lords and bais. According to the 1917 census, 232,971 poor and not very rich middle peasant households, or more than half of the households in Ferghana, owned only 9.8 per cent of the land. In Samarkand Province, for example, 5.6 per cent of bai households possessed 29 per cent of the land, while 50.1 per cent of poor peasants owned only 10.2 per cent. The picture was the same in all the other provinces of Turkestan.

Nearly 50 per cent of the poorest peasants in the territory had no land at all; 40-50 per cent of the peasants in Tashkent and Andijan districts were landless. Land-starved and landless dekhans were compelled to work for becoming share-croppers.

The sharecropper had to surrender nearly half of his harvest, despite the fact that he used his own implements and seeds. But those who rented land and implements and borrowed seeds could retain only a quarter, one-fifth or even only one-fifteenth of their harvest.

Under these onerous conditions, the *dekhans* were unable to feed their families. They fell in debt to the rich landowners and were reduced to the position of serfs.

Labour rent flourished. The *dekhans* frequently tilled the *bais'* land under so-called agricultural association "contracts" or as "service to kinsmen". The *bais* provided the *dekhans* with land, implements or draught animals and in return mercilessly exploited their labour.

Hired labour-permanent, annual or seasonal-was also relatively widespread. Remuneration was small, usually in kind, and could not satisfy even the minimum requirements of the labourer.

All these enslaving forms of land rent forced ever-increasing numbers of *dekhans* to sell their plots to the rich landowners and become sharecroppers.

The maintenance of the irrigation ditches required great outlays of labour and time. This duty was imposed on dekhans, who held land allotments, as a form of rent in kind. Every year their families had to assign a certain number of hands, depending on the size of their allotments, to weed and repair the ditches. This work was performed at the busiest time of the year and led the dekhans into still greater

poverty.

Although the peasants kept the irrigation ditches in repair and received no remuneration for that work, their farms were frequently short of water. The water shortage was acute in the villages situated at the end of the ditches. Bribery, which flourished in the countryside, was a dreadful scourge for the population. The peasants could not pay the officials in charge of the distribution of water as much as the rich landowners. The incessant quarrels and conflicts over the distribution of water frequently provoked fights and bloodshed.

All the shortcomings and abuse in the distribution of water remained after Central Asia was annexed by Russia. The tsarist government left the old rules in force; only the large irrigation canals were placed under the control of the territorial authorities.

Moreover, the established practice of water utilisation further deteriorated because the changed economic conditions entailed an increase in the crop areas, especially in those

under cotton. Naturally, that required more water.

The tsarist government did nothing to improve the situation, confining its activity to interminable talks, surveying, devising grandiose plans, working out draft laws and so on. In practice, however, no irrigation work, which required large capital investments, was organised. During its 50-year rule in Turkestan, the tsarist government built only two relatively big irrigation canals-one on the tsar's estate in Murghab, and the other in the Hungry Steppe, both of which watered only 37,000 dessiatines* of land. All told, 95,000 hectares of land were irrigated in Turkestan after it was joined to Russia. That was but a drop in the ocean, for there was enough water to irrigate millions of dessiatines of waste land.

The condition of the peasants deteriorated still further because of the policy of resettlement fostered by the tsarist government. Colonising the territory by plan, it confiscated the best irrigated land from the local population turning it

over to settlers from Russia. More and more peasants lost their land and became farm labourers. The nomads were hit the hardest by this policy. Their land was declared state property and they were permitted to use it only by communes.

This law chiefly affected the Kazakhs and Kirghiz, depriving them of their national territory and making the colonialists complete masters of it. In the steppes alone, for example, nearly 30 million dessiatines of arable land were confiscated and turned over to the military authority and the resettlement administration. In all, 476,000 dessiatines were seized from the peasants in Syr Darya Province, 75,000 in Ferghana Province, 3,000 in Samarkand Province and 7,000 in the Transcaspian area.

The policy of creating land reserves for colonisation not by expanding the irrigated territory but by confiscating land from the local inhabitants, forced some sections of the native population to settle in remote mountain regions, while others went to work for kulak settlers and were ruthlessly exploited

by them.

In Turkestan agriculture underwent a gradual change after Central Asia was joined to Russia. Previously it had grown cotton, wheat, rice, sorgho, barley, millet and clover; but when its economy began to be drawn into commodity relations, cotton became the major crop and the basic marketable commodity.

Though some progress was made, cotton-growing developed fully in Turkestan only after the October Revo-

lution.

Pre-Revolution Turkestan had no industry worth mentioning. The tsarist government regarded it only as a source of raw materials and deliberately obstructed the development of local industry. Before the Revolution there was not a single engineering plant in Central Asia, and though it was a cottongrowing area, it did not even have a textile mill. The entire

cotton output was processed in Russia.

Russian capitalists, however, were compelled to build a few factories in Turkestan which mainly processed agricultural produce. These industries developed noticeably in the years preceding World War I, when there was an economic upsurge throughout Russia. The enterprises working for export, in particular those processing cotton and cotton-seed oil, accounted for 83.2 per cent of the gross industrial output.

^{*} Dessiatine-an old square measure introduced in Russia in 1753; equal to 1.0925 hectares.

The value of the gross industrial output was less than oneseventh the value of the gross agricultural output. These facts lucidly prove the extremely low level of lop-sided industry in Turkestan.

In 1914, there were only 702 industrial enterprises (excluding railway) in the territory. All of them were semi-primitive workshops with a low technical standard of production. The vast majority employed not more than 30 workers whose working day was from 10 to 12 and sometimes from 16 to 18 hours long. The average earnings of the workers were so scanty that they and their families could hardly keep body and soul together. Most of the enterprises worked only part of the year, employing only seasonal workers, a fact which also affected earnings. There were no safety arrangements, whatsoever, and the working conditions were terrible.

Here is what the *Turkestansky Kuryer* (*Turkestan Courier*), a newspaper published in those days, wrote in this connection.

tion:

"Should you take an interest in the condition of workers, you would find it almost identical everywhere: 1) the workers live in one of the factory's warehouses; 2) there is no fuel for heating and lighting; 3) the working day everywhere is 12 hours long; 4) in the ginning department the air is always filled with dust; 5) there are not more than three or four suspended lanterns in a factory and the workers have to grope their way about in the dark; wads of cottonwool clenched in their teeth are their only means of filtering the air they breathe; 6) when the factory stops the workers remove the transmission belts from the pullies manually and when it resumes work they replace them; they also stop and set in motion the water-driven machines, and take turns as oilers because nobody is employed specially for the job. As a direct result, almost every week there is an accident at some plant, where a worker is either seriously injured or killed."

The workers of the local nationalities were in the position of colonial slaves. All of them, with rare exceptions, were employed on unskilled jobs. Compared with Russian workers of the same qualification, their wages were almost 50 per cent lower for the same amount of work. On top of that they were treated harshly and with contempt.

Their cultural backwardness is explained by the difficult

material circumstances, hideous exploitation and lack of all political rights.

Practically nothing was done to tap the vast natural resources. Though there were thousands of millions of tons of coal in the operating pits, in the year preceding the Revolution only about 330,000 tons were mined. The colleries situated far from the railways and from consumers had no mechanical equipment.

The situation in the oilfields was the same. These oilfields were unscrupulously exploited by French and German investors. Turkestan imported from Russia up to 400,000 tons of petroleum and approximately 16,000 tons of coal although

it had its own huge deposits of natural fuel.

Consequently, with industry in such a state, in 1914 there were only 20,925 factory workers in Turkestan (excluding Khiva and Bukhara). This was less than 0.5 per cent of the population. Of the total number of workers 72 per cent were local native inhabitants. The tsarist reactionary colonial policy was manifested in the nature of the industry, the ruthless exploitation of the workers and the opposition to the training of national cadres.

Following its annexation, Turkestan was flooded with Russian goods. In addition to critical goods, Russian merchants brought wares, whose quality was much higher than similar wares made by local handicraftsmen and artisans. This rapidly led to the latter's ruin and caused the

domestic industry to decline.

Some branches of the domestic industry, however, manufacturing goods for the local population (silks with national ornaments, confectionery, etc.) continued to grow. But these were few in number and could not serve as grounds for saying that those years witnessed the development of the handicraft industry.

The development of industry and agriculture in Turkestan largely depended on Russian capital. On the one hand, the money invested by Russian capitalists in cotton-growing, railways, mining, and the textile and cotton-ginning industries stimulated some development of these branches of the economy, but, on the other hand, it became a means of enslaving the population, particularly in the rural areas.

The money for financing cotton-growing passed through numerous trade and credit establishments such as banks,

19

cotton firms, cotton ginneries, purchasing agencies and usurers, and by the time it reached its destination the interest on it grew to exorbitant proportions. For example, if the state bank granted a loan to private banks and cotton firms at an interest rate of 6.5 per cent, the cotton-grower would obtain the loan at 60 per cent interest. This was the most vicious form of exploiting the rural population. As a result, the cotton-growers, already enmeshed in all sorts of extortionate transactions, were unable to extricate themselves from the clutches of the usurers.

The usurers, who acted as go-betweens in loan transactions, and the agents of cotton firms made the most of the illiteracy of the *dekhans*. Promissory notes were so involved that the *dekhans* did not know how much they owed and at times settled one and the same promissory note several times. Cotton firms, which granted loans on the security of future harvest, strove to keep the *dekhans* in constant debt, which in the end brought about their utter ruin. If a *dekhan* who was repeatedly cheated and duped ran into excessive debt, which he was unable to repay, all his property was confiscated.

Large numbers of peasants were deprived of their dearest possession—land. The local authorities were eventually forced to prohibit the mass confiscation of land in payment of debts. Nevertheless, some dealers gained possession of large tracts of land. In the Andijan District, Ferghana Province, for example, 145 bais, not counting the prominent millionaire Mirkamil Muminbayev, who had approximately 5,000 dessiatines of the best irrigated land, owned 7,224 dessiatines, while 9,008 dekhan households had only 3,072 dessiatines of land.

In the towns and villages the working people lived in dire poverty, while wealth flowed into the hands of the brokers, usurers and merchants. A new class, the national trade and industrial bourgeoisie, and kulaks were coming into being, inaugurating the transition from simple commodity production to capitalism. The non-Russian bourgeoisie solidly supported tsarism and abetted in the enslavement of its people. At the same time it strove to capture the supremacy among the incipient local bourgeois nations with the objective of gradually seceding from Russia.

Tsarist Russia's tax policy was also responsible for the deteriorating condition of the working masses. Though the

reform carried out by the tsarist government after the conquest of Central Asia simplified the tax system, it made the tax burden heavier than ever before. The state land tax, land duty in cash and in kind, quitrent, production taxes and many other dues fell squarely on the shoulders of the working people, particularly in the rural areas. The taxes paid by the *dekhans* were the main source of revenue of the Turkestan State Budget. In 1913, taxes brought in a total of 23.049,000 rubles.

The imperialist war of 1914-18 adversely affected the economy of Turkestan. All the hardships of that destructive war fell to the lot of the working masses. Difficult as it was, the condition of the people was still further worsened by the increase in the old and the imposition of new taxes and dues, "voluntary" contributions, the requisitioning of livestock and property, the soaring cost of living, hunger and profiteering.

In 1915, taxes mounted to 38,329,000 rubles. It becomes clear why the masses were brought to ruin and impoverishment if we bear in mind that in addition to taxes there were contributions for the upkeep of the volost* headmen, aryk-aksakals,** mirabs,*** mullahs, ishans,**** and Russiannative schools, and the graft that flourished among the bureaucracy.

Although industry and agriculture, particularly cotton-growing, showed some sign of development, it did not improve the lot of the people. The marketable output of cotton fibre increased by almost 49,000 tons in 1914-15 alone. Railway construction was begun on a small scale in Turkestan in the first years of the war: the Ferghana branch-line joining Kokand-Namangan-Andijan, the Bukhara branch-line joining Kagan-Karshi, and the Semirechensk branch-line. The revival of industry and transport and the mobilisation of Russians into the army brought about an increase in the number of workers from the local population.

Nevertheless, the territory's economy continued its downhill trend, and the food supply dwindled considerably. The

^{*} Volost-the lowest administrative territorial unit in pre-Revolution Russia.

^{**} Aryk-aksakal-official in charge of the irrigation system.

^{***} Mirab-official supervising water distribution.

**** Ishan-confessor, preceptor in Muslim religion usually holding no official clerical office.

cotton area expanded at the expense of the areas sown to grain and fodder crops. The quantity of wheat, the staple food grain imported from Russia, decreased by the autumn of 1915 and towards the end of 1916 it was almost completely suspended because of the bread shortage in Russia herself.

In 1915-17 the livestock population diminished by almost 1,500,000 head due to frequent requisitions. These were, in the main, draught animals. The war, however, was not the only factor responsible for the catastrophic situation in stockraising; animal husbandry was completely neglected by the tsarist government. In 1917, there were only two livestock experts and six instructors in the whole of Turkestan.

Simultaneously with the decrease in the number of draught animals and productive livestock there was a shortage of farm implements because the supply of these implements, imported from Russia and manufactured locally, stopped. Agriculture was also affected by the mobilisation of the local population for work on the home front and the front-lines. Most of the 250,000 persons subject to conscription were dekhans.

The tsarist government granted greater privileges to factory owners and cotton dealers, by giving them a free hand in fixing prices on cotton through the Cotton Supply Committee, which was set up in 1915 in Moscow. The Committee registered all the cotton reserves in the country. The fixed price of cotton was set at far below the market price in the interests of the manufacturers and that dealt the material position of the cotton-growers a heavy blow and caused their further impoverishment.

The discrepancy between the prices of cotton and other goods was immense. In 1916, as compared to 1913, cotton prices rose by 50 per cent, while those of other commodities climbed by 400-500 per cent. The *dekhans* complained bitterly to the Governor-General.

The price of butter also soared from an average of 25 kopeks per kilo in 1913 to 3 rubles 75 kopeks in 1917.

The 1916 crop failure ruined many cotton-growers who had to sell their land to cover their debts. After the national liberation movement of 1916 was suppressed, the Governor-General ordered the confiscation of many allotments in the villages which had, in one way or another, been involved in the struggle of the people against their oppressors.

Many of the poorest sections of the *dekhans* were dispossessed of land through so-called "voluntary renunciation of ownership". The tax on irrigated land, introduced by the tsarist government on July 21, 1909, covered even those allotments which were not cultivated and which brought no profit at all to the *dekhans*. Consequently, they were compelled to give them up, thus speeding up the dispossession of the poor.

In Central Asia the death-rate due to impoverishment, starvation and monstrous exploitation was extremely high. In 1915-17 the population of Turkestan dropped by 750,000. In 1916, in Semirechensk Province alone the population decreased by one-fifth, or by 273,225, most of whom were Kirghiz, Kazakhs and Dungans.

The war brought with it greater exploitation of the working class. The working day grew longer, real wages declined, more female and child labour was used and labour productivity fell.

Tsarism took feverish measures to meet the growing war requirements. The colonies were drained of raw materials, food, forage, draught animals, productive livestock and funds, which were shipped to Russia under the guise of procurements

for the army and industry. The medical and sanitary service was hopelessly inadequate. The local socio-economic conditions were such that, far from developing, medicine declined. The congested and unhygienic conditions in which the impoverished people lived gave rise to epidemics, which took a heavy toll of life. In various parts of Turkestan there were constant flare-ups of trachoma, itch, tetter, dracunculosis, ulcer, malaria, typhus and other infectious and epidemic diseases. Practically nothing could be done to stop the rising sick-rate. What talk could there be of the authorities organising medical and sanitary services for the local population when there were almost no hospitals, out-patient clinics or first-aid stations, when there was only one doctor per 50,000 of population in Ferghana Province, while in Kara-Kalpakia, whose pre-Revolution population numbered 250,000, there was also only one doctor. Neither could there be talk about improving the national health service.

Thus, hunger, poverty and political inequality were the lot of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan before the October Socialist Revolution.

In a letter to the people of Kazakhstan on the republic's 25th anniversary, the Central Committee of the Communist

Party of Kazakhstan declared:

"Before Soviet rule was established, the life of our people could be likened to spring without flowers, to sunless days. to a dry river. Precious metals lay in the depths of the earth. but man cultivated land with primitive hoes. The lakes and rivers overflowed their spacious banks with life-giving water from the mountain glaciers, but man died of thirst. In winter, the pastures were covered with an ice crust, and herds of cattle, the only means of existence of the nomads, perished. It took months and years to travel from one end of the country to the other. A person was born, lived and died in ignorance of the pulsating life of the world. The whole people bowed to their fate, which was as relentless as a blizzard in the steppes." Such was the bitter lot of all the peoples in Turkestan.

True, in the interests of its colonialist policy the tsarist government was forced to build a number of factories, irrigation projects and a railway linking Central Asia with Russia. This in turn promoted the growth of towns and their population. Some of the towns sprang up as centres of the

cotton industry.

In spite of the colonialist policy towards the non-Russian peoples and the support that was given to the local despots, the stifling of national culture and the disregard for the economic interests of the local population, the joining of Central Asia to Russia had its progressive aspects. It put an end to the economic and political dismemberment of Central Asia and its interminable internecine wars. It enabled Turkestan gradually to emerge from national isolation and seclusion, promoted internal ties between different parts of the country and also external relations, chiefly with Russia, broke up the old patriarchal-feudal relations and gave birth to new ones. Central Asia entered the road of capitalist development. This led to the growth of factory production and the appearance of a working class composed of non-Russian nationalities. But in pursuing its reactionary aims, tsarism distorted the features of the new, though slow, process of capitalist development and impeded the growth of the country's productive forces.

To some extent, the closer ties with Russia, which had a more advanced economy and culture, contributed to cultural development in Central Asia. Previously it had neither a post-office nor a printing shop; now it started publishing books, magazines and newspapers and opening libraries and museums. All this was done primarily to satisfy the requirements of the Russian population, but the very fact of their appearance brought the local population closer to literature and art.

The peoples of Central Asia came in contact not only with the Russia of the tsars, but also the Russia of the ordinary people, with a revolutionary Russia, which at the turn of the twentieth century became the centre of the world revolutionary movement, and identified themselves with its progressive democratic culture and its revolutionary liberation

movement.

In Central Asia progressive people soon learned to distinguish between Russia's exploiter classes and the real representatives of the Russian people. They considered that the happiness of their peoples and the development of their land were closely bound with the peoples of Russia. Friendly ties between the Central Asian and Russian peoples grew and became stronger despite the wishes of the tsarist autocracy and the Russian bourgeoisie, who fanned strife between nations.

Turkestan's progressive national intelligentsia and democratic forces began to grow under the influence of Russian democratic culture and the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat led by the Bolshevik Party. The peoples of Central Asia began to awaken to political consciousness and, eventually, their national liberation movement merged with the mainstream of the revolutionary movement in Russia and became one of its components.

The moulding of revolutionary views among the local working masses was largely promoted by political exiles, progressive Russian workers and intellectuals, who brought with them the ideas of Marxism-Leninism. Illegal Bolshevik newspapers, brochures and books, which had been arriving in Turkestan since the beginning of the twentieth century, were

circulated throughout Turkestan.

The Social-Democratic organisations that sprang up in Turkestan played a great role in educating the people politically. Their members carried on propaganda and Party work among the local population. The underground newspapers published by Turkestan's Social-Democratic organisations, in which Bolshevik influence predominated, devoted much attention to the national question, which is one of the most important in Marxist-Leninist policy. They denounced among other things the reactionary national policy of the tsarist autocracy, which preached discrimination against and humiliation of the non-Russian peoples, and the incitement of one nationality against another, and raised the question of emancipating the nations and granting them equal rights.

The system of enslavement and the unbearable national and colonialist exploitation evoked strong protest of the downtrodden peoples. They repeatedly came out against their tyrants. The many years that elapsed from the moment Central Asia was joined to Russia until the October Revolution, were marked by frequent dekhan uprisings against the

colonialists and the local feudal lords and bais.

The working-class movement in Turkestan began to grow under the influence of the maturing revolutionary movement in Russia's industrial centres. Together with their Russian comrades, the non-Russian workers, especially those employed on the railway, came out with demands for better economic conditions. In 1901-03, there were large-scale strikes, particularly in the Transcaspian area, where the first Central Asian railway was completed and put into operation, and where there were railway workshops and depots, a relatively large oil industry, as well as a cotton-ginnery, a creamery and a soap works in the tsar's Murghab estate. There were several thousand stevedores, mostly Azerbaijanians, in the port of Krasnovodsk. Another important factor was the proximity of Baku, which was a large industrial centre already in those days. These strikes were spontaneous and, lacking organisation, were broken by the tsarist authorities.

The class nature of the struggle of the working people in Turkestan became more pronounced during the Revolution of 1905-07. Lenin wrote: "A powerful impetus to the political awakening of the Asian peoples was given by the Russo-

Japanese War and the Russian Revolution."*

Workers of the local nationalities formed a united front with Russian workers in strikes, rallies, demonstrations and marches. Together with the Russian workers they took part in political strikes as, for example, the all-Russia strike in October 1905, the November general political strike in Turkestan and in local political and economic strikes. Workers fought for higher wages, a shorter working day, against illegal lay-offs and harsh, inhuman treatment at the hands of the managements.

Turkestan's working class started a political struggle against tsarism. In Tashkent in 1905 the demonstrations on May Day and on October 18 were held under the slogans: "Down with the Autocracy", "Down with Capitalism" and "Long Live the People in Power". The October demonstration, in which nearly 10,000 people took part, was organised by railwaymen; it was joined by workers and employees of many of the city's enterprises as well as by artisans, students, workers and handicraft workers from the local population. On the following day, October 19, the demonstrators were met, on the orders of the tsarist authorities, with whips and bullets in reply to their peaceful demands for an amnesty for political prisoners, an eight-hour working day, higher wages, a cut in taxes on artisans and small traders, and so on. The shooting of the peaceful demonstration evoked a wave of general indignation. In Ashkhabad (now capital of Turkmenia), Krasnovodsk, Kyzyl-Arvat, Samarkand, Kagan, Kokand, Pishpek (now Frunze, capital of Kirghizia) the workers protested openly.

Despite the attempts of the tsarist authorities to keep the local population away from the general revolutionary struggle, the people were beginning to awake from their age-old sleep; their political and class-consciousness began to develop and they began to appreciate the revolutionary demands of the Russian workers. The colonialists were helpless to thwart the alliance between the Russian and Turkestan proletariat; that alliance grew ever firmer in the joint struggle. This was of the utmost importance to the working people of Central Asia, for the revolutionary movement of the Russian working class in the period of the Revolution of

1905 gave them considerable political experience.

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 15, p. 220.

The working people of Turkestan were beginning to see that not all Russians were their enemies, as the feudal lords and clericals wanted them to believe. They realised that the tsarist autocracy, its officials and all the exploiter classes were not only their enemies, but also the enemies of the

Russian people.

A revolutionary movement began in the villages of Turkestan under the influence of the revolutionary struggle in the towns. The dekhans, reduced to utter despair by colonialist exploitation, came out against the tsarist officials, the gendarmes, the volost heads and the local kulaks, landowners and usurers. The village poor refused to pay taxes, debts or exactions in kind, and land, pastures and hayfields belonging to bais, mosques and diverse religious organisations, were seized by them.

Kazakh and Kirghiz dekhans opposed arbitrary decisions in the agrarian problem. They protested against the lawless seizure of land and demanded the return of confiscated land. The peasants of Turkestan opposed the candidates nominated by the bais for the office of volost head, and demanded new elections, nominating their own representatives. The spontaneous, unorganised national liberation struggle of the dekhans, particularly in 1906 and the ensuing years, was

ruthlessly suppressed by the tsarist government.

The workers' struggle also found a response among the troops of the Turkestan Military Area, who were incited to action mainly because of the bad food and the harsh, contemptuous treatment at the hands of the officers. The mutiny of the Tashkent garrison in mid-November 1905 was a direct outcome of this. It was ruthlessly suppressed. The resultant arrests and executions precipitated a general political strike of railway employees and workers of other industrial enterprises in Turkestan and drew violent protests from the troops of other garrisons and of a number of battalions of railway quards.

Thus, the revolutionary events of 1905-07 drew the peoples of Turkestan into political activity and sparked off the united revolutionary movement of the proletariat of Turkestan and Russia against tsarist oppression and arbitrary rule.

Tsarism was unable to check the revolutionary movement of the peoples of Turkestan and their growing unity with the Russian people either in 1905-07 or during the years when

the Black Hundred reaction went on the rampage. The shooting of the workers at the Lena goldfields in 1912* touched off a new wave of strikes in Turkestan, while the growing revolutionary sentiment among the peasants found expression in more frequent clashes between the dekhans and the hated tsarist officials and local exploiters.

Dissatisfaction with the tsarist policy was so widespread that the authorities expected a national uprising at any time. In the middle of July 1913, the commander of the Turkestan Military Area ordered all regions "to take the strictest measures to maintain internal order and also general measures to prevent anything like what happened in Andijan"**

An outcome of the fresh revolutionary upsurge in Turkestan was the mutiny of the sappers of the Tashkent garrison in July 1912. This mutiny and the brutal reprisals provoked still greater revolutionary unrest among the troops and the

working class.

Social-Democratic study-circles, groups and organisations, which had been hunted in the years of reaction, were reactivated, and new groups began to be formed. They carried on revolutionary propaganda at factories, in military units and among the population at large. Many of them had contact with Tashkent, which in that period continued as a centre of the Social-Democratic movement.

Illegal Bolshevik literature had an extensive circulation, the newspaper Pravda (Truth) being in the greatest demand. Bolshevik publications and propaganda by word of mouth helped the working people of Turkestan to understand the actual situation and to distinguish friend from foe. Slowly but surely they became imbued with the ideas of the revolu-

The Russian proletariat replied to the Lena massacre with mass

political strikes and demonstrations.

^{*} On April 4, 1912, the tsarist authorities ordered troops to fire on the workers of the Bodaibo goldfields on the Lena River in Siberia. The monstrous mistreatment by the owners had forced the workers to strike for better working conditions and higher wages.

^{**} The Andijan uprising flared up in the middle of May 1898, when nearly 2,000 Uzbek and Kirghiz dekhans in Ferghana Province rose against the national and colonial oppression and vicious exploitation by the local feudal lords. But reactionary Muslim clericals, who had great influence over the illiterate masses, succeeded in giving the uprising a religious twist and incited one nation against another. The uprising was crushed.

tionary proletariat and were drawn into the general revolutionary struggle. The *dekhans*, who comprised the bulk of Turkestan's population, were also gradually stirred to action.

The First World War brought with it a further exacerbation of class contradictions. The revolutionary movement, temporarily suspended by the war, began to spread with renewed vigour. The hatred of the working masses for the tsarist government, which was responsible for the hideous exploitation, the rising prices, the diminishing wages and the food crisis, caused an intensification of the revolutionary movement in both the central and outskirt regions of Russia. A revolutionary crisis was approaching. The revolutionary struggle was led by the Communist Party.

At the close of 1915, workers, peasants and revolutionary-minded soldiers began coming out more and more frequently against the tsarist autocracy. The working people of Turke-stan drew ever closer to the Russian working class and intensified their struggle against the common enemy—tsarism—and the local tyrants, bringing the latter to justice and meting out punishment. Though this was undertaken chiefly in defence of economic rights, the non-Russian working masses gradually came to realise that their unbearable condition sprang from the country's socio-economic and political system.

The years 1915 and 1916 witnessed many strikes and revolutionary actions by soldiers and *dekhans*. The rising cost of living precipitated housewives' riots during which shops were wrecked and raided. There were instances of the people gutting the homes of volost heads, *bais* and factory offices, and killing the most hated officials.

Even the slightest attempt to achieve freedom from the colonial yoke elicited savage reprisals. The tsarist government was always quick to come to the assistance of the exploiter classes of nations over whom juridically it had no authority. Thus, in 1915 and then in 1916 it put down rebellions in Khiva. Its troops razed and plundered villages and shot and tortured hundreds of people.

The national liberation movement in Central Asia and Kazakhstan developed into a popular uprising, bringing the class contradictions to a head. This was a manifestation of the crisis of capitalism that was beginning to grip Russia.

The national liberation nature of the uprising was evident almost everywhere. The 1916 uprising was particularly violent in Kirghizia, where it involved primarily the *dekhans* and the urban poor, who came out not only against colonialism but also against exploitation by the *bais, manaps* and usurers.

The 1916 uprising in Central Asia and Kazakhstan, however, was spontaneous and consisted of scattered actions. It lacked the leadership of the working class and had no clear-cut goal, and was, therefore, doomed to failure.

Though strangled by the tsarist government, it was a valuable political lesson for the oppressed peoples of Turkestan, for it showed them that isolated action cannot result in victory. It also taught them how to fight and to distinguish friend from foe, and demonstrated that they could cast off their double yoke only by organising themselves under the leadership of the Communist Party with the help of the Russian proletariat.

THE OCTOBER REVOLUTION AND THE ROLE OF THE MASSES IN THE VICTORY OF SOVIET POWER IN TURKESTAN

The victory of the Great October Socialist Revolution was a natural development both in Turkestan and the whole of Russia. Its objective prerequisites were on hand already in the pre-October period. They stemmed from historical development, and were the inevitable result of the class struggle.

The proletarian revolution in Turkestan was consummated by the working class jointly with the poorest sections of the peasants under the leadership of the Communist Party. Its main striking force was multi-national; it included Russians, Uzbeks, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Turkmenians, Tajiks and other peoples inhabiting the outlying regions of tsarist Russia.

The October Revolution could not have been victorious if the revolutionary masses of Russia's outskirts had not taken the side of Russian working class, if the national liberation movement had not merged with the general revolutionary struggle.

The working people of Central Asia saw in the Soviet rule the guarantee of their freedom and independence and actively joined the struggle for the realisation of Marxist-Leninist ideas thereby helping to establish Soviet power in Turkestan.

Since the establishment of Soviet rule, when the world split into two opposing camps—socialist and capitalist—reactionary bourgeois historians, statesmen and diplomats have been distorting its history and crying down the road traversed by the world's first socialist state.

The torrent of lies, slander and propaganda against the socialist camp is steadily mounting in the capitalist countries.

The achievements of the formerly oppressed Central Asian peoples have a great revolutionary influence on the countries of the East, primarily on young sovereign states, for whom the experience of the once backward colonies of tsarist Russia is a magnificent example, proving that within the lifetime of one generation it is possible to do away with backwardness, poverty, disease and ignorance and to rise to the level of the economically advanced countries.

The growing influence of the Soviet Union, especially of the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, and their successes in the building of a new society mobilise the colonial peoples and accelerate the disintegration of the colonial system. In an effort to retard this process and to retain the key positions in the economy of the rising states, the imperialists are misrepresenting all aspects of Soviet life.

Bourgeois historians resort to primitive methods of falsification and to what they imagine is refined slander and misinformation, calculating primarily to undermine the prestige of the Soviet Union, and stunt the growth of its popularity and authority as a genuine and consistent fighter for the freedom and independence of all oppressed peoples, against aggression and war.

One of the principal theses on which bourgeois falsifiers base their fabrications about the Soviet Union is the assertion that for the non-Russian peoples the October Revolution was foreign in nature and one in which they did not participate, and the allegation that Soviet rule was imposed on them by Russian Bolsheviks.

They represent the October Revolution in Turkestan as accidental and resulting from a Bolshevik conspiracy and the forcible seizure of power by a handful of Bolsheviks.

Baymirza Hayit enlarges upon this version in Turkestan im XX. Iahrhundert.

Walter Kolarz in *Russia and Her Colonies* repeats these allegations when he writes: "The Revolution was a Russian revolution. It was Russian not only in the sense that it took place in Russia, but also in that it was carried out by people who were Russians in the ethnical or cultural sense."*

^{*} Walter Kolarz, Russia and Her Colonies, 3rd ed., London, 1953, p. 7.

This is supported by Olaf Caroe of Britain, Alexander Park of the U.S.A. and other writers who maintain that the October Revolution and the establishment of Soviet rule in Turkestan

were solely the work of Russian Bolsheviks.*

These slanderous statements are refuted by indisputable facts. A study of the files, documents, memoirs and periodicals of those years, especially publications in the languages of the peoples of Central Asia, and of other sources leads to the undeniable conclusion that the social and economic prerequisites for revolution had matured in Turkestan on the eve of the October Revolution. There were more than 45,000 workers, including railwaymen and miners, most of whom were non-Russian; Russians made up only 23 per cent of the workers employed in Turkestan's industries. As has been mentioned earlier, the double exploitation had reduced the greater part of the working masses to poverty. A huge percentage of the rural population consisted of poor peasants. At the same time, the rural exploiter classes and the emergent national bourgeoisie were rapidly accumulating wealth. Land, capital, industrial enterprises and trading firms were in the hands of the bais, usurers, traders and capitalists.

All this sharply aggravated the contradictions between the working masses and their exploiters and facilitated the growth of the revolutionary movement in Central Asia. That was why the revolutionary events in Russia had such a tremendous impact. The existence of classes, the class struggle and the unbearable conditions of the masses in Turkestan caused the revolutionary movement of the Russian proletariat and the other peoples of Russia to merge with the national liberation movement of Central Asia. This was enough to bring about the downfall of the tsarist autocracy and end the

rule of the bourgeoisie.

The October Revolution in Turkestan was part and parcel of the Great October Socialist Revolution due to the community of prerequisites and of the basic laws of development of the revolution, the community of aims, and the unity of the Bolshevik leadership.

But the proletarian revolution in Turkestan, one of the

Nonetheless, by dint of hard work the Bolsheviks of Turkestan made the local working masses class conscious and

drew them into revolutionary activity.

The local workers and the dekhans gladly accepted the leadership of the Russian proletariat because they had been prepared for this in the course of the struggle against tsarism

and the local exploiters.

The overthrow of the tsarist monarchy in February 1917 was an important stage leading towards the socialist revolution in Turkestan. The downfall of the hated autocracy roused the non-Russian peoples to an active political life. "At such times," Lenin said, "the people are capable of performing miracles."** The Uzbek, Tajik, Kazakh, Turkmenian, Kirghiz and other peoples took the road of the October Revolution. Led by the Bolsheviks and assisted by the Russian proletariat, they actively set about establishing Muslim Soviets of Workers' Deputies, trade unions and workers' control over production, and launched a struggle for economic and political rights, against the Provisional Government, which continued to pursue the anti-popular policy.

most backward tsarist colonies, had its own peculiarities and difficulties stemming, primarily, from the social, economic and cultural backwardness, the numerically small, scattered and inexperienced working class, the large admixture of petty-bourgeois elements that was fertile soil for Socialist-Revolutionary and Menshevik* propaganda, the feudal-patriarchal relations in the villages, the consequences of the tsarist colonialist policy, and the enormous influence wielded over the downtrodden masses by the clericals and the national bourgeoisie.

^{*} Socialist-Revolutionaries—members of a petty-bourgeois party founded in Russia in 1902. They denied that there were class contradictions among the peasants, rejected the idea of establishing the dictatorship of the proletariat, refused to recognise the leading role of the working class in the bourgeois-democratic revolution, and preached terrorism as the chief tactical weapon in the fight against the tsarist autocracy.

The Mensheviks were representatives of a petty-bourgeois opportunist trend. They formed a separate group within the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party at its Second Congress in 1903. In the elections to the Party's central bodies the Leninists won the majority (bolshinstvo, hence the name Bolsheviks), while the opportunist group remained in the minority (menshinstvo, hence Mensheviks).

^{**} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 9, p. 113.

^{*} Olaf Caroe, Soviet Empire. The Turks of Central Asia and Stalinism, London, 1953, pp. 91-99; Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, pp. 10, 13.

The most progressive workers joined the Bolshevik groups. The first Bolsheviks in Tashkent were Uzbeks and their names have gone down in history. They include the building workers Anvar Abdusamatov, Teshabai Abdurakhmanov, Achil Babajanov and Jalal Kamalov, the railwayman Mirzaakhmed Mirkhodiev and the Namangan stevedore Abduraz-

zak Khakimbayev.

At the beginning of 1918 many workers joined the Bolshevik Party. Among them were Abdushukur Abdurashidov and Shamurza Khalmukhamedov, tram-car workers in Tashkent, Nasreddin Babajanov, a building worker, Nurmat Khalmuhamedov, a metal worker, Zainutdin Ilyasov, a railwayman, Ghani Turayev, a farm labourer, Doust Ustabayev and Kudratulla Magzumov, Red Armymen stationed in Samarkand and Tashkent respectively.

Following the overthrow of the tsar, with the country under dual power and then ruled solely by the bourgeoisie, the local working people gradually freed themselves from the influence of the Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries, bourgeois nationalists, feudal lords and clerical elements. They began to take increasingly more determined steps in defence of their class interests and for the transfer of power

to the Soviets.

The workers and dekhans began to understand the full significance of the Bolshevik slogans, and worked to implement them. Throughout Turkestan there were demands for an eight-hour working day, higher wages and better working conditions, for land and water. The people opposed the Provisional Government. The September events in Tashkent had

repercussions in many Central Asian towns.

At a mass rally on September 12, 1917, the Uzbek population of the old part of Tashkent supported the Bolshevik resolution calling for the transfer of power to the Soviets, the nationalisation of banks, the confiscation of landed estates and an end to the imperialist war. The Uzbek workers joined the seven-day protest strike against the activity of the Provisional Government's Turkestan Committee which refused to stop the punitive expedition sent to Tashkent to suppress the revolutionary movement. Forty Tashkent trade unions participated in this political strike.

The working class led the struggle for the establishment of Soviet rule in Turkestan. The most organised and united

detachment of the proletariat in Central Asia were the railwaymen, among whom were many workers of the local non-Russian nationalities. Next in line were the workers of the mining, cotton and other industries. Though it was new and numerically small, the Bolshevik-led working class was extremely active in promoting the revolutionary struggle and had a mobilising influence on the urban poor and the dekhans.

An army of many thousands of former labour front workers made up the majority of Turkestan's peasants who joined

the revolutionary movement.

In 1916, under the tsar's edict, more than 100,000 dekhans were mobilised for work on the labour front in Russia's industrial centres and in the front-line areas. Upon returning home after the February Revolution, most of them joined the foremost fighters for the victory of the socialist revolution in Turkestan. Having acquired a knowledge of politics by working together with progressive Russian workers and Bolsheviks, they explained to their kinsmen the slogans of the Communist Party, and the essence of the anti-popular policy of the bourgeois Provisional Government. They helped to consolidate the unity of the Russian and local non-Russian workers and prepare the masses for the forthcoming struggle for Soviet power. Led by the Bolsheviks, former labour front workers set up revolutionary non-Russian workers' organisations in opposition to the counter-revolutionary organisations of the national bourgeoisie and clericals.

Soldiers of the garrisons of Tashkent, Perovsk (Kzyl-Orda), Fort Kushka and other towns and settlements of Turkestan fought on the side of the proletarian revolution. Revolutionary-minded soldiers quickly reacted to all the political events in the country, put up organised resistance to the counterrevolutionary policy of the Provisional Government and its Turkestan Committee and demanded that power be trans-

ferred to the Soviets.

The armed uprising of the workers, the urban poor and revolutionary soldiers in Tashkent, which was the centre of political activity in Central Asia, ended in victory on November 1 (14), 1917, after four days of bitter fighting in face of immense difficulties. Following Tashkent, Soviet rule was established in Termez, Katta-Kurgan, Perovsk, Ashkhabad, Ferghana and other towns and settlements of Turkestan, with the exception of Khiva and Bukhara, where the revolution was accomplished in 1920.

The overwhelming majority of Turkestan's working population joyously greeted the victory of the October Socialist Revolution. Numerous rallies and meetings passed resolutions

approving and supporting Soviet power.

One such resolution, for example, was adopted by the workers and employees of the 18th track maintenance section, the Party committee of the Central Asian and Tashkent railway junction, and the workers of the Khojayev factory at the railway station of Gorchakovo. "We, Muslim workers," they wrote, "have unanimously decided to support the Workers' Government with every means at our disposal.... We stretch our hand out to the Russian proletariat, in whom we illiterate Muslims see the real defender of the working class. It had delivered us from the whip of the official and the fist of the bai." They resolved to give part of their earnings to aid the families of the men who were killed or wounded during the revolutionary fighting in Tashkent. An analogous resolution was passed by the Kushka Soviet of Workers' and Soldiers' Deputies.

Abdurakhman Musayev, a veteran of the October Revolution who is now on pension, recalls that the victory of the revolutionary workers, soldiers and the Tashkent poor over the counter-revolutionary Turkestan Committee was greeted

with joy by the people.

Together with the Russian working class, the working masses of Turkestan fought for their rights against the antipopular Provisional Government in the period of preparation for the October Revolution. Later they fought on the barricades and helped to build, consolidate and defend Soviet power. They made their contribution to the fight against the counter-revolution, which attempted to depose by various means the Workers' and Peasants' Government, and took part in building up Turkestan's armed forces.

After the victory of the October armed uprising, Red Guard detachments were formed and grew in number throughout Turkestan. These detachments included both Russians and non-Russians. This fact had to be admitted even by reactionary bourgeois historians, who dispute the participation of the local working people in the Revolution. Baymirza Havit, for example, writes that non-Russians, too, also enlisted in the Red Guard detachments.*

The following facts completely refute the allegations of reactionary historians. By January 1918, in Tashkent alone there were nearly 3,000 Red Guardsmen, 600 of whom were Uzbeks. A Red Guard unit of 200 men, all of them Uzbeks from the old part of Tashkent, was formed in January 1918 to combat a counter-revolutionary organisation known as Ulema that attempted to seize power. Red Guard detachments were formed in Andijan, Kokand, Skobelev, Charjou, Novaya Bukhara, Samarkand, Turkestan, Khojent, Ashkhabad, Kushka, Petro-Alexandrovsk, Verny and other towns and settlements of Turkestan. All of them included non-Russians. In Skobelev, for example, the proportion between Russians and Uzbeks in the armed detachments was two to one.

The proportion was the same in other detachments. There was an especially large number of Uzbek workers in the Red Guard detachments in Ferghana Province, where their formation was directly linked up with the appearance of the Kokand Autonomous Government. More than 60 per cent of the Red Guards in Kokand were Uzbeks, Tajiks and

Kirghiz.

In Samarkand, Charjou and Novaya Bukhara, Red Guard detachments were formed to counter the threat to the Revolution from Colonel Zaitsev's White-Cossack units which were returning home from Khiva and Iran. The Cossacks were used by the counter-revolutionaries to disarm Samarkand and Tashkent, arrest the people's commissars and seize power.

The number of Red Guard detachments steadily increased. In Turkestan at the beginning of 1918 there were about 5,000 Red Guardsmen, but at the end of the year their number rose

to 10,000.

In their "researches" on what they term as the Turkestan problem, bourgeois historians speak at length about the counter-revolutionary Kokand Autonomy. They portray it as the spokesman of the peoples of Turkestan, claiming that it fought only for its independence and intended to do a great deal for the people.** Bourgeois literature characterises the

^{*} Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt, 1956, pp. 73-81. ** *Ibid.*, pp. 59-70.

Kokand Autonomy as "the first organised native opposition to the Soviet Regime".* The author of these lines, Alexander Park, an American bourgeois historian, forgets an important detail. He says nothing about who these "natives" were. He also passes over in silence the fact that the counter-revolutionary "Autonomy" was established mainly by the exploiter classes in order to retain their former power and wealth, which they had acquired by mercilessly exploiting the poor.

The so-called Autonomous Government elected by the Fourth Territorial Muslim Convention, staged to appear as an all-Muslim convention, vividly revealed the social composition of the leadership of this counter-revolutionary movement. The "Government" consisted of enemies of the working class-rich traders, cotton dealers, bankers, manufacturers, clericals, whiteguards, Socialist-Revolutionaries, Mensheviks and Jadid-Pan-Turkists. A third of the posts in it were filled by representatives of the Russian bourgeoisie and whiteguards. Thus, the question arises: whose interests did the Kokand Autonomy represent and promote?

Feudal and clerical elements and the local national bourgeoisie became active immediately after the First Russian Revolution. They wanted to use the national liberation movement as a means of retaining their privileges and property.

A bourgeois-nationalistic organisation called Shura-i-Islamia (Council of Islam) was set up in old Tashkent in March 1917. It represented the commercial and industrial bourgeoisie and had branches in many towns of Turkestan. The clerical party-Shura-i-Ulema (Clerical Council)—was founded some time later. Both these organisations maintained close ties with former tsarist officials, Pan-Turkists and Pan-Islamists from other countries and were supported by the Constitutional-Democrats (Cadets)** and the Monarchists.***
They had the backing of Ittihad (Union), a Pan-Turkist organ-

isation of primarily Turkish officers who had been prisoners

The aim of these anti-popular organisations was to form a national-religious autonomy. While the Council of Islam agreed to carry out certain reforms in education and the way of life to meet the requirements of capitalist development, the Ulemists, using the laws of the Shariat as a screen, shrewdly played on the national and religious feelings of the local population, fomented national discord and violently opposed all reforms. Nonetheless, both organisations were united in the struggle against the rising revolutionary movement and the approaching socialist revolution.

The landowners, clericals and the national bourgeoisie wanted to use the people's discontent with the anti-popular policy of the Provisional Government to achieve their own ends. In doing so they followed the Pan-Turkist ideology which claimed that the people of Turkestan belonged to a single Turkic nation and should unite with other Turkic

peoples under the aegis of Turkey.

The leaders of the local exploiter classes protested against any change in the deep-rooted foundations of the old way of life. In particular, the Ulemists, who belonged to the most reactionary and conservative part of the bourgeoisie and high clergy, demanded complete inviolability of the precepts of Islam, the mediaeval way of life, feudal property and the

oppressed status of women.

Spurred on by their hatred for the socialist revolution, the enemies of the people did not stop at cold-blooded murder. In September 1917, the Ulemists in Kokand killed five agitators, who were urging the working Muslims to unite in the elections to the Municipal Council. Shamsitdin Ibragimov, member of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party of Bolsheviks since 1917 and one of the first members of the Samarkand Soviet of Workers', Dekhans' and Soldiers' Deputies, was shot by members of the Shura-i-Islamia. They also sentenced to death 16 Red partisans of Samarkand, who had been active in the fight for the rights of the working people and in exposing the counter-revolutionary organisations as enemies of the people.

The bourgeois nationalists, landowners and clericals formulated their political demands at congresses of the Shurai-Islamia and Ulema, held in Tashkent, on April 16-23 and

^{*} Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, pp. 21-22.

^{**} Cadets were members of the Constitutional-Democratic Party, the chief party of the imperialist bourgeoisie in Russia. It was founded in 1905.

^{***} Members of the Monarchist Party, a counter-revolutionary organisation formed in Russia in 1905. It was the spokesman of the big landowners, high tsarist officials and higher clergy, and championed the absolute monarchy.

on October 19, 1917, respectively. Leaders of the Shura-Islamic congress-Mustafa Chokaev, Ubaidulla Khodjayev and Munavarkari Abdurashidkhanov-welcomed the formation of the Provisional Government in Russia and approved

its policy with regard to Turkestan.

In a move to belittle and weaken the class struggle, members of both organisations appealed to all Muslims to unite in a single bourgeois-landowner Turkic state, where behind the screen of the laws of the Shariat it would have been easier to drain the life-blood of their brothers who were not divided

by "holy Islam into castes and classes".

Together with Russian Constitutional-Democrats, the Socialist-Revolutionaries and other enemies of the people, the local exploiter classes pledged themselves to defend the Provisional Government. The Muslim battalion, which had been formed before the Revolution by the bourgeois nationalists, acted in concert with the whiteguards to incite the local working people against the Revolution. But the rallies and meetings organised by them failed miserably. The local working people were beginning to understand the true aims of their "protectors", to distinguish between friend and foc, and instead of siding with the bourgeois nationalists still further strengthened their friendly ties with the Russian working people.

Meanwhile the bourgeois nationalists, the Mensheviks and the Socialist-Revolutionaries made a bid for power after the victory of the armed uprising in Tashkent. At a conference on November 2, 1917, convened by the Menshevik and Socialist-Revolutionary Territorial Soviet and attended by the members of the bourgeois-nationalist Territorial Soviet of Muslim Deputies, a territorial executive committee consisting of Menshevik, Socialist-Revolutionary and bourgeois-nationalist elements was elected to govern the territory. But this manoeuvre failed. The working people of Tashkent gave their support to the Tashkent Soviet of Workers' and Sol-

diers' Deputies.

The counter-revolutionaries in Turkestan, headed by bourgeois-nationalist, feudal and clerical leaders, began to muster their forces and plan the overthrow of Soviet rule and the restoration of feudal and capitalist supremacy. A special place in these plans was assigned to the Kokand Autonomy.

Using the slogan of autonomy as a screen, the counter-revolution in Turkestan wanted, first of all, to restore private ownership of land and means of production, make the Shariat the basis of the laws of legal procedure, perpetuate the enslavement of women, restore the old Kokand Khanate, establish a Central Asian caliphate to include Persia, Baluchistan, Bukhara, Khiva and Turkestan, unite all Muslims and secede from Russia.* These demands were reflected in the programme drawn up by the Kokand autonomists.

The Kokand Autonomous Government, which nursed hopes of stifling Soviet rule and resurrecting the old regime with the assistance of the external and internal counter-revolution, maintained its alliance with Bukhara and Khiva, which became a nest for all anti-Soviet forces in Central Asia and a stronghold of international imperialism after the October Revolution. The Kokand Autonomy received financial and military aid from the Khan and the Emir, who in their turn

obtained this aid from abroad.

The Kokand Government was party to the plan of forming the South-Eastern Union to include immense territories of Soviet Russia. It established contact with the "Military Government of the Orenburg Cossack Army" and was to

take part in overthrowing Soviet power.

The Orenburg "government" sent its representative to the autonomists' congress to clinch the union, while the Foreign Minister of the Kokand Autonomous Government went to Orenburg in December 1917 for personal talks with Ataman Dutov** on military aid. Dutov promised to support the Kokand autonomists against Soviet Turkestan and to send units of Orenburg and Turghai Cossacks to their assistance.

* Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt, 1956,

^{**} Dutov was the General Staff Colonel of the tsarist army and Ataman of the Orenburg Cossack Army. After the October Revolution he mustered together the counter-revolutionary forces from among the kulak elements of the Orenburg Cossack Army and, on instructions from the Anglo-American imperialists through the "military and diplomatic missions" in Tashkent, organised a military campaign against Soviet Russia with the objective of seizing the Urals, Bashkiria and Turkestan. Dutov's short-lived rule was marked by terror with regard to revolutionary workers and peasants. His army cut Soviet Turkestan off from Russia three times, but it was finally routed by the Red Army, which included Red Guard detachments from Tashkent and other towns in Turkestan.

At the end of December, the "Government of the Cossack Army" instructed Cossack units to support the Kokand autonomists in their fight against Soviet rule. Colonel Zaitsev, former commander of Russian troops in Khiva and ex-Commissar of the Provisional Government in the Khiva Khanate, was put in command of the operations of the White-Cossack bands. After overthrowing Soviet rule in several towns, he turned them over to the Autonomous Government, whose head, Mustafa Chokaev, arrived in Charjou to welcome the White Cossacks.

Ubaidulla Khojayev, the autonomists' War Minister, was sent to Samarkand to persuade the Cossacks, who had captured the city, to come over to his side* and, at the same time, to evolve with their commanders a plan for over-

throwing Soviet power in the whole of Turkestan.

The autonomists also contacted the secret Turkestan Military Organisation, which was planning a counter-revolutionary coup in Turkestan. The Kokand Autonomous Government was supported by other states, receiving weapons, equipment and money from the British imperialists. The newspaper *Hurriat*, for instance, reported that the Kokand Government received half a million rubles from Britain via Iran.

The autonomists did not conceal their ties with the foreign invaders. On the contrary, by boasting about them they hoped to increase their influence over the masses and demonstrate that they were not alone and were therefore strong. Early in January 1918, Shukurkhan Khazrat, a member of the Ulema, frankly stated at a meeting at the Jami *Medresseh* in Kokand that the "autonomists are not alone; they have the support of Britain".

Britain gave the Kokand Autonomous Government her backing, for she counted on its help in forming a "democratic" Turkestan republic headed by an elective president after Soviet power had been overthrown. Furthermore, the republic was to be Britain's exclusive sphere of influence with a status similar to that of the British and French colonies in Africa and Asia.

The British imperialists gave financial and military aid to all anti-Soviet forces, issued instructions through numerous

spies and saboteurs as well as through various missions and organisations, and gradually threaded their way through to Central Asia. They armed pro-British Afghan officers and soldiers and sent them to Bukhara to help the Emir. Planning to invade the Caucasus and Turkestan via Iran, Britain concentrated large army units in India and Egypt under General Malleson and moved them into north-eastern Iran under the pretext of "protecting" that country from an alleged threat by Germany and Turkey.

Considerable Anglo-French forces were concentrated at Kashgar and Kulja in China. The British headquarters set up in Kulja worked out plans for intervention in Turkestan and the organisation of aid to the autonomists. The drive on Tashkent was to start from Kulja through Semirechye. The former Russian consul in Kulja was to arrange passage for

Allied and Chinese forces heading for Turkestan.

The Kokand Autonomous Government was supported by the U.S.A. as well. Having stretched their feelers out to Soviet Russia, the U.S. imperialists aided and abetted all sorts of bourgeois "autonomous" set-ups, and like the British wanted to seize Soviet Turkestan and turn it into a colony. The official instructions concerning Central Asia received by the U.S. delegation to the Paris Peace Conference said in part: "It may well be that some power will have to be given a limited mandate to act as protector."*

Colonel House in his Intimate Papers admitted that the occupation of the Trans-Siberian Railway by U.S. troops was a measure of support for the "autonomous" administrations in South-Eastern Russia, including the Kokand Autonomous Government. Thus, the latter enjoyed the backing of many imperialist powers which, with the assistance of internal counter-revolutionary forces in Turkestan, wanted to parcel the young Soviet republic out among themselves. For the whiteguards and foreign imperialists "the distant frontiers of the new socialist state were a base and a refuge from where they could increase their attacks on the rule established by the October Revolution".**

^{*} A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47, p. 365.

^{*} The Intimate Papers of Colonel House, London, 1928, Vol. IV,

^{**} Marcel Egretaud, L'Orient Soviétique, Kazakhstan-Ouzbékistan-Kirghizie-Tadjikistan-Turkménistan-Azerbaidjan, Paris, 1959, p. 84.

A campaign was in the making against Soviet Turkestan imperilling the gains of the Revolution and involving the destiny of the Central Asian peoples—either they would remain free, or would once more fall into colonial slavery. The people themselves had to decide their destiny: everything depended on whether the broad masses of the local population would support the bourgeois autonomy or rise to the defence of Soviet power.

Alexander Park and other bourgeois historians of his ilk falsely claim that the Kokand Government enjoyed great

popularity with the masses.*

Nothing came of the attempts of the national bourgeoisie and the feudal landowners and clericals to win over the masses, incite them against the Russian people and enlist

their help to overthrow Soviet power.

After the February Revolution, and especially after the October Revolution, the national bourgeoisie appealed to the masses to safeguard "common national" interests and tried to stir them up against the Russian "infidels". These were mere words of "concern" for the people. Actually, the bourgeoisic tried to coerce the people to submission, aiming to preserve its own prerogatives. Through agitation, religious sermons, threats, blackmail and terror the autonomists tried to induce the people to follow them.

A vivid illustration of what the working people of both town and country felt for the Kokand Autonomous Government was their boycott of the "state" loan and their refusal to enlist in its armed forces, which were in the process of formation. Despite pressure, violence, threats and reprisals, the people subscribed to only about a third of the 30,000,000-

ruble loan floated by the Kokand Government.

The voluntary enlistment into the army announced by the government was also a complete failure. Most of its 60-man regular "army" were soldiers of Persian extraction or Caucasians. But there was no shortage of officers and military instructors, for Russian whiteguards and ex-p.o.w.'s. Turkish officers hastened to offer their services to the Kokand Government.

In the end the autonomists had to form a mercenary army consisting of adventurers and criminals. The formation of a

"national militia" was entrusted to an inveterate criminal called Irgash. This fact is mentioned by Joseph Castagné, a French spy and an agent of the imperialist powers. He wrote:

"Fearing the Bolshevik threat, the Kokand Government entered into negotiations with the *Basmachis**.... [It] invited them into its service, thus creating the nucleus of the national army.... Irgash was among the first to respond to this appeal; an out-and-out bandit, who had served a term of imprisonment, he knocked together a formidable band of professional thieves."**

Essentially, the basmachi movement was founded and

promoted by the Kokand Autonomous Government.

The ordinary people refused to be led by the local bourgeoisie and supported Soviet rule: the *dekhans* from the villages around Kokand refused to supply food, horses and forage to the "government"; those living in the vicinity of the Santo mines vigilantly protected them against raids by the autonomists; in Ferghana Province the people armed them-

selves and guarded the railway and bridges.

In Turkestan the masses never had any sympathy for the Kokand Autonomous Government, and eventually turned away from it altogether. Though they could not fully understand the objectives of the Kokand "administration", the people felt that the exploiters had no intention of looking after their interests, and it was not long before they received proof of this. The growth of the class consciousness of the people was accelerated by the programme demands and activities of the autonomists directed against Soviet rule and the working people. Realising that their position and interests were being threatened, the people became more determined than ever before to support Soviet rule and strengthened their ties with the Russian working masses.

Proof of the people's opposition to the counter-revolutionary bourgeois Kokand Autonomous Government and their friendly feelings towards the Russians, is given in the eyewitnesses' accounts. Perfiliev, the Military Commissar of Turkestan, who came into close contact with the people during tours of some of its provinces, wrote: "The working people are with the Russian proletariat and want only proletarian autonomy."

** Joseph Castagné, Les Basmatchis, Paris, 1925, p. 14.

^{*} Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, p. 22.

^{*} Armed gangs. The name is derived from the Uzbek verb basmak, meaning to oppress, to plunder.

In this connection, the conclusion drawn by Chanyshev, commander of the armed forces of the Autonomous Government, is interesting. He wrote: "The Provisional Government of Turkestan has no authority or influence over the people. . . .

The Muslims have no antagonism towards Russians."

The attitude of Turkestan's working population towards the Kokand Autonomous Government was shown at the Fourth Territorial Congress of Soviets held on January 19-25, 1918. The delegates spoke of the fraternal unity of the workers of all nationalities in the fight against all bourgeoisnationalistic and whiteguard bands, and the solidarity of the peoples of Central Asia with the working class of Russia. They enthusiastically subscribed to the words of F. I. Kolesov, Chairman of the Council of People's Commissars, who said that the Kokand Autonomous Government should be disposed of as soon as possible and Soviet autonomy established in the territory. The delegate of the Bairam-Ali Soviet of Working People's Deputies said: "Bairam-Ali with its population of 18,000 recognises the autonomy of Turkestan, but not the one arbitrarily proclaimed by the bais and Russian adventurists. We wholly support the autonomy that will be proclaimed by the Russian and Muslim proletariat."

Resolutions protesting against the Kokand Autonomous Government and supporting Soviet rule were passed at work-

ers' meetings and conferences throughout Turkestan.

In the period when the Kokand Autonomous Government was being formed, the workers of Kokand published a letter in Nasha Gazeta (Our Newspaper) under the heading "Sentiments of the Muslim Proletariat", in which they asked the Russian workers for assistance. "If the Russians recognise the bourgeois Kokand Autonomous Government," they wrote, "it would mean that the native workers would forever become the slaves of bais."

The congress of Uzbek workers' organisations of Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr Darya provinces, convened at the same time as the Kokand congress of the autonomists, protested against the formation of the Kokand Autonomous Government. The Jizak Zemstvo* Council unanimously passed a vote of confidence in the Workers' and Peasants' Government. The dekhans of Ferghana Province, Andijan District, spoke of Soviet rule as the one and only protector of the toiling masses and pledged their support for it.

Though vigorously backed by both the internal and external counter-revolution and a force of 2,000 basmachis, the Kokand Government could not last long without the support of the people. When the autonomists openly came out against Soviet rule, the working people of town and country turned away from them and helped to rout the counter-revolution.

True, the most backward sections of the population, who remained under the influence of Muslim clericals during the first months of Soviet rule, blindly followed them and fought on the side of the autonomists. But those were small, isolated groups. The majority of the population, among whom Russian and native Bolsheviks did much explanatory work, sided

with the Soviets.

In the period of decisive battles between the Red Army and the forces of the autonomists, the inhabitants of old Kokand turned a deaf ear to the calls of the clericals and feudals for a "jihad" against the "infidels". Irgash, who succeeded Chokaev as head of the Kokand Government, ordered the people to be driven into fighting by force. But whips proved useless. The poorest sections of Kokand's population, organised in the Union of Muslim Working People headed by Yusup Pavur Shamsitdinov, Tashpulat Urazbayev, Fazil Matkabilov and others, fought side by side with the Red Guard detachments.

The working population of many other towns and regions also took part in routing the Kokand Autonomous Government.

A wave of rallies and meetings denouncing the Kokand Autonomous Government swept across Turkestan. This confirmed the fact that the ordinary people had nothing to do with the autonomists and that they wholeheartedly sup-

ported Soviet power.

At a rally in March 1918, Uzbek workers representing 15 trade unions of Kokand branded the Kokand Autonomous Government and its organisers. Its resolution, adopted unanimously, stressed that "this shady enterprise of the bourgeoisie, the bais and the Ulema, led by glib outsiders and in collaboration with bandit gangs, is guilty before mankind of an unpardonable and inexpiable crime. . . . Therefore, we Muslim workers and employees curse all these adventurers and recognise the Russian Workers' and Peasants' Social

^{*} Zemstvos-local self-government bodies.

(Socialist–*Kh. I.*) Republic and are subject only to the rule of the Soviets." The meeting elected a committee of inquiry and decided to open workers' canteens, tea-rooms and bakeries catering at reduced prices, a labour exchange and a conciliation chamber.*

At a meeting in Chernyaev, Syr Darya Province, over 2,000 Uzbek workers expressed their full trust in and whole-hearted support for Soviet power, which had proved that it was their friend and protector. They declared that it was imperative to form a workers' party representing the Uzbek poor, so that enemy sorties of all kinds could be resisted by joint effort.

All trade unions in Samarkand expressed support for Soviet power and their readiness to take up arms in its defence if necessary.

In the first half of April, the Third Territorial Congress of Post and Telegraph Workers proclaimed its recognition of Soviet power as the only legitimate one, condemned the saboteurs who refused to work in Soviet institutions and declared that it was ready to come to the defence of Soviet power. The extraordinary conference of people's judges, volost heads, village headmen and aksakals of Kokand and its district, adopted a resolution recognising and supporting Soviet rule. It said that inasmuch as the Council of People's Commissars-the central government of Russia and Turkestan -expressed the interests of the workers and enacted just economic laws directed at making the life of the workers and the indigent classes easier, "we render this power full recognition; we are grateful to it and welcome it, and declare that, arm in arm with the Russian population, we shall support and defend it with every means at our disposal".

Consequently, the above-mentioned historical facts testifying that the "autonomy" was nothing but the first attempt of the internal and external counter-revolution to overthrow Soviet power, are the best reply to the falsifiers who irresponsibly describe the Kokand Autonomous Government as "the first organised native opposition to the Soviet regime".*
It was an attempt of the imperialist states, primarily of Britain and the U.S.A., to get the dethroned exploiter classes to help them carry out their predatory plan of making Turkestan a colony and a springboard for an offensive against Soviet Russia. Historical facts clearly show that this venture of the enemies of Soviet rule not only lacked the sympathy and support of the majority of the working people but was also condemned by them and sustained a crushing defeat at their hands.

Central Asia's working masses jubilantly welcomed the establishment of a genuinely autonomous republic, a Soviet republic, at the close of April 1919 by the Fifth Territorial Congress of Soviets, whose government served the people and not some privileged classes.

The Congress endorsed the basic rights of the Turkestan

Autonomous Republic, which were:

1) The right to promulgate laws; 2) the right of sovereign administration of its territory, of its lands, waters and peoples; 3) the right to institute official posts and fix salaries; and 4) the right to elect official representatives to all branches of the administration, with the exception of the federal administration, but with the right to recall and control official representatives of the federal administration.

The establishment of the Soviet Autonomous Republic of Turkestan was an event of major political importance ushering in a new stage in the history of Central Asian peoples and marking the first step on the road of the territory's political, economic and cultural progress. The proclamation of Turkestan an Autonomous Soviet Republic and its voluntary accession to the Russian Federation on the basis of equality, initialled the formation of Soviet national statehood of its peoples, the shaping of socialist nations, and promoted the growth and consolidation of friendship and co-operation between the peoples of Turkestan and all the other peoples of the Soviet Union.

With the formation of Soviet Turkestan its working people were drawn into the mainstream of socialist construction. "By proclaiming the territory of Turkestan part of the great

^{*} Conciliation chambers existed in the first years of Soviet power. They were institutions organised on consent between employers and trade unions to settle conflicts arising from the signing and interpretation of collective agreements and from amendments of these agreements. They also handled conflicts arising from existing or changed working conditions, which could not be settled by wage rate conflict commissions,

^{*} Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, pp. 21-22.

R.S.F.S.R.," wrote *Nasha Gazeta*, "the Fifth Congress of Soviets placed the fate of Turkestan into the hands of its people and thus placed them in the ranks of active fighters for the cause of the world proletariat." Following its accession to the R.S.F.S.R., and becoming its inseparable and organic part, the Turkestan Republic achieved full freedom and independence. It was no longer threatened with enslavement by foreign imperialists, and its peoples protected by the peace-loving U.S.S.R. joined the family of Soviet nations in building a new life.

The proclamation of Turkestan as a Soviet Autonomous Republic was festively welcomed by the people. On May 1, 1918, this event was marked with rallies and meetings in towns and villages throughout Central Asia. The people expressed eternal solidarity, friendship and co-operation with the Russian people. "We shall learn from you," declared representatives of the Central Asian population at the Fifth Congress of Soviets, "only stretch your hand out to us. Once, we Muslims were terribly oppressed. After the overthrow of tsarism nothing changed in our lives. Now, when we have more or less matured and have come to understand everything, we are here. Today our hands are stretched to each other and we shall remain together for ever."

Workers of all nationalities living in Tashkent staged a grandiose demonstration to mark the proclamation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, and a flag was raised in Revolution Square. At a rally in Samarkand, more than 4,000 representatives of the town and country poor

adopted a resolution, which said:

"We the Muslim and European proletariat of Samarkand, fully appreciating the necessity for active work now that the proletariat of Russia has granted autonomy to the territory of Turkestan, and acknowledging that only under the banner of Bolshevism and in co-operation with Soviet power can the cause of the local proletariat be realised, by this unanimous vote demonstrate our readiness at any time to join the ranks of the revolutionary proletariat led by the Bolsheviks, and solemnly declare that we recognise only Soviet rule, which we shall support in every respect."

The Soviets of Working People's Deputies in the localities also welcomed the establishment of the Autonomous Republic. The Soviets of Andijan, Samarkand, Charjou and other towns

sent congratulatory telegrams to the Central Executive Committee and the Council of People's Commissars of Turkestan.

After the formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, its working population embarked upon economic and cultural development. Representatives of local nationalities worked in the Soviets, running affairs of state, and the influence of Soviet rule spread to the most out-of-

the-way villages.

The Communist Party's national policy which conformed with the interests of the peoples, ensured the assimilation of the ideas of the Revolution by the masses who were now turning away from conciliatory parties and various antipopular groups. Paying no heed to the increased agitation of the bais, clergy and other anti-popular elements, who did their utmost to distort the significance, aims and purposes of the Soviet autonomy in Turkestan, the local population rallied round the Bolsheviks and the Soviets.

The ignominious rule of the Kokand Autonomous Government offered convincing proof that the Communist Party was the true defender of the interests of the working class and peasantry and that it was the only party that led them

along the correct road.

Reactionary foreign historians have spent large quantities of ink on the basmachi movement, devoting articles, brochures, parts of books and whole books to it. They include: Joseph Castagné, Les Basmatchis, Paris, 1925; F. M. Bailey, Mission to Tashkent, London, 1946; A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47; Baymirza Hayit, Turkestan im XX. Jahrhundert, Darmstadt, 1956; Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957; Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, London, 1957; "The Basmachis, The Central Asian Resistance Movement 1918-1924", Central Asian Review, 1959, Vol. VII, No. 3, pp. 236-50.

These and similar "treatises" are clumsy falsifications of the history of the civil war in Central Asia and the history of the *basmachi* movement. Adulterating the social origin of that counter-revolutionary nationalistic movement, bourgeois historians endeavour to depict it as a national liberation

struggle of the Central Asian peoples.

Ahmad Zeki Velidi Togan, who was one of its most active

participants, attributes to it precisely such features. He writes that "the basmachi movement was an immense national movement which, in the years 1918-23, attracted all forces that

were capable of energetic action".*

U.S. Air Force Colonel Charles Warren Hostler, who was awarded the Ph. D. for his Turkism and the Soviets, upholds Veli Kajum-Khan (Kayum-han), Chairman of the National Turkestanian Unity Committee, who calls the basmachis "...these remarkable fighters for national liberty", and claims that "all tribes without exception took part in this movement for liberation".**

. Let us briefly examine the social origin of the basmachis and establish what support and sympathy they received from

the masses.

As we have already noted, the basmachi gangs gladly served the Kokand Autonomous Government, which encouraged their bandit activities and paid them not only by the day but also by the number of bullets expended by them.

Under the Kokand "administration" the basmachis became a political force. They became a military bastion of the exploiter classes, who had been deposed by the October Revolution, and a link in the struggle of the internal and external counter-revolution against Soviet rule. British imperialism, which aimed to seize Turkestan and utilise it as a springboard for an offensive on Central Russia, was the inspirer and virtual organiser of the basmachi movement as of the civil war and the foreign intervention in Central Asia.

In mid-1918 Turkestan was encircled by fronts. Communication with Russia was disrupted, and the already difficult economic, military and political situation deteriorated

still further.

of the revolt of the Czechoslovak Corps*** to recapture Orenburg and menace Aktyubinsk and Semirechye. The Aktyubinsk Front was formed to fight them.

Early in July 1918, Dutov's Cossack units took advantage

* A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47, p. 471. ** Charles Warren Hostler, Turkism and the Soviets, London, 1957,

The counter-revolutionary sally of Dutov's bands was followed by an anti-Soviet revolt engineered by the British in the Transcaspian area. The Mensheviks, Socialist-Revolutionaries and bourgeois nationalists temporarily came to power in Ashkhabad and Kysyl-Arvat. The Right-wing Socialist-Revolutionary Funtikov became the head of the new "government". On August 12, 1918, British occupation troops invaded the Transcaspian area and later, when more troops were moved into Ashkhabad, General Malleson transferred his headquarters to that city. The British and the new "government" planned to snuff out Soviet rule in Turkestan. and started military operations to achieve that aim. Consequently, a second front was formed in Turkestan. Initially it was called the Ashkhabad or Southern Front but was later renamed into the Transcaspian Front.

A tense situation developed in Semirechye, in North-Eastern Turkestan, where whiteguard and kulak revolts were instigated by the whiteguards, kulaks, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries, who acted on orders from the U.S. and British imperialists. The U.S. imperialists operated through Treadwell, the Consul for the United States in Tashkent, and secret service agents in Sinkiang, while the British acted through Colonel Bailey, who arrived in Tashkent from India on a "friendly" mission. Bailey conducted his espionage and subversive activities under the pretext of studying the territory and establishing friendly ties. His mission maintained close ties with the British Consulate in Kashgar and with General Malleson, Commander of the British forces in Northern Iran, who had signed an agreement with the Transcaspian whiteguards on joint operations against Soviet rule in Turkestan.

The White Cossack units, invading the northern areas of Semirechye, fomented revolts in the wealthy Cossack settlements in June 1918. A large part of Semirechye fell to the rebels, who were in contact with Osipov, a traitor who had wormed his way into a high post in the Turkestan Govern-

^{***} The Czechoslovak Corps, over 40,000 strong, had been formed during World War I from Czech and Slovak war prisoners and other troops who had voluntarily gone over to the Russians. When peace was signed with Germany, the Soviet Government permitted the

Czechoslovaks to leave for France via Siberia and the Far East. The imperialists, however, made a deal with their commanders, under which the latter agreed to turn the corps against Soviet power. This was done by spreading the rumour that the Soviet Government intended to turn the corps over to Austria-Hungary. The revolt broke out at the end of May 1918, and was put down by the Red Army in the autumn of 1918.

ment, and with Kolchak and Annenkov, leaders of the counter-revolution in Siberia. The Semirechye Front was formed to combat the kulak revolts and the whiteguards.

Having declared themselves "independent" states, the Bukhara Emirate and the Khiva Khanate continued to pursue a hostile policy towards Soviet Turkestan. Directed and actively assisted by the British imperialists, they feverishly prepared for military action against Soviet power. They believed that an armed struggle against the new government in Russia, chiefly against the government of the Turkestan Republic, would protect them from the revolutionising ideas of the socialist revolution.

Right until the revolutions that broke out in Khiva and Bukhara in 1920, the foreign imperialists used the territories and the reactionary forces of the Emirate and the Khanate for attacks against Soviet Turkestan. With the approval of the British,* Junaid Khan, the supreme commander and absolute ruler of Khiva, led several armed attacks on Soviet Turkestan. At the close of November 1918, his troops captured Nukus, Chimbai and laid siege to Petro-Alexandrovsk (now Turtkul) for 11 days. Under the Anglo-American plan, his troops were to capture Charjou and to cut off the Transcaspian Front from Tashkent, a key strategic point in Central Asia. These plans came to nothing. But Junaid's bands continued their raids even after he was routed by Soviet troops.

A similar situation obtained in Bukhara which, as was mentioned earlier, the British likewise planned to use against Soviet rule. They promised to instal the Emir as head of the Turkestan Republic, to be established as a British protectorate following the overthrow of Soviet power. Constantly violating the Kzyltepa Peace Treaty, signed with Soviet Turkestan, the Emir hastily equipped his army, bringing its strength up to 50,000 and stationing it near the frontier with Soviet Turkestan, provoking border conflicts and preparing to start military operations.

Simultaneously, basmachi bands stepped up their activity. Their movement gained its greatest momentum in Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr Darya provinces, and then in Eastern Bukhara and in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya. The

An example of this bitter class struggle was the fight of the Turkestan exploiters, deposed by the Revolution, against the new state system and the dictatorship of the proletariat. Their favourite methods were sudden raids on poorly protected localities, murder, destruction of whole villages, arson, robbery and other brutal actions, hence the name basmachis given by the people. No matter how hard the basmachis tried to play the role of "defenders of Islam" intent on "saving Muslims from the Bolsheviks", the population regarded them as bandits, as their name implies. That alone explodes the claim that it was a national liberation movement.

Under tsarism the *basmachi* movement was far removed from politics, but after the Revolution it acquired a class character, becoming the military and political force of the deposed exploiter classes.

The basmachis lived mainly by robbery, but after the Revolution, when they found themselves in the service of the Kokand Autonomous Government, they fought Soviet rule, resorting to overt political terrorism, which dovetailed into the common plans of the internal and external counter-revolution to overthrow the new social system.

The nucleus of the *basmachi* movement consisted of rich landowners, *bais*, local national bourgeoisie and all sorts of declassed elements that had lived out their time. Like the drowning man who clutches at a straw, they sacrificed everything in their effort to restore the old regime and recover their former privileges. Landowners, *bais*, usurers, factory owners and nationalists organised armed gangs, which they either commanded or joined as rank-and-file members, and supplied them with food, forage, clothes, money and arms.

Russian whiteguards participated directly and indirectly in this, as bourgeois historians call it, "national liberation"

Ferghana Front was established to counter this movement. The *basmachi* movement, Lenin said, is a form of the class struggle "which, *atter* the overthrow of capitalist rule, *atter* the destruction of the bourgeois state, *atter* the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat, *does not disappear* (as the vulgar representatives of the old socialism and the old Social-Democracy imagine), but merely changes form and in many respects becomes fiercer".*

^{*} At the close of October 1918, the British command in the Transcaspian area turned over to Junaid 3,000 rifles, many machine-guns and large quantities of ammunition.

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 29, p. 389.

movement. Some were military instructors with the basmachi bands, others supplied them with arms, equipment and money, and still others, who had signed an alliance on joint action against Soviet rule, fought shoulder to shoulder with the basmachis.

A political alliance of this kind between Russian and Turkestan exploiter classes was signed by Madamin, chief of the Ferghana basmachis, and Monstrov, a former tsarist officer, who was in command of the "peasant army", which had nothing in common with the working peasants. Following direct talks between Madamin and Monstrov, the armed forces of these "supreme commanders" were united. The "peasant army" was renamed into the "people's" army, while Madamin's bands were named the "Muslim White army" of Turkestan. Emir-lyashkarbashi (supreme commander) Madamin became deputy to Monstrov, who was appointed joint commander of these "armies".

Basmachi bands received aid and support from the Ashkhabad, Siberian and the Bukhara counter-revolutionary "governments", the whiteguard Turkestan Military Organisation and so on.

Imperialist powers, primarily Britain and the U.S.A., helped organise and activate the basmachi bands. At this juncture it is necessary to delve deeper into this issue, insofar as reactionary bourgeois historians deny that Britain and the U.S.A. ever entertained aggressive designs with regard to Turkestan and that foreign states afforded military assistance to the basmachis (without which the basmachi movement would have been unable to recover after the rout of the

Kokand Autonomous Government).

A. Zeki Velidi Togan in Modern Turkestan declares in a chapter headed "The Basmachi Movement and the British" that "there is no truth in Bolshevik talk that the British are rendering aid, etc., to the basmachis".* Togan claims that Colonel Bailey, Captain Blacker and other officers of the Anglo-Indian Army came to Turkestan and maintained contact with whiteguard organisations with the sole purpose of "countering Turkish and German propaganda".**

The same preconceived idea is contained in Alexander Park's book. He also endeavours to camouflage the part played by Britain and the U.S.A. in organising the basmachi movement and creating its main material base. He writes: "Aid was sought from Great Britain and Afghanistan. The former, on the advice of Colonel Etherton (British Consul-General in Sinkiang.-Ed.) hesitated (but Madamin Bek in a visit to the Afghan delegation in Turkestan in November obtained a promise of support from the latter)."*

Bourgeois historians make these assertions in order to exculpate the predatory plans of British and U.S. ruling circles and convey the impression that the Anglo-U.S. imperialists respect the sovereignty of other states, interfering in the internal affairs of independent nations only at

the request of and for the benefit of the latter.

But then how can anybody deny widely known historical facts that expose Anglo-U.S. policy as a policy of enslaving the peoples of Central Asia and encouraging the basmachi

movement?

Under the treaty signed in September 1918 between the whiteguards active in Turkestan and representatives of the British Government, Turkestan was to become a British protectorate for 55 years and was to grant Britain mining concessions. On her part, Britain was committed, via the underground counter-revolutionary organisation, to aid the basmachis with weapons, money, equipment and if necessary with manpower (troops, instructors).

Simultaneously, another agreement between the British Mission and the Turkestan Military Organisation provided that the basmachi chiefs Irgash and Ishmat would be transferred to a secret organisation (in Tashkent), which supplied the basmachis with food, while representatives of the British Government would give it money, arms and ammunition. Under that agreement, the British were, as a first step, to turn over to the underground whiteguard and nationalist organisation 100,000,000 rubles, and supply the basmachis with 16 mountain artillery pieces, 40 machine-guns and 25,000 rifles.

The whiteguard Colonel Zaitsey was sent to Ferghana to organise basmachi detachments along army lines, introduce

^{*} A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47, p. 423. ** Ibid., p. 442.

^{*} Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, pp. 41-42.

military discipline and work out methods of warfare to suit local conditions. He was also entrusted with establishing permanent liaison with the British Consul in Kashgar and co-ordinating the actions of the basmachis with the Tashkent counter-revolutionary organisation, Dutov's Cossacks and the Bukhara Emirate. A certain Bobchinsky, meanwhile, left for Kashgar to collect 5,000,000 rubles from the British Consul to finance the organisation of basmachi bands. The British Government did not stint means for the struggle against the Soviets. In addition to directly intervening in the Transcaspian area, it supplied the basmachis, via Sinkiang, Iran and Bukhara, with everything they needed in accordance with a military and political agreement. In May 1920, Mikhail Frunze* wrote that the basmachi movement "is supported from abroad, with British ... and Bukhara gold and weapons".**

U.S. ruling circles conducted espionage and subversive activities against Soviet power in Turkestan through U.S. Consul-General Treadwell. Enjoying diplomatic immunity, he tried to group around himself all foreign missions and diplomatic representatives in Tashkent devoting special attention to drawing nationalistic elements to his side. Direct contact with the *basmachis* was maintained by Henrich Gotshmidt Norden, a U.S. intelligence agent in Namangan.

Baymirza Hayit speaks of the British as friends of Turkestan, saying that they interfered in the internal affairs of the Ashkhabad "government", ran its financial affairs and granted credits with purely friendly intentions.

For some reason Hayit and his ilk are dumb when it comes to describing the atrocities inflicted upon peaceful Soviet citizens by the British interventionists on the territory under their temporary occupation. Unable to solicit the support of the masses, they tried to bolster their authority by establishing an absolute military dictatorship, which gave full rein to brutal violence, terror and mass murder.

Not a word is said by capitalism's myrmidons about the fact that the peoples of Central Asia were not indifferent to

these crimes, that these atrocities roused the righteous indignation of the masses and incited them to retaliatory action. Protest rallies and meetings were held in the Transcaspian area, and new Red Guard detachments were formed. Workers of local nationalities protested together with the Russians. A resolution adopted by the Katta-Kurgan workers at a meeting on November 4, 1918, condemned "the vile attempt of British imperialists upon the free Turkestan Republic", and voiced the decision of the workers to "cement their proletarian ranks and to be always ready to defend their proletarian rights". The general meeting of workers of local nationalities in the town of Turkestan resolved to "fight the cursed imperialists to the end and to die rather than fall into their clutches".

The British occupation and the atrocities evoked a vehement protest on the part of the government of the Turkestan Republic. In a cable to Moscow, to the All-Russia Central Executive Committee, the Council of People's Commissars of the R.S.F.S.R. and Lenin, it said:

"The Turkestan Central Executive Committee emphatically protests against the entry of British troops into Turkestan, their outrageous methods of warfare and their interference in the internal affairs of the Republic." The cable further read: "We request you vigorously to support our protest before the governments of all civilised countries, to inform the proletariat of Europe and America and to urge measures to prevent similar action by the imperialists of all states."

The working masses were hostile to the whiteguards and the British interventionists and resisted them in diverse ways. For instance, Turkmen peasants refused to be conscripted into the whiteguard army although conscription was made "compulsory" by decree of the "Provisional Executive Committee". A large number of Russians and Turkmenians eligible for conscription did not turn up at the recruiting stations. The peasants refused to surrender their camels to the whiteguard army, to pay arrears and taxes to the whiteguard "government"; they hid food or transported it to other localities, pulled down telegraph lines, looted shops and so forth.

"At 12 o'clock on August 15, local saryks staged a riot in the Tekin market in the village of Iolotani," states a report on events in Merv District. "Ruffians broke into the offices of the commissariat, seized the arms stored there (army

^{*} M. V. Frunze (1885-1925)—prominent leader of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, devoted follower and associate of Lenin, talented military commander and outstanding organiser of the Soviet Armed Forces, one of the founders of Soviet military science.

** M. V. Frunze, Selected Works, Russ, ed., Vol. I, Moscow, 1957, p. 314.

rifles, confiscated guns and pistols whose number is not known) and disappeared." The district commissar in Kara-Kalinsk complained that the local population "has not been very obedient of late and there are not enough men to deal with the law-breakers".

The peasants that had experienced the temporary rule of the British imperialists, who had brought utter ruin to the Transcaspian area, welcomed and supported the Red Army. T. Krylov, former headman of the village of Archinyan, recalls that the peasants of Khiva-Abad and his village were wholly on the side of the Red Army and that they were extremely hostile to the whiteguards. After the defeat of the whiteguards at Bairam-Ali and Merv, the working Turkmenians sent a delegation to a Red Army unit with expressions of friendship. The Turkmenians rendered inestimable service to Soviet troops by reporting the whereabouts of the whiteguard forces, their numerical strength and their equipment. They also volunteered to act as guides behind the enemy lines and gladly shared their hidden food supplies

with the Red Army.

Bourgeois ideologists "investigating" the part played by the local population in the basmachi movement resort to deliberate slander. Remaining true to the tendentious nature of bourgeois historical research, they twist facts to make them serve the interests of their masters. Their aim is to convince the readers that the colonial system brought as much satisfaction to the colonial peoples as to the colonialists themselves. They forget to differentiate between the poor and the rich, the exploited and the exploiters, and to point out exactly what strata of the local population were against Soviet rule and desired the restoration of the old regime. Indisputable facts prove that the core of the basmachi movement consisted of the exploiter classes dethroned by the Revolution, ex-criminals and morally corrupt elements, all of whom were motivated by a lust for riches, plunder and violence.

Nonetheless, it should be said that part of the working dekhans joined the basmachi bands when they were first being formed.

First and foremost, the explanation lies in the legacy of the past-in the economic and political backwardness of the peasants of Turkestan, who were steeped in mediaeval superstitions and prejudices and were influenced by the bais and mullahs.

The Muslim clergy, playing on religious sentiments of the people, did their utmost to draw them into the struggle against Soviet rule. Their propaganda supported the basmachi movement, Pan-Turkism and Pan-Islamism and sowed discord between Russians and the peoples of Central Asia. Agitators travelled from town to town and from village to village calling upon the "faithful" to rise against the "infidels". No words were spared to blame the Bolsheviks for the difficult situation and the economic dislocation which the Soviet state had inherited from the tsarist regime. By such methods the Muslim clergy succeeded in recruiting the most backward sections of the dekhans to the side of the basmachis.

Secondly, basmachi chieftains capitalised on the mistakes and shortcomings that were evident in the national question during the initial stage of Soviet development in Turkestan.

The Mensheviks. Socialist-Revolutionaries and bourgeois nationalists, who had penetrated into Soviet administrative bodies, also played their part. On several occasions they deliberately fanned national hatred. Some of the measures undertaken by the Soviet authorities were sabotaged with their consent or on their instructions. For example, Matkabul Matfazilov, a veteran of the October Revolution and the Civil War, recalls that "Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, Dashnaks and others of their kind, who had penetrated into the Kokand Soviet, were secret traitors. They had their armed detachments which, on the pretext of combating the basmachis, went to the villages where they committed outrages, plundering the peaceful inhabitants."

Unfortunate mistakes were made by the detachments fighting the basmachis. Sometimes they mistook peaceful inhabitants for basmachis. Moreover, there were cases of looting by alien class elements that had wormed their way into

the Red Army.

The activities of some of the surplus food-requisitioning detachments, formed by the Soviet Government to alleviate the disastrous plight of the population, also caused discontent among the people. Either unaware of the class nature of the Soviet food policy, or intentionally violating it, some detachments requisitioned food not only from profiteers and bais, but also from working people.

All this played into the hands of the enemies of Soviet rule and helped the basmachis recruit the most backward dekhans.

When sermons proved ineffective the basmachis turned to blackmail, threats and terrorism to get the people to follow them. Many dekhans were forced to join the basmachi gangs on the threat of the destruction of their families and

property.

The special situation obtaining in the villages in Turkestan was another reason why a small backward section of the dekhans supported the basmachi movement. Before the Revolution Turkestan was an agrarian country, a typical agricultural colony of tsarist Russia. The greater part of the land with its irrigation system was owned by the state and the exploiter classes. Most of the peasants were either landless and had to rent land on onerous terms, or were smallholders. Consequently, the implementation of the Decree on the Land in this territory, where the agrarian question was paramount, was of major significance and meant the winning over of the vast majority of the population to the side of Soviet power. Acting in conformity with Lenin's Decree, the Soviet Government in Turkestan adopted a series of measures to nationalise land and water: the purchase, sale and rent of land were forbidden, all land on which hired labour was employed was registered, the largest estates were nationalised, resettlers' organisations, which were dominated by the big landowners, were abolished and a People's Commissariat of Agriculture was set up in their place. The land and water committees, formed throughout Turkestan, were authorised to confiscate land, structures and farm implements belonging to the exploiters and to distribute them among the poorest sections of the peasants.

These measures were fiercely resisted by the bais, mullahs, kulaks, former aksakals, mirabs and former tsarist officials. By deceiving and intimidating the backward section of the peasantry they obtained posts in rural administrative bodies and obstructed the fulfilment of the Government's decisions.

Bourgeois nationalists, Mensheviks and Socialist-Revolutionaries supported the exploiters in the villages, who wanted to deprive the land-hungry peasants of their right to land and water. They considered that the equitable distribution of water should embrace only landowners.

In some cases the solution of the land problem in Turkestan was impeded by the peasant masses themselves, who were entangled in all sorts of fettering deals and feudal-patriarchal survivals. These survivals were largely in evidence in the southern regions of present-day Kirghizia, where the hereditary manaps* were the absolute rulers of groups of clans. Naturally, they wanted to retain their power and wealth even after the Revolution, and therefore opposed Soviet laws,

inciting their clans against Soviet rule.

The example set by the central parts of Russia, where the law on land was enforced immediately after the Revolution, could therefore not be followed in Turkestan, where the peasants had to be freed from the influence of the clergy and from patriarchal-tribal customs before agrarian reforms could be carried out. The land and water reform was initiated in Turkestan only in 1926. Therefore the most backward sections of the peasants did not understand the land policy of the Communist Party during the first years of Soviet rule and temporarily followed the lead of their former masters against the new government.

The participation of the people in the counter-revolutionary movement neither was nor could have been of a mass nature. The small part of the people, who were drugged by religion, had nothing in common with the aims of the exploiters and became tools in their hands. At first they did not imagine that the victory of the counter-revolution could reduce the peoples of Central Asia to the position of slaves of the foreign imperialists and result in the restoration of the old regime, which had been abolished by the Revolution. They did not realise that it could, in the long run, bring about the strengthening of the feudal-patriarchal relations and the absolute triumph of feudal-clerical reaction with its system of brutal exploitation, oppression and impoverishment of the people.

Most of the working people of Central Asia, however, clearly saw the ultimate goal of the basmachi chieftains, their desire to overthrow Soviet power, restore the old pre-Revolution regime in Turkestan and bring the people under the colonial yoke of British and U.S. imperialism. The majority of the people awakened to the conviction that the basmachis

^{*} Manap-representative of the ruling feudal-patriarchal nobility in pre-Revolution Kirghizia.

were their enemies and morally corrupt robbers and murderers.

There is plenty of evidence to prove that the *basmachis* inhumanly tortured their victims before killing them. They were particularly barbarous in their treatment of government and Party officials. During a bandit raid on the Vuadil Poor Peasants' Committee, Ferghana Province, the *basmachis* tortured to death its chairman. First they inflicted several wounds on him, rubbed salt into them and finally killed him when he lost consciousness.

Nuritdin Alihojayev, a veteran of the Revolution and the Civil War, recalls how several *basmachi* gangs looted old Namangan and massacred 200 local Jews, setting fire to almost all the shops, barns and houses. Then, together with members of the *Dashnak* and other counter-revolutionary organisations, they burned down the rest of the old quarter of the town, killing more than 1,500 persons, the remainder being saved by the Red Army units.

The people were terrorised by the *basmachi* raids, atrocities and violence, in retaliation for the slightest show of sympathy for Soviet rule or for refusal to join their gangs or to surrender food, even if it was the last that the peasants had.

Impartial Western historians also speak of the White terror sowed in the villages by the *basmachi* gangs. Marcel Egretaud, for example, writes that the *basmachis* opposed "the enforcement of agrarian reforms, the introduction of social reforms, the emancipation of women and the promotion of public education". To achieve their goals they made use "not only of the attachment of the people to old traditions, their abject poverty and ignorance, but also resorted to raids and murder".*

Therefore, realising that the *basmachis* were their sworn enemies the overwhelming majority of the people took up arms against them.

This fact was stressed by the Sixth Congress of the Turkestan Communist Party in August 1921, in a resolution summing up the results of the struggle against the *basmachis*. It pointed out that "the agricultural and industrial workers of Ferghana, who want the economic crisis to be eliminated, regard the *basmachi* movement as an opposing force ideolo-

gically and economically directed against their interests, and, notwithstanding the *basmachi* terror, have no sympathy for that movement and are fighting it, motivated by their irresistible desire to eradicate it as quickly as possible and at all costs."

The hostility of most of the population to the *basmachis* is admitted even by some of the most vehement enemies of Soviet power. The following opinion of Colonel Zaitsev illustrates this point: "The rumour that the grateful native population supported *basmachi* bands with their own means, has turned out to be a damnable lie."

The overwhelming majority of the people, especially the poorer sections, were on the side of Soviet rule. The inhabitants of every village gave the Red Army every assistance against the *basmachis*. They gave the garrisons of the forts advance notice of attacks and informed Red Army units of the location, numerical strength and arms of the *basmachi* gangs. They helped the Red Guards and Red Army troops with food and clothes, allowed them to use their homes and looked after the wounded.

At rallies and meetings in the towns and villages the working people whole-heartedly pledged their support for Soviet rule, requested the authorities to take the most energetic measures to wipe out the basmachis and declared their readiness to help the Red Army. In June 1919, a meeting of representatives of the villages of Urmit and Ravat, Falghar Volost, Samarkand Province, passed a decision, which stated that "being fully prepared and resolved to assist in the fight against the bandits not only by supplying provisions but also by taking up arms ourselves, we urgently request to be given as many weapons as possible, both fire-arms and side-arms. If no arms are available we shall take stones and go with the Red Army in order to help it crush the robber gangs".* The workers and peasants of the Kuva Volost, Skobelev District, of old Andijan and many other places also expressed their determination to fight the basmachi movement.

The basmachi gangs were fought by tens of thousands of workers, artisans and rural poor who joined the Red Guard, the volunteer militia, civil-defence units, special purpose

^{*} Marcel Egretaud, L'Orient Soviétique, Kazakhstan-Ouzbékistan-Kirghizie-Tadjikistan-Turkménistan-Azerbaidjan, Paris, 1959, p. 99.

^{*} The Struggle for the Establishment and Consolidation of Soviet Power in Khojent District (1917-20). Collection of Documents, Russ. ed., Leninabad, 1957, p. 107.

detachments, the Extraordinary Commission and the Special Department. More than 15,000 working people of Ferghana, the centre of *basmachi* activities, gallantly fought against the bandits.

A prominent part in routing the *basmachi* movement was played by national detachments. They included detachments commanded by Abdurakhman Madyarov (250 men), Yuldash Baimatov (125 men), Nuritdin Alihojayev (100 men), Igamberdyev (200 cavalrymen) and Paramonov (400 men, over half of whom were Uzbeks), and the 1st Muslim Regiment (nearly 150 men). These small units of staunch and gallant fighters often got the best of numerically superior *basmachi* forces.

A major role in the struggle against the *basmachi* movement was played by detachments of Russian and local Communists. For instance, half the members of the Andijan Party Detachment were Uzbeks, while the Skobelev Detachment was almost entirely non-Russian. All told there were about 4,000 Communists in these detachments.

In the struggle against the *basmachis*, Communists not only displayed heroism, courage and fortitude but educated the people, exposing the essence of the *basmachi* movement and explaining the policy of the Soviet Government.

Many members of the Turkestan Young Communist League died heroically in action against the *basmachis*: Rakhimbayev, Sabadkhojayev, Turgun and Nabiev, to mention a few.

The formation of regular national units of the Red Army considerably accelerated the rout of the basmachi movement. In the summer of 1920, 30,000 men were drafted into the Red Army; 11,240 were from Syr Darya Province, 6,520 from Samarkand Province, 2,790 from Transcaspian Province, and 2,000 from Semirechye Province. Military instructors, commanders and political workers from the native population were trained at the same time. These measures of the Soviet Government placed the formerly downtrodden peoples of Central Asia in the ranks of equal defenders of their country and in this way raised their morale and strengthened their desire to wipe out their hated enemies. A steadily growing number of people joined in the fight against the basmachis.

The Soviet Government gave the peoples of Turkestan inestimable assistance in crushing the *basmachi* gangs and the whiteguard counter-revolution. On October 8, 1919, on Lenin's initiative, the All-Russia Central Executive Committee

and the Council of Peoples' Commissars of the Russian Federation set up a Special Commission for Turkestan Affairs. Its members included Mikhail Frunze, Fillip Goloshchekin, Valerian Kuibyshev, Shalva Eliava, Yan Rudzutak and other prominent functionaries of the Communist Party and Soviet Government.

Helped by the Bolshevik organisations in Turkestan, this Commission accomplished the gigantic task of resolving the national problem, correcting mistakes, eradicating deviations from the Party line which had caused a great deal of harm in the building up of the national statehood of the Central Asian peoples, consolidating and strengthening of the Party ranks, adjusting the relations between the peoples of Turkestan and drawing the local working masses into economic and state development.

The arrival of the Turkestan Commission also resulted in a fundamental change in the military situation. Under its supervision decisive measures were taken to tighten up military discipline, end disorganisation and arbitrary decisions and actions, strengthen the Red Army and enlist the people into the Red Guard and partisan detachments.

The methods and forms of the struggle against the basmachis also underwent a change. Military operations were combined with political and economic measures, and in the end many of the people recruited by the basmachis deserted upon realising the essence of basmachi movement and became active fighters in the struggle against that movement. The urban and village poor, cheated and intimidated by the basmachis, started coming over to the side of Soviet rule, depleting the ranks of the bandits.

The Communist Party inspired and organised the defeat of the basmachi gangs. Its programme slogans, for whose realisation it consistently worked, ensured it the unlimited support of working people of all nationalities. As a result of the closer link between the Bolsheviks and the people, a link, which, Lenin said, had always to be fostered, "our slogan 'All Power to the Soviets', which the masses had tested in practice by long historical experience, had become part of their flesh and blood".* This slogan of the Communist Party

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 27, p. 89.

stimulated the revolutionary energy of the masses and directed it against all enemies

ed it against all enemies.

The victory of the working people over the interventionists and internal counter-revolution, the consolidation of Soviet power in Turkestan and the initial successes in economic and state development exerted a profound revolutionising influence on the peoples of the Khiva Khanate and the Bukhara Emirate. They rose against the Emir and the Khan and, supported by the Red Army, overthrew these despotic rulers. Thus, with the fall of their last bastion, the Turkestan counter-revolution and foreign imperialism lost their last hope of destroying Soviet rule in Turkestan and of enslaving its people.

As a result of the victorious revolutions in Khiva and Bukhara, these two territories became People's Soviet Republics in April and October 1920 respectively. Having defeated the interventionists and internal counter-revolution, the peoples of Central Asia and of the entire Soviet Union started rehabilitating and developing the national economy and build-

ing up their national statehood.

LENINIST NATIONAL POLICY AND THE NATIONAL STATEHOOD OF THE PEOPLES OF CENTRAL ASIA AND KAZAKHSTAN

The correct, Leninist solution of the national question was of the utmost significance in consolidating Soviet rule, developing the economy and culture of the peoples of Central Asia and granting them national statehood.

The Soviet Government's national policy was founded on the Communist Party's programme on the national question

evolved long before the October Revolution.

Its basic principles, laid down by Marx and Engels, the founders of scientific communism, were developed in the new historical conditions by Lenin, the great continuer of their work.

Having made a profound study of national movements, the founders of Marxism-Leninism showed their essence and social roots and proved that national oppression and inequality could be abolished and fraternity and friendship between the peoples established only by a relentless class struggle, a socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat.

Basing himself on the ideas of Marx and Engels, Lenin worked out the Bolshevik Party's programme and policy on the national question in conformity with conditions of the era of imperialism and the building of socialism and communism.

He linked the national-colonial question with the general question of the liberation of the colonial and dependent countries from imperialism, declaring that the national question is a major part of the over-all problem of the socialist revolution and the dictatorship of the proletariat, making its solution dependent on the class problems of the proletariat. He said that "we must *link* the revolutionary struggle for socialism with a revolutionary programme on the national

question".*

The Communist Party, led by Lenin, championed the right of nations to self-determination up to and including secession and the establishment of independent states. It stood for a thoroughly democratic republican system of government "which guarantees full equality of all nations and languages, which recognises no compulsory official language, which provides the people with schools where instruction is given in all the native languages, and the constitution of which contains a fundamental law that prohibits any privileges whatsoever to any one nation and any encroachment whatsoever upon the rights of a national minority".**

Taking the practice of the revolutionary struggle and the historical experience of the working class of Russia and other countries into account, the Communist Party's national programme moved to the forefront the need to abolish social-estates and to grant complete equality to all citizens irrespective of sex, religion, race or nationality. It envisaged "the right of the population to education in the native language at schools built and run by the state and self-government bodies; the right of every citizen to speak in his native language at meetings; the use of the native language equally with the official language at all public and state institutions".***

The policy of the Communist Party, which considered that not only nations but peoples in general have the right to self-determination, was of major significance to the peoples of the eastern and north-eastern territories of Russia, who still lived under the patriarchal-feudal system. These peoples were now given the right to freely decide their own destiny.

The victory of the October Revolution confronted the Party with the problem of defining the concrete forms of state organisation and government in the country. The principle of socialist federation based on voluntary accession, equality, internationalism and democratic centralism**** was adopted

as the foundation of the state system of the Russian Soviet Republic.

Long before the October Revolution, Lenin, the great proletarian internationalist, pointed out that when formerly oppressed small nations and peoples would become socialist nations they would join in a durable multi-national union, because, more than any other, large progressive states conform with the interests of the working masses. In his "The Discussion on Self-Determination Summed Up" he wrote: "The masses of working people, as they liberate themselves from the bourgeois yoke, will gravitate irresistibly towards union and integration with the great, advanced socialist nations . . . provided yesterday's oppressors do not infringe on the long-oppressed nations' highly developed democratic feeling of self-respect, and provided they are granted equally in everything, including state construction, that is, experience in organising 'their own' state."*

One of the principles proclaimed by Lenin was that in establishing Soviet statehood to conform with the features of a given people, the state should be administered by the working class in alliance with the peasants, this alliance

tration, accountability of the deputies to their electors and the right of the electors to recall them, formation of a single system of bodies of state power and bodies of state administration based on the strictest subordination of lower bodies to the higher-merge with the principles of socialist federation.

In the system of state administration of a Union Republic democratic centralism finds its expression in the responsibility of its Council of Ministers before its Supreme Soviet and Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. At the same time, however, the Council of Ministers of a Union Republic promulgates its acts on the basis of and in conformity with the laws of the U.S.S.R. and the Union Republic and the acts of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. Democratic centralism in the ministries of a Union Republic has two forms. One is the subordination of Republican ministries only to the Council of Ministers of the Union Republic, the other, parallel with the first, is their subordination to the corresponding Union-Republican ministries of the U.S.S.R. Following the abolition of the harmful consequences of the Stalin cult, the first form of democratic centralism was considerably broadened (see pp. 96-97 of this book).

In a multi-national state democratic centralism guarantees the sovereign rights of all nations simultaneously with the centralisation of the planned administration of the country, the unity and co-ordination of the activity of all republics.

** Ibid., Vol. 19, p. 427.

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 22, p. 339.

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 408.

^{***} The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Russ, ed., Part I, Moscow, 1954, p. 40.
**** In the multi-national Soviet state the principles of democratic centralism-election of all central and local bodies of state adminis-

being the decisive force in the political and economic development of the country. Local government bodies, as envisaged by the national programme, should include representatives of the local nationalities who are well acquainted with the mode of life, customs and language of the local population. If this condition is satisfied the authorities will have stable ties with the masses and Soviet rule will be firmly consolidated.

Lenin and the Communist Party proclaimed national equality, the abolition of actual inequality of the peoples, and charted the programme for their non-capitalist development to socialism. This can be achieved, the Communist Party pointed out, by establishing new relations, by co-operation and fraternal aid between the peoples when the victorious proletariat of a stronger country renders all-round support to the less developed countries which have taken the path of socialist development.

The principles of the national programme of the Communist Party began to be consistently put into practice as soon as the Revolution triumphed. The Communist Party successfully coped with this task, despite the fact that the implementation of the principles of its programme was a very complicated historical process closely linked up with the revolution-

ary remaking of society.

The formation of the world's first socialist state on principles of equality, inviolable friendship and mutual assistance between all its peoples was the result of the correct solution of the national question. The best illustration of this is the burgeoning of the former backward colonies of tsarist Russia, in particular, of Turkestan, which completely or partially embraced the territories of the present-day Central Asian republics.

After winning freedom and independence, the peoples of Central Asia, with the fraternal assistance of the Russian and other peoples of the U.S.S.R., rapidly accomplished an unprecedented leap from backwardness to progress, from feudalism to socialism, attaining a high level of economic and cultural development. Together with all the other peoples of the multi-national Soviet Union they are confidently advancing towards communism.

Contemporary bourgeois historians dwell at length on the Soviet national policy. Some of them, in contradiction to reality, write that there is no difference between the national policies of tsarism and the Soviet Government; others assure the reader that the Central Asian peoples are economically and politically discriminated against, that they are segregated and exploited; still others say that the Soviet system has colonial features and so forth.

Bourgeois historians and publicists resort to diverse methods of falsification in their broad ideological campaign against the socialist countries, particularly against the Soviet Union. Some of them brazenly distort the history of the former colonial outskirts of old Russia; others, knowing that more and more people in the West are beginning to question their fabrications, get the facts they need from Soviet publications and deliberately distort them, especially critical articles and topical satire in Soviet newspapers, still others complicate and entangle established propositions with all sorts of philosophical arguments.

But the main content and trend of the "investigations" of the overwhelming majority of British, U.S., French and other reactionary historians remain unchangeably anti-Soviet. Their aim is to deprecate and vilify the Soviet socialist system, to discredit the ideas of the socialist revolution and the experience of socialist construction, and to extol capitalism, which

history has doomed to extinction.

Hence the extremely tendentious treatment in bourgeois historical literature of the essence of the national policy of the Soviet state, and the demagogic arguments about Soviet colonialism and imperialism and the subjection and dependence of the Central Asian and other non-Russian peoples of the U.S.S.R.

Assertions of this kind are made, among others, by A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Walter Kolarz and Tahir Çagatay. Quite often, according to the French bourgeois historian Vincent Monteil, they get their information from émigrés, turncoats and traitors, as well as from tourists who visit the U.S.S.R. and

from criticisms published in the Soviet press.

A certain Raghib Ahsan, who visited the Central Asian republics in 1957 with a delegation sent by the Central Djamiyat Ulema Pakistan, speaks about "Russian colonisation" of Central Asia. In an article entitled "My Impressions of the Soviet Union" published in *The Islamic Review*, Ahsan, ignoring facts, writes "that in the Muslim Zones of Central Asia, State feudalism has been coupled with Russian colonialism.... Russians control all key positions. The entire economy of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kazakhstan, etc., has been made subservient to and a dependency of Russia. Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have been turned into raw cotton farmland and the supply hinterland for the whole Soviet Union." Continuing his slanderous fabrications, he writes: "The sovereignty and independence, and nationhood and statehood, of Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and other so-called National Republics, are not real but illusory."*

His declarations are so ludicrous and absurd that Muhammad Abdul Hamid Qadri Badayuni, who headed the delegation, wrote a brochure for the purpose, as he put it, of giving a correct account of reality and preventing all sorts of false rumours. He describes his impressions of his visit to the Soviet Union, completely rejecting the slanderous fabrica-

tions of Raghib Ahsan.

He writes that the declarations of Raghib Ahsan or Adavi reflect the situation that existed 50 years ago, or rather they concocted them from slander and thrusts. Badayuni further declares that though he disagrees with the Soviets on many questions it does not mean that he should give a distorted picture of the actual situation, deny the real situation and turn it inside out. No delegation, he continues, if it has good will should distort reality.**

Indeed, Soviet reality is totally different from the portrayals of bourgeois historians, and no matter how hard they try to present it in a distorted light, especially the national

question, the truth will out.

Let us turn to facts, consider the Soviet declarations on the equality of nations and see how they have been put into effect.

The first acts of the Soviet Government—the appeal To Workers, Soldiers and Peasants, the Decree on Peace, and the Decision to Form the Workers' and Peasants' Government—promulgated on the day after the victory of the Revolution, concerned vital national problems. They stipulated with

the utmost clarity that Soviet rule genuinely guarantees all the nations inhabiting Russia the right to self-determination.

The basic principles of Soviet national policy, embracing the programme demands of the Communist Party, have been proclaimed in some of the most important acts of the October Revolution—the Declaration of Rights of the Peoples of Russia and the appeal of the Council of People's Commissars of the Russian Federation to the Working Moslems of Russia and the East. These acts proclaimed the freedom and equality of nations, their right to self-determination up to and including secession and the formation of independent states and repealed national and national-religious privileges and restrictions. Autonomy within national territories took shape as one of the forms of political organisation. Lenin wrote: "Autonomy is our plan for organising a democratic state."*

The problems of state organisation were resolved at the Third All-Russia Congress of Soviets in January 1918. The principle of socialist federation, based on voluntary accession, equality, internationalism and democratic centralism, was made the cornerstone of the state system of the Russian Soviet Republic. The Congress endorsed the constitutional acts of the Soviet Government—the Declaration of Rights of the Working and Exploited People and the Resolution on Federal Institutions of the Russian Republic—which laid down the basic principles of the political organisation of the Soviet socialist state and consolidated the gains in the national question.

The Declaration, drawn up by Lenin, proclaimed Russia a Soviet Republic where power belongs to the working masses and to their authoritative government—the Soviets of Workers',

Soldiers' and Peasants' Deputies.

The Third Congress advanced federation as the most expedient form of state organisation for Soviet Russia and granted all the peoples of Russia the right to free self-determination. In this connection, the Declaration said that "endeavouring to create a really free and voluntary, and therefore all the more firm and stable, union of the working classes of all the nations of Russia, the Third Congress of Soviets confines its own task to setting up the fundamental principles of a federation of Soviet Republics of Russia, while leaving it to the workers and peasants of each nation to

^{*} Raghib Ahsan, "My Impressions of the Soviet Union", The Islamic Review, London, February 1958, pp. 31, 32.

^{**} Muhammad Abdul Hamid Qadri Badayuni, Impressions of Soviet Tour, Karachi, 1957, pp. 37, 80, 81.

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 501.

decide independently at their own authoritative Congress of Soviets whether they wish to participate in the federal government and in the other federal Soviet institutions, and on what terms".*

In this way the Soviet socialist federation as a form of the dictatorship of the proletariat, established on the principle of a free union of equal nations with due consideration for the economic integrity of territories and the specific national composition of each region, differs radically from bourgeois federations, which are founded on the forcible annexation of independent states under the leadership of the bourgeoisie, without any consideration for the national features of the regions being united. The Soviet federation, whose establishment was directed by the working class, unites only Soviet republics formed voluntarily by the peoples of Russia through the abolition of national oppression and irrespective of the level of development of the nation concerned.

Attaching great significance to strengthening the dictatorship of the proletariat by implementing the principle of selfdetermination of nations, the Communist Party and the Soviet Government constantly showed concrete ways and means of resolving the national question in Turkestan, stressing that the main prerequisite was to draw the local nationalities into the building and administration of the Soviet state, to bring them into the mainstream of socialist construction. At the same time, it was emphasised that this could be achieved only by recognising complete state independence, solely through the free self-determination of nations, through Soviet regional national autonomy where all organs of power, schools, courts, cultural, political and educational institutions function in the native language.

Such autonomy, where power belongs not to a privileged few but to the working people, was established in Central Asia and Kazakhstan after the Russian Federation was formed and was enthusiastically welcomed by the overwhelming majority of the people.

The state system of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (T.A.S.S.R.) was legislatively recorded in its Constitution, adopted and endorsed by the Sixth Extra-

* Congresses of Soviets of the R.S.F.S.R. in Resolutions, Russ. ed., Moscow, 1939, p. 42.

ordinary Congress of Soviets in October 1918. The First Constitution of the Turkestan Republic stated that the working people had triumphed over the exploiters and guaranteed the former full freedom and independence. For the first time in their long history, the peoples of Central Asia won the right to actively participate in the development of their own independent state.

The formation of the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic and, later, of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, was a great victory for the Leninist national policy and the beginning of the establishment of the Soviet statehood

of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan.

After Soviet autonomy had been achieved in Turkestan and Kazakhstan, the best sons and daughters of their peoples began to participate in the administration of the state, in the work of the Soviets and other state bodies. For instance, of the 356 delegates to the Twelfth Congress of Soviets of T.A.S.S.R. (January 1924) 226 were representatives of local nationalities; the 555 delegates to the Samarkand, Ferghana, Amu Darya, Turkmen and Semirechye regional congresses included 128 Kazakhs, 98 Uzbeks, 44 Turkmenians, 35 Kara-

Kalpakians and 18 Kirghiz.

The number of Uzbeks, Turkmenians, Kazakhs, Tajiks, Kirghiz and representatives of other Central Asian nationalities working in Soviet bodies steadily increased. As an illustration take the number of Kazakhs working in organs of state power. In 1923, they constituted 49 per cent of the composition of the volost executive committees and in 1927-67 per cent; in 1923, 65.5 per cent of the personnel of the district executive committees were Kazakhs and in 1927-70 per cent; in 1923, 51.8 per cent of the people in the regional executive committees were Kazakhs and in 1927 their number increased to 53.5 per cent. In 1926 Kazakhs made up 61.2 per cent of the members of rural and village Soviets and 66 per cent of the composition of the Central Executive Committee of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Communist Party and the Soviet Government have always emphasised that the national question would be resolved only when all inequality between the Soviet peoples would be abolished.

The decisions on the national question adopted by the Tenth and Twelfth congresses of the Communist Party played a significant role in introducing measures to abolish actual inequality between the peoples. The resolutions of these congresses pointed out that establishment of genuine national equality took time and could be consummated only by the joint efforts of the peoples in economic development with aid from the peoples of the central regions of the country.

For that reason the Tenth and Twelfth congresses resolved to help the backward nations of the Soviet Republics, including the T.A.S.S.R., to abolish "all remnants of national inequality in all spheres of social and economic life", and assist them to:

"a) promote and strengthen their Soviet statehood along lines conforming with local conditions and way of life;

"b) confer greater authority upon their courts, administration, economic organisations and organs of state power functioning in the native language and composed of local people well acquainted with the life and psychology of the local population".*

The Tenth Party Congress, guided by Lenin's precepts on voluntary co-operation of equal and sovereign nations, adopted a policy of establishing a completely new type of multi-national state founded on the principles of proletarian internationalism. That state was proclaimed at the close of December 1922 by the First All-Union Congress of Soviets.

The formation of the U.S.S.R., which included the T.A.S.S.R., was a tremendously important development expediting the rehabilitation of the economy of Soviet Turkestan, inasmuch as it created the conditions for systematic practical aid.

The next step in strengthening and developing the Soviet statehood of the Central Asian peoples was the national state demarcation of Central Asia. This led to the formation of Soviet Socialist Republics and Autonomous Regions on the territory of former Turkestan. The formation of first the Uzbek and Turkmen, and then the Tajik, Kirghiz and Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republics, and their voluntary union with the U.S.S.R., opened a new stage in the development of the national Soviet statehood of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, signifying the emergence of free Soviet national states.

80

"It is enough," Marcel Egretaud, the well-known French publicist, wrote after visiting the Central Asian republics, "to see—to believe." Speaking of the formation of the nations of these republics, he stressed that "these nations were actually born together with the socialist regime and are grateful to it. They arrived at socialism directly from the Middle Ages. In this lies their uniqueness in history".*

"Progress after the division of the land," impartial bourgeois historians admit, "was so rapid that when, in 1930 and 1931, the Soviets undertook the collectivisation of farming, Central Asia for the first time underwent a major social change at about the same time as the rest of the country."**

The equal Central Asian republics have broad powers. They independently exercise state authority on their territories and resolve all political, economic and cultural issues.

All Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan have their own higher organs of state power and administration—Supreme Soviets, Presidiums of Supreme Soviets and Councils of Ministers. The material and cultural values in the republics belong to the people of these republics. State organs control the land, waters, forests and mineral wealth, and independently define the principles of land tenure. The boundaries of the Union Republics may not be altered without their consent.

The Central Asian republics have their own constitutions legally establishing their sovereign rights and reflecting their national features. These constitutions are adopted by the Supreme Soviets of the Union Republics and are not subject to further approval. The republics have their own coat-of-arms, flags and anthems symbolising their national statehood and sovereignty.

The supreme manifestation of the sovereignty of all the Soviet republics is their right to freely secode from the U.S.S.R. in which they are united on the principle of voluntary co-operation. Lenin called this principle the most important and inalienable condition for the establishment of a Soviet union state. He said:

"We want a voluntary union of nations-a union which precludes any coercion of one nation by another-a union

1944, p. 116.

^{*} The C.P.S.U. in Resolutions, Russ. ed., Part I, Moscow, 1954, p. 559.

^{*} Marcel Egretaud, L'Orient Soviétique, Kazakhstan-Ouzbékistan-Kirghizie-Tadjikistan-Turkménistan-Azerbaidjan, Paris, 1959, p. 88. ** William Mandel, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, New York,

founded on complete confidence, on a clear recognition of brotherly unity, on absolutely voluntary consent."*

Such guarantees of independence of the peoples of every Soviet republic exist only in the Soviet Union, which is founded on the Leninist principle of voluntary federation.

The Soviet Union safeguards the sovereignty of the Union Republics with all its economic, political and military might. By giving effect to mutual aid "along economic and political as well as military lines", to quote Article 13 of the Constitution of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic, for example, the Soviet Union promotes the rapid social, economic and cultural growth of the peoples of Central Asia and strengthens the material basis of the national economy, and also safeguards the Union Republics against any encroachment by the imperialists.

In the struggle for socialist reforms, for the building of communism the Communist Party directs the activity of all state and public organisations of the working people, works out the programme of action and indicates concrete ways of implementing it. The Party adheres to the Leninist national policy, ensures the alliance of the working class with the peasants under the hegemony of the proletariat, and promotes friendship, fraternal co-operation and mutual aid between the peoples of the whole country. It pursues a policy that guarantees the free development of the socialist nations and their genuine independence.

Bourgeois falsifiers consider the single leadership of the C.P.S.U. as one of the indications of colonialism. Geoffrey Wheeler distorts reality by claiming that the C.P.S.U. is like a dictator constantly issuing instructions to all the republics and that the peoples of the republics "have no say in, and indeed oppose. Moscow's decision".**

This is the argument of many bourgeois historians who misrepresent the national policy of the Communist Party and shield such die-hard colonialist powers as Britain and the U.S.A.

A few facts about the so-called free countries will help us to raise the veil of lies that falsifiers of all hues throw around those "champions" of the "free development" of the peoples. The U.S. imperialists have enmeshed Pakistan, Turkey, Iran and other countries in a web of fettering agreements as partners in aggressive military blocs, and having reduced them to complete military and political dependence, are directing economic policy and development of these countries to suit their own selfish ends. Foreign monopolies are throttling the growth of the national industry, causing stagnation in agriculture and a deficit in foreign trade.

As a member of two aggressive blocs-CENTO and SEATO -Pakistan in 1959 had the huge debt of U.S. \$1,200,000,000 on loans she had received while Iran owed U.S. \$656,000,000. Military expenditures eat up the lion's share of the loans. With regard to economic "aid", even the Teheran newspaper Zahan calls it illusory. The repayment of high-interest loans and credits deteriorates the already calamitous economic position of the working people of these countries.

But this does not disturb the imperialists, who are concerned, first and foremost, with reaping profits from dependent countries and maintaining dominating positions in them. The imperialists do not hesitate to use force whenever their positions are threatened, as has been and still is the case in the Congo, Kenya, Laos, Angola and elsewhere. Armed intervention, coups, bombing of towns and villages, annihilation of defenceless people—such is freedom in the opinion of the imperialists. In Algeria alone, during the war that lasted seven years, the French colonialists killed 800,000 Algerians.

Though more than 650,000,000 have freed themselves from the shackles of colonialism in Africa and Asia since 1945, some 50,000,000 are still under its yoke.

No matter how the apologists of imperialism try they are unable to conceal the predatory colonialist policy of their countries. Their efforts to besmear and misrepresent the just national policy of the Soviet Union are similarly futile. The contrast is too great between the flourishing culture and well-being of the peoples of the non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R. and the poverty and ignorance of the population of the "free" countries.

A guarantee of the happy life of all Soviet peoples is their mutual friendship and fraternal solidarity.

The Programme of the C.P.S.U. says: "Full-scale communist construction constitutes a new stage in the development of national relations in the U.S.S.R. in which the nations will

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 293.

^{**} Geoffrey Wheeler, "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R.", The Political Quarterly, London, July-September 1958, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 219.

draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved. The building of the material and technical basis of communism leads to still greater unity of the Soviet peoples. The exchange of material and spiritual values between nations becomes more and more intensive, and the contribution of each republic to the common cause of communist construction increases. Obliteration of distinctions between classes and the development of communist social relations make for a greater social homogeneity of nations and contribute to the development of common communist traits in their culture, morals and way of living, to a further strengthening of their mutual trust and friendship."*

One of the many examples proving the full equality enjoyed by people of different nationalities is the fact that every citizen of a Union Republic is a citizen of the U.S.S.R. Citizens of the Uzbek, Tajik, Turkmen, Kazakh and Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republics have the right to elect and be elected to the Supreme and local Soviets of their republics and to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. Every nationality has its representatives in the higher organs of state power.

All the national republics, as equal members, are represented in the Soviet of Nationalities of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., where deputies, in addition to representing the interests of their republics and helping to settle political, economic and cultural issues with due consideration for national features, effectively participate in the administration of the state. A prominent role in the practical activity of the Soviet state is played, for instance, by the Chairmen of the Presidiums of the Supreme Soviets of Union Republics who are usually Vice-Chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., by the Chairmen of the Councils of Ministers who are also members of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., and by the Chairmen of Supreme Courts who simultaneously are members of the Supreme Court of the U.S.S.R.

A striking example of the freedom of the national republics of Central Asia is their right to have their own troops, enter into direct relations with foreign states and to conclude agreements and exchange diplomatic and consular representatives with them.

This right has enabled the Union Republics to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign states and promote political, economic and cultural ties with them and foster reciprocal exchanges of delegations, visits by statesmen, artists,

scientists and tourists.

Many statesmen, public leaders and scientists from the Central Asian republics have participated in the work of the United Nations Organisation, international scientific congresses, conventions and conferences. For example, the Foreign Minister of the Uzbek Republic was a member of the Soviet delegation to the U.N., the Uzbek Minister of Justice participated in the Sixth Congress of Jurists (in Belgium), prominent scientists from all the Union Republics took part in the Third Session of the Philosophical Congress (in Pakistan), the International Convention of Chemists, the World Astronomical Congress (in Rome), the Twenty-Third International Congress of Orientalists (in London), the Session of the Pakistani Medical Association, the Colloquium of Low Energy Nuclear Physics (in Hungary), the Conference on the Uses of Radioisotopes (in Denmark), the Twenty-Second Physiological Congress (in the Netherlands), the Symposium on Radiation Injury (in Italy), the International Congress on the Effects of Radiation (in Britain), and so on.

In 1962-63, more than 30 scientists of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences alone travelled abroad, many of whom attended and spoke at international scientific and technical congresses, conferences and symposiums. Among those who made trips abroad in 1962-63 were members of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, A. Y. Yunusov, S. V. Starodubtsev, T. A. Sarymsakov, U. A. Arifov and I. M. Muminov, corresponding members of the Academy K.S. Akhmedov, M.Z. Khamudkhanov, R. A. Alimjanov and V. P. Shcheglov, and Doctors of Science N. K. Abubakirov, I. Kh. Khamrabayev, T. Bada-

lov and M. Y. Antonovsky.

Many foreign statesmen and scientists have visited the Central Asian republics. Tashkent alone, now an important international and cultural centre of the East, has been the venue of an Afro-Asian Writers' Conference attended by delegates from 50 countries, an Afro-Asian film festival, the First All-Union Conference of Orientalists, a Conference on Problems of Cotton-Growing, seminars on health protection

^{*} The Road to Communism (Documents of the Twenty-Second Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union), Moscow, pp. 557-58.

and the co-operative movement, a chess tournament and many other international undertakings.

More than 50 delegates from 24 countries of all the continents and 11 Union Republics of the U.S.S.R. participated in the work of the international symposium on the problem and effect of the secondary soil salination, chemical composition and regime of ground waters that took place in Tashkent in 1962. A major international undertaking in Tashkent was the four-month UNESCO study courses on the hydrology and improvement of salinated soil organised for specialists from Asian and African countries by the Institute of Hydrogeology and Land Improvement of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences. An important contribution towards the establishment of international contacts was made, for instance, by the International Itinerant Seminar on Problems of Obstetrics and Gynaecology organised in Tashkent by the World Health Organisation. It lasted for almost a week in the first half of July 1964, and was attended by specialists from Indonesia, Yugoslavia, Ceylon, Greece, Ghana, Japan, Pakistan, Nigeria, India, Chile, Ecuador, Spain, Venezuela, Peru, Iran and New Guinea.

The flow of delegations and tourists, all of whom are cordially welcomed in all Central Asian republics, is increasing. The number of foreign delegations visiting Uzbekistan, for example, increased from 124 in 1956 to 400 in 1962. In the period 1956-62 the Uzbek Republic was host to 2,161 foreign delegations from 98 countries of all the five continents.

Simultaneously, there has been a growth of the number of delegations and tourists from Central Asia and Kazakhstan going abroad. In 1956, delegations and tourist groups from Uzbekistan totalling 1,750 persons visited 29 countries; in 1962, Uzbek delegations went to more than 50 countries and Uzbek tourists visited 32 countries. Contacts with foreign countries are maintained through trade union, women's, youth and other organisations. In 1962, the Uzbek Council of Trade Unions was host to 36 trade union and workers' delegations from abroad. At the same time Uzbek trade union delegations visited 21 countries.

The steadily growing interchange between writers, journalists, composers, painters, theatrical and film workers, and exchanges of books with all the People's Democracies

are an indication that international contacts are developing. In 1963, the Uzbek Academy of Sciences alone sent abroad over 3,530 books and magazines and received 3,080 publications in return.

This in itself is sufficient to convincingly demonstrate that the peoples of Soviet Central Asia are in full measure exercising their sovereign right in foreign relations. The facts we have cited refute the anti-Soviet fabrications that there is no contact between the Soviet Central Asian republics and the neighbouring countries, that "an iron curtain was erected along the entire southern frontiers of the Soviet Union" causing their artificial isolation and "their segregation from the outside world", that the peoples of Central Asia have no right to travel, etc.*

The apologists of capitalism are endeavouring to discover Soviet "colonialism" in the official figures on the composition of the population of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic. An identical claim is contained in an article published by Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society. It presents the 1959 census as having been influenced by the policy of resettlement.**

The Central Asian Review also carried an article alleging that the change in the numerical composition of the population of Kazakhstan was due to Russian domination.***

Douglas Dillon, former U.S. Under-Secretary of State, tries to prove the same thing. Referring to the figures of the latest population census in the U.S.S.R., he arrives at the conclusion that all the non-Russian peoples in the U.S.S.R. live under colonial yoke. Citing Kazakhstan as an example, he makes the groundless assertion that the Kazakhs are nothing more than peasants in their own land.

He and his like resort to the favourite practice of the falsifiers by saying that the population of Kazakhstan has

^{* &}quot;A New Departure", Central Asian Review, London, Vol. V, No. 3, p. 231; Geoffrey Wheeler, "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R.", The Political Quarterly, London, July-September 1958, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 222; Richard A. Pierce, "Russian Central Asia, 1867-1917", A Study in Colonial Rule, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1960, p. 306.

^{** &}quot;The Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R.", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, London, 1960, April, Vol. XLVII, Part II, pp. 106-08.

^{*** &}quot;The Social Structure and Customs of the Kazakhs", Central Asian Review, London, 1957, Vol. V. No. 1, p. 6.

increased through Russian resettlement, and cite only the result without adducing the cause. It is not in their interests to recall that the population of Kazakhstan increased as an outcome of the epoch-making, revolutionary measures taken by the Communist Party to develop millions of hectares of virgin and disused lands and foster the rapid growth of the republic's industry. On the basis of their deductions people like Dillon endeavour to promote their thesis of the enslavement of the Kazakh people.

The development of virgin and disused lands and the rapid growth of industry could not but result in an increase in the republic's population, which mounted by 53 per cent in the 20 years between the two censuses. The native Kazakh population also grew by 21 per cent despite the exhausting

war.

It should be remembered that the rise in the population of the republic caused by the arrival of Russians and people of other nationalities was not the only result in the realisation of the grandiose plans for reclaiming virgin and disused lands. In addition to farm machine-operators, building workers, engineers, technicians, doctors and other specialists, all the fraternal republics sent first-class technical equipment, building materials, fertilisers and so forth to Kazakhstan.

The new-arrivals helped the Kazakhs to open up vast expanses of virgin steppeland, and to build modern settlements with schools, medical institutions, welfare amenities, workshops, oil dumps, electric power stations and other industrial projects. The development of these lands completely changed the appearance of the republic's towns and villages and raised its economy and culture to a high level.

Kazakhstan's industrial development is the result of mutual aid within the close-knit family of Soviet peoples. All Soviet republics helped to build heavy industries-the republic's new large coal centre, a giant iron and steel plant, harvester combine and aluminium plants, an ore-dressing mill and other

large industrial enterprises.

By joint effort the Soviet peoples freed the people of Kazakhstan from backwardness, ignorance, poverty, hunger and political oppression, which had been their lot before the October Revolution. Today Kazakhstan is an independent industrial and agrarian republic, which has by-passed

the agonising stage of capitalist development and built socialism.

Irrespective of their nationality or geographical location, Soviet people always render assistance to those peoples and republics which need it most, and, of course, many settle in the new places thus changing the national composition of the

population of the given republic.

People representing many socialist nations are working on large projects in other Union Republics. For example, nearly fifty nationalities of the Soviet Union, including those of Central Asia and Kazakhstan, are working on the Bratsk Hydropower Station. The whole country helped build the new industrial centres of Sumgait and Mingechaur in Azerbaijan. Workers representing many nationalities are putting up Central Asia's biggest hydropower station at Nurek on the Vakhsh River in Tajikistan, and many other projects. Creative co-operation and mutual assistance underlie the relations between the Soviet peoples in all spheres of social activity.

Friendship among the peoples of Russia, which began to take shape before the Revolution in joint action against tsarism, the common enemy of all working people, was steeled and consolidated during the Revolution, the Civil War, the period of economic rehabilitation, the life-and-death struggle against the nazi invaders and in the ensuing years of economic development. Marxism-Leninism teaches that this friendship will continue to be cemented in the period of full-scale communist construction, which, as the C.P.S.U. Programme puts it, is "a new stage in the development of national relations in the U.S.S.R. in which the nations will draw still closer together until complete unity is achieved".* This will come about as a result of joint efforts in solving economic problems in the building of the material and technical basis of communism.

As regards Dillon's fabrications, his empty talk about all Kazakhs being peasants will convince no one. That situation obtained before the Revolution and in the first years of Soviet rule. In 1926, 93 per cent of the Kazakh population were peasants, but in 1939 their number fell to 64 per cent, and in 1959 to 39 per cent. Today 16 per cent of the Kazakh

^{*} The Road to Communism, Moscow, p. 559.

population are engineers, technicians, agronomists, educational workers, doctors or other mental workers; 19 per cent are industrial workers, and 26 per cent are farm machine operators and other workers at state farms.

Bourgeois falsifiers, however, choose not to mention these

figures.

Reactionary foreign literature alleges that discrimination is practised against the population of Central Asia. Some bourgeois historians, like the French writer Vincent Monteil in his Soviet Muslims, hold "that the Muslims are masters neither in their republics, nor in the state apparatus, nor within the Party, nor in the political militia".* Ann Shukman, author of the series of surveys entitled "The Muslim Republics in the U.S.S.R.", completely ignores well-known facts and draws the conclusion that "today the majority of responsible posts in every field are held by non-natives. These facts receive little publicity and in Soviet propaganda works a deliberate attempt is made to create the opposite impression".**

Alexander G. Park in *Bolshevism in Turkestan* comes out with the absurd assertion that the Soviet Government encourages make-believe participation of the native population

in the administrative apparatus.***

Reality, however, disproves these and similar fabrications. As we have pointed out earlier, the Soviet Government, true to its Leninist national policy, draws people of non-Russian nationalities into socialist construction and promotes them to responsible posts.

Even in the years when there were almost no educated people among the non-Russian population, the Communist Party concentrated on training specialists and administrative,

state and Party workers.

Today the majority of the responsible posts in the national economy of the republics are held by non-Russians. The following data show that the composition of the organs of state power in Central Asian republics, elected on March 3, 1963, is genuinely national: the 458 deputies to the Supreme

Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic include 321 Uzbeks, 61 Russians, 18 Kazakhs, 13 Ukrainians, 12 Kara-Kalpakians, 9 Tajiks and 4 Koreans; in the Supreme Soviet of the Turkmen Soviet Socialist Republic there are 282 deputies of whom 192 are Turkmenians, 52 Russians, 16 Uzbeks, 5 Kazakhs, 5 Ukrainians, and 12 seats are occupied by other nationalities; the Supreme Soviet of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic has 473 deputies of whom 215 are Kazakhs, 179 Russians, 50 Ukrainians and 29 deputies of other nationalities; the 339 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic include 196 Kirghiz, 82 Russians, 29 Ukrainians and 18 Uzbeks; of the 300 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic 211 are Tajiks, 42 Uzbeks, 32 Russians, the remaining deputies are Kirghiz, Turkmenians, Georgians, Armenians and others.

A more impressive picture is presented by the state administrative bodies and the various ministries, most of which are headed by non-Russians. An analogous situation obtains in the militia or, as Monteil calls it, "political militia". According to the latest figures given by the Ministry for Internal Affairs, 60.5 per cent of the personnel of the Uzbek Internal Affairs Ministry are non-Russians, of whom 43 per cent are Uzbeks; on the whole 68 per cent of the militia are non-

Russians.

Even these incomplete data are ample proof that there is no political inequality in the non-Russian republics of the Soviet Union, that the local population is in charge of the national economy and that it plays the leading role in state, economic and cultural development.

A fitting reply to attacks of reactionary bourgeois historians are the opinions of unbiased foreigners, who have visited the

Soviet Union and its Central Asian republics.

After seeing Uzbekistan, Pandit Onkar Nath Thakur, Vice-President of the All-India Peace Council, wrote that Uzbekistan had become a highly developed country, whose achievements are multiplying from day to day. Ranking first among its remarkable gains, in his opinion, were the outstanding successes in promoting national and racial equality. He said that Uzbekistan is a striking illustration of how a once backward people developed rapidly and that it is a vivid example for people who desire to live in freedom from castes

^{*} Vincent Monteil, Les Musulmans Soviétiques, Paris, 1957, p. 57.

** Ann Shukman, "The Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R.", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XLVII, April 1960, Part II, p. 108.

*** Alexander G. Park, Bolshevism in Turkestan, 1917-1927, New York, 1957, pp. 185-203.

and exploitation, as equal among equals, without racial discrimination.

Speaking of the Soviet national policy, W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, a British couple who travelled in Central Asia, wrote in their book *Soviets in Central Asia*: "Whatever may be thought of the Soviet system, whether one likes or dislikes it, no one can deny that the Soviet national policy . . . has

been an outstanding success."*

Remarks in a similar vein were made by Joseph Nort, prominent U.S. writer and journalist. In an article for the newspapers *Pravda Vostoka* and *Kzyl Uzbekistan* and in a number of features in *The Worker*, he contrasts the oppressed position of the American Negroes with what he saw in socialist Uzbekistan. There are nearly 20 million Negroes in the U.S., he wrote, but though the Civil War ended almost a hundred years ago, their children still have no right to education on equal terms with white children.

Angello Frandza also speaks of racial discrimination in U.S. schools. In 17 southern states only 7 per cent of Negro children attend so-called state schools for Whites. The rate at which desegregation is progressing makes him come to the conclusion that segregation in schools in the southern

states will be ended only after the year 2400.

George Morris, Labour Editor of *The Worker*, wrote: "I found here (Tashkent industrial enterprises-*Kh. I.*) ... that there is no economic differential on nationality, sectional or sex grounds."**

Morris said that the Russians, Uzbeks, Tajiks, Georgians, Kirghiz, Tatars and people of other nationalities employed at the textile mills and at the Tashkent Textile Machine Plant

work together as a friendly family.

K. Tsioupras, correspondent of the Cyprus newspaper Haravgi, who visited Uzbekistan in July 1964, describes the friendly relations between the different nationalities in the republic, particularly in the Hungry Steppe, as a wonderful feature of the Soviet Union. Dwelling on his impressions, he declares that the example of Uzbekistan shows the peoples of other countries how to build up relations between various

national groups. He says that the population of his native country has much in common with the Uzbeks, and stresses that the Uzbeks have already acquired the benefits of socialism, while the Cypriots are still struggling for their right to self-determination.

An impartial appraisal of national problems in the Soviet Union is given by the authors of articles in the Cahiers du monde russe et Soviétique, a publication of the French centre for the study of the U.S.S.R. and the Slav countries, whose first issue came out in May 1959. Their correct estimate of the Soviet national policy exposed the fabrications of many bourgeois authors. For example, Nos. 1 (May 1959) and 3 (April 1960) of the magazine carried articles by A. Benningsen and C. Quelquejay on various aspects of the life and customs of the peoples of Central Asia. The authors reach the conclusion that "the evolution of the Muslim family in the U.S.S.R. . . . did not result in the Russification of Muslim society but, on the contrary, reinforced the national sentiments",* and that the national inequality which was fostered by tsarism has been eradicated.

The absurd conclusions drawn by reactionary bourgeois historians that there is "Soviet colonialism" in Central Asia are exposed by unbiased foreigners who have seen for themselves the present life of the peoples of the Soviet East.

M. Ispahani, a Pakistani bourgeois leader, who toured Uzbekistan, wrote in his book *Leningrad to Samarkand* (published in Karachi in 1962) that though he had heard talk of the Central Asian republics groaning under "Russian oppression", he, personally, had seen nothing of the sort.

Soviet people indignantly reject the slander that "Soviet colonialism" exists. Replying to the battered fabrications of Yaroslav Bylinsky of Brunswick University published in New York Times, M. Karimov, a member of the Karl Marx Collective Farm, Angor District, Surkhan Darya Region, writes: "All these stories about the privileged position of some nationalities in Soviet Central Asia are preposterous. You are not being clever, gentlemen from the New York Times, but funny. The thousands upon thousands of examples from our life knock the props from under all your mendacious fabrications."

^{*} W. P. and Zelda K. Coates, Soviets in Central Asia, London, 1951, p. vii.

^{**} George Morris, "Uzbek Textile Machine Plants", The Worker, May 3, 1959, p. 6.

^{*} Cahiers du monde russe et Soviétique, No. 1, 1959, p. 108.

Describing his family, Karimov calls it an ordinary family of a collective farmer. Both he and his wife, Saibjamal, are pensioners. Their 11 children are educated people. Among them are institute graduates, students and pupils of secondary schools. Some took jobs at the collective farm after

finishing secondary or seven-year school.

Writing about the comfortable circumstances enjoyed by his family, this simple Soviet worker recalls the abject and hapless life eked out by his father's family before the October Revolution, when all its members, including small children, laboured in the sweat of their brows for a few miserable crumbs, which Ibraghim, the bai, would give them. Karimov concludes with the words: "Soviet power brought us a new life, the joy of unfettered labour and the light of knowledge."

Bylinsky is wrathfully rebuffed by Doctor of Medical Sciences, Professor Guliya Sulaimanova. She tells the story of her family: "When our father died, our illiterate mother was left with five infants on her hands. But thanks to Soviet power, which looked after us as our father would have done, all of us received an education and found our way in life. Each of us had his dreams and they materialised. My sister Hadicha, Doctor of Jurisprudence, is Chairman of the Juridical Commission of the Council of Ministers of Uzbekistan and a member of the Academy of Sciences of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic. Niyaz, my brother, who is a Candidate of Medical Sciences, is in Leningrad where he is working on his thesis for a Doctor's Degree. My husband, Djura, and I are Doctors of Medical Sciences and Professors."

Only Soviet power opened the road to a happy life to such prominent Soviet scientists as the Rajabov brothers, who were born into the family of a poor shoemaker. One of them. Sali, is Rector at the Tajik State University, a member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences and Doctor of Jurisprudence; his brother, Zarif, is a corresponding member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences and Director of the Academy's Institute of History; the third brother, Dodo, is a reader and assistant rector of the Inter-

Republican Higher Party School in Tashkent.

Such examples from the life of the formerly oppressed peoples of Central Asia are commonplace. But it will not be superfluous to say a few words about the family of the old Turkmen Bolshevik Atamurat Bazarov, whose father was a

farm labourer. The October Revolution saved him from becoming an oppressed farm labourer like his father. From the first days of Soviet rule he actively participated in building a new life and held responsible government and Party posts. Today he is head of a department at the Charjou Town Executive Committee. One of his daughters, Rosa, is a Candidate of Historical Sciences and a reader and assistant rector of the Turkmenistan's Lenin Teachers' Institute. Khatydsha, another of his daughters, is a Candidate of Philological Sciences and a reader at the same Institute; his third daughter, Maria, and his son, Babamurat, are working on their candidate's theses under the guidance of physicists of Moscow and Kiev.

Or take the Shakhabov family. Did Shakhabov ever think one of his sons, Fazliddin, would become a Merited Art Worker of Tajikistan, that his other son, Badriddin, a Merited Doctor of the Republic, or that his daughter, Malohat, instead of being chained to the household and having to wear a horsehair veil all her life, as did the women of pre-Revolution Turkestan, would hold the Chair of Foreign Languages at the State University of Tajikistan. The Shakhabovs have another relative they are proud of. He is Shonazar Sakhibov, Malohat's father-in-law, who is a Merited Art Worker of the

Uzbek and Tajik Republics.

Impartial foreign researchers do not conceal their admiration for the wonderful transformations that have taken place in the Central Asian republics, their freedom and independence and the equality of their peoples. In a reference to the non-Russian republics of the U.S.S.R., L'Histoire Générale des Civilisations, published in Paris in 1957, states: "These are no longer exploited territories, colonial purveyors of raw materials for the industries of the metropolis; they are steadily changing the nature of their products. New railways permit them to make the utmost use of their natural resources. The rate of development of these territories is much faster than in Europe and their investments are proportionately greater than in the European part of the U.S.S.R.... All these territories have gone through a stupendous transformation which enabled them to enter the economy of the Soviet Union as equal partners."*

^{*} L'Histoire Général des Civilisations, Paris, 1957, Vol. VII, pp. 270-71.

Speaking of the equality and rapid development of the former colonial territories of the old tsarist empire, and especially of the Central Asian republics, R. Palme Dutt writes: "The picture of equality and rapid advance of the former colonial territories of the old Tsarist Empire, and especially of the Central Asian republics, cannot but give cause for furious thought to all colonial peoples. It is a picture which inevitably arouses bitter comparison with the stagnation and exploitation of every colony under imperialism. But it is a picture which also holds out glowing hope and confidence for the future advance which can be achieved in every colonial territory everywhere without exception, once the imperialist yoke has been thrown off and the colonial people have become masters of their own country."*

The Central Committee of the C.P.S.U. and the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R. strengthened the sovereign rights of the non-Russian republics after the Second World War and, in particular, after 1953, when steps were taken to surmount the harmful consequences of the personality cult.

As a result, their role in guiding the national economy was further enhanced. They obtained direct control of almost all the food, meat and milk, fish, procurement, light, textile. building materials, paper and wood-working industries, the motor transport and highways, the river fleet, the health protection system and retail trade and public catering establishments on their territories.

The first step in this direction was the transfer of 40 large industrial enterprises to the control of the Uzbek Republic, and of 144 enterprises to the Kazakh Republic. These included enterprises of the non-ferrous metallurgical, sugar, salt, tobacco and other industries, as well as the largest meatpacking plants and organisations engaged in building metallurgical and chemical plants. The rights of the Union Republics in economic planning, the judiciary, legislation, defence, foreign relations, and other spheres were also considerably broadened.

The extension of the rights of the Union Republics in administrating their economic and cultural construction, stressed the resolution of the Twentieth Congress of the C.P.S.U., will further promote the development of the creative initiative and activity of the masses, the flourishing of the

material and spiritual might of all nations and nationalities of the Soviet Union, the strengthening of friendship among the peoples.

What talk can there then be about enslavement of the

Central Asian peoples?

The foreign press often carries irresponsible statements casting aspersions on the moral and political unity of Soviet society and the friendship among the Soviet peoples, alleging that there is violent discontent among the national minorities in the Soviet Union. In the above-mentioned book, Togan says that there is mutual distrust, estrangement and antagonism between the Russian and non-Russian peoples. For example, when speaking of the attitude of the Russian intelligentsia to other peoples, he upholds the opinion that in its enmity to the non-Russian peoples inhabiting Russia the new Russian intelligentsia is as irreconcilable as tsarism and Orthodox Christianity had been to Islam and Buddhism.*

This zealous champion of imperialism deliberately falsifies reality pretending not to see the new relations that have been established between different peoples as a result of the Revolution and the abolition of capitalism, which preaches and fosters oppression. He heaps dirt on the friendship of the peoples of the U.S.S.R., a friendship that is founded on mutual trust and fraternal co-operation and cemented by practical mutual aid and the common cause of building

communism.

2-755

Foreigners who do not conceal their unfriendly attitude to the Soviet Union, after visiting it, themselves dispel the myth about antagonism, discontent and so on. For example, Averell Harriman, former U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., points out that he visited five non-Russian republics in the Soviet Union and had found no proof to substantiate this "theory".

Reactionary bourgeois historians reach the highest pitch in their falsifications when they "analyse" what they call the issue of "Russian expansion". In an afterword to Features and Objectives of Russian Colonialism, Togan attributes the development of what he also terms "Russian expansion" to Russia's striving to increase the number of her peoples, i.e., to "expand the nation geographically".**

^{*} R. Palme Dutt, Britain's Crisis of Empire, London, 1950, p. 139.

^{*} A. Zeki Velidi Togan, Bugünkü Türkili (Türkistan), ve yakin tarihi, Gilt I, Istanbul, 1942-47, p. 590. ** Ibid.

Similar ideas are voiced by Colonel Geoffrey Wheeler, who writes about the danger of "Russian colonialism" allegedly threatening the newly independent peoples of Asia and Africa, or those who expect to win independence soon. At the same time, he profoundly regrets that the peoples of these continents "imagine that the Soviet Union is an ardent and disinterested champion of their freedom and independence".*

Togan, Wheeler and other opponents of friendship between the Soviet Union and Eastern countries portray the Soviet Union's disinterested aid to the countries that have shaken off colonial oppression as pursuing the aim of seizing these countries. But the peoples receiving this assistance have long ago found that the Soviet Union has no ulterior aims.

Lenin considered "an end to wars, peace among nations, the cessation of pillaging and violence",** as the ideal of

the socialist state.

The Soviet Union's peace-loving foreign policy, based on principles of equality and non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, consistently pursued from the very first day following the establishment of Soviet rule, also

overturns all these and similar fabrications.

The Soviet Government firmly and steadfastly adheres to the Leninist principles of peaceful coexistence. Its proposals for universal and complete disarmament, the dismantling of all military bases on foreign territories, the withdrawal of troops from there, its unilateral reduction in the armed forces of the U.S.S.R., etc., testify to the sincerity of the peace-loving policy pursued by the Soviet Union. Eloquent proof of this can be found in the figures of the State Budget of the U.S.S.R., whose basic outlays are for improving the standard of living, housing and municipal developing, expanding public education and the health service, and promoting culture.

A living symbol of the Soviet Union's policy of peaceful coexistence is its fruitful co-operation with many countries of the world. This co-operation is marked by the enormous aid which the Soviet Union is rendering to the newly independent countries on principles of equality and mutual

respect. Today 150 industrial and other projects built with the assistance of the Soviet Union are operating in 24 developing countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, and 350 others are under construction. Among them are such large heavy industry, power, transport, communication and agricultural projects as the Aswan Hydropower Development on the Nile; coking and engineering plants, oil-refineries, a factory producing welding electrodes, ship-repair yards and an iron-ore concentrating mill in the United Arab Republic; a heavy electrical equipment plant, a thermopower station, heavy machine-building and mining equipment plants in India; a tyre factory in Ceylon; an oil refinery in Ethiopia; a cement mill in the Mali Republic and so forth.

The Soviet Union is helping the less developed countries to prospect for minerals, build ports, railways and highways

and set up communication lines.

The Soviet Union's extensive aid to the developing countries is not limited to the granting of credits or the shipment of industrial, military and farm equipment, foodstuffs, medicines, etc. It also helps these countries by sending them teams of Soviet engineers, technicians, doctors, and by training national specialists in various fields of economy at educational institutions and industrial enterprises in the Soviet Union. At the moment nearly 24,000 foreign students from 128 countries are studying in the U.S.S.R. The Patrice Lumumba Friendship University, founded in Moscow in 1960, alone has 2,600 students from 82 countries, mostly Asian and African. In the period 1956-63 Soviet specialists trained 50,000 persons directly at construction sites in various countries. The U.S.S.R. is helping the developing countries to set up their own educational institutions for training engineers and technicians. Among them are the technological institutes in Burma, Guinea and India, a technical school in Ethiopia, the schools under construction in Mali and Somali and the planned construction of technological institutes in Afghanistan, Tunisia, Indonesia, Cambodia and other countries.

Soviet aid is granted to the developing countries with no political strings attached. Its sole purpose is to strengthen the economic independence of countries that have shaken off the chains of colonialism and entered the road of socialist development. The peace-loving Soviet Union is doing all this in the name of world peace.

^{*} Geoffrey Wheeler, "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R.", The Political Quarterly, London, July-September 1958, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 222.

^{**} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 21, p. 293.

Unbiased foreign guests correctly draw the conclusion that for Soviet people peace and creative work are inseparable. A Brazilian cultural delegation, which visited Uzbekistan, declared that the Uzbek people are engaged in peaceful creative labour and have no other thoughts than that of peace

and of working for peace.

"As with many other visitors to the Soviet Union," writes Averell Harriman, "one of my first and strongest impressions was the craving for peace which obsesses every Soviet citizen. Together with it is the longing for friendly relations with the United States. Wherever I travelled I was greeted with the appeal 'Peace and Friendship'. This was not simply a propaganda slogan. On the contrary, it seemed to spring spontaneously and sincerely from the crowds who gathered around me everywhere."*

Vittorino Veronese, UNESCO Director-General, who travelled to Uzbekistan in June 1960, stated that the Uzbek people are making serious efforts to consolidate world peace.

The well-known U.S. journalist Joseph North wrote that wherever he travelled in Uzbekistan he saw that Soviet people sincerely wanted peace in the world. He declared that the striving of the Soviet people for peace was so earnest that it was leaving its imprint on all spheres of life.

It cannot be otherwise in a socialist country where power belongs to the whole people and not to a small group of exploiters, a country which not only granted genuine freedom and equality to all its nations irrespective of size but is also a staunch fighter for the eradication of national oppression and inequality in countries which have not yet liberated themselves from colonialism. It cannot be otherwise in a country whose ideal is universal peace.

ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL BURGEONING OF THE CENTRAL ASIAN SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS AND KAZAKHSTAN

Economic Development

The October Revolution abolished private ownership on land, water and implements and means of production, emancipated labour from exploitation, for all time to come, and gave all the Soviet peoples extensive rights to political,

economic and cultural development.

On the eve of the Revolution the level of economic and cultural development of the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan was extremely low and they were in need of practical aid from the peoples of more developed countries. Such aid was forthcoming from the Russian people. They helped all the backward peoples of old tsarist Russia to cast off numerous archaic survivals of feudalism, take the road of socialist construction by-passing the capitalist stage of development, and join the ranks of the advanced peoples of Russia.

The First World War and then the Civil War and foreign military intervention completely dislocated the weak economy of Turkestan. At the close of the Civil War farm output was nearly 50 per cent below the 1915 level, and the crop area in Ferghana, Samarkand and Syr Darya provinces, the three major farming regions in Turkestan, decreased by more than 50 per cent. Cotton, the main crop, was affected most of all. In the period 1916-20 the area sown to cotton decreased by more than half a million hectares. Moreover, the yield dropped sharply on account of the lack of fertilisers, poor cultivation of the soil, inadequate pest control and the poor quality of the seeds. Stock-raising and silkworm-breeding

^{*} Averell Harriman, Peace with Russia?, New York, 1959, p. 161.

were also hard hit. The livestock population dropped by

more than 50 per cent.

Almost half of the republic's factories were idle. Some had been destroyed, others were inoperative due to fuel shortage. Industrial output totalled only 20 per cent of the pre-war level. On top of the general economic dislocation, transport was completely disorganised.

The peoples of Central Asia could not by themselves rehabilitate such an utterly devastated economy. Soviet Turkestan, as never before, needed the friendly support of the Russian people, and despite the difficult economic situation in the Russian Republic itself, the Soviet Government

lent the Central Asian peoples fraternal assistance.

Money, farm equipment and vital materials were sent to Turkestan. In 1922 alone, the Soviet Government sent 232,844 gold rubles' worth of farm equipment to the Central Asian republics. By a decree adopted by the All-Russia Central Executive Committee on December 21, 1922, the Central Asian republics were granted a long-term loan of 1,500,000 gold rubles for agricultural rehabilitation and 28,880,000

rubles as advance payment to cotton-growers.

In 1921-23, the central areas of Russia shipped to Turkestan 10,000 hoes, 800 tons of iron, 3,640 ploughs, 549 harrows, 179 seeders and 138 cultivators. For those days this

was a very substantial aid. The Government allocated large funds for irrigation and the building of repair shops and foundries. Supplies of food and manufactured goods, sold at fixed prices to cotton-growers, came in uninterruptedly. In 1923, alone, Turkestan received from Bussia, 368,000 to 1924, and 1924 alone.

In 1923 alone, Turkestan received from Russia 368,000 tons of wheat, 110 railway carloads of sugar, 32 of tea, 150 of crockery and glass, 50 of textiles and 310 of metal wares.

The Soviet Government's economic measures brought about a marked improvement in agriculture. The gross value of farm produce in Turkestan increased by more than 30,000,000 rubles from 1922 to 1923. The crop area increased from 1,092,500 hectares in 1922 to 1,638,750 hectares in 1923, while in the Bukhara Soviet People's Republic it increased by 82.6 per cent as compared with 1913. The total area sown to cotton in the Turkestan, Bukhara and Khoresm republics was increased from 187,135 hectares in 1923 to 376,924 in 1924.

Another factor that stimulated the growth of agricultural production was the improvement of the peasants' standard of

living. Thanks to the concern shown by the central and local governments, the peasants began to buy farm implements and draught animals (the number of draught animals owned by the peasants increased by 30 per cent in 1922-23).

The Party and the Government devoted no less attention to rehabilitating and expanding industry. Considerable headway was made in this field in the already mentioned period. The rehabilitation of industry and agriculture was attended by great difficulties arising, in the first place, from the extreme economic and cultural backwardness, the activity of the *basmachis* and overt and covert sabotage by counter-revolutionaries. It was imperative, in addition to rehabilitating the war-ravaged industry, to establish local industrial centres in Turkestan. It was also necessary to enlarge the proletariat by drawing the masses into socialist construction.

A tremendous part in reviving industry and agriculture was played by the consistent, all-round assistance of the Russian people. Lenin considered that one of the most important prerequisites for abolishing inequality was the establishment of local industrial centres whose output could satisfy the needs of the national economy. With this aim in view, the Soviet Government supplied Turkestan with money and plant for factories and mills. In the period between June 1, 1919, and June 15, 1920, the Central Economic Council gave Turkestan 3,055,000,000 rubles for the needs of the cotton and vegetable oil industries. Technical aid was rendered by Russian workers, technicians and engineers. Nearly 1,700 skilled workers arrived in Turkestan from Russia in the first seven months of 1920 alone.

That year, on Lenin's instructions, Russia shipped equipment for silk, spinning and weaving mills in Ferghana and Margelan, and in 1922 plant for a paper mill, a soap works and a tannery in Bukhara. Specialists were sent to these places at the same time. The large Zarya Vostoka and Krasny Vostok textile mills were transferred from Moscow Region to the

Turkestan Republic.

In this way the proletariat of Russia helped to reconstruct and build a number of industrial enterprises in the Central Asian republics. The old factories in Bukhara, Charjou and Leninabad were reconstructed; work was started to complete the Khilka cement mill, and build textile mills in Ferghana and Ashkhabad, a silk mill in Leninabad, power stations and other important industrial projects. In 1924, nine power stations, two metal-working plants, a silk mill, a tannery and other industrial enterprises were built in Uzbekistan.

The industrial rehabilitation of the Central Asian republics was, in the main, completed in the period 1927-28. New enterprises appeared on the industrial map of these republics.

The rapid economic development of the Eastern republics of the U.S.S.R. led to a considerable growth of the basic assets of industry in the First Five-Year Plan period. Uzbekistan, for instance, registered an increase of 194 per cent, while in the U.S.S.R. as a whole, there was a 112 per cent increase. Or take the total industrial output in 1937 as compared with 1913. In the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic it increased almost 18-fold over the 1913 figure, in Kazakhstan 14-fold and in the Soviet Union as a whole 8-fold. These figures best illustrate the fact that the Communist Party ensured a much faster rate of industrial development for the non-Russian republics as compared with the central areas of the country.

The Soviet Central Asian republics made an unprecedented leap in the development of their heavy industry in the period of the First and Second Five-Year plans. The industrial revolution that took place in Central Asia created conditions for reorganising the whole national economy. The power, fuel, chemical, oil, cotton, cotton-ginning, silk-spinning, metalworking, engineering and food industries were outfitted with modern equipment and considerably enlarged. The first section of the Tashkent Textile Mills became operational during the Second Five-Year Plan. At the close of that period, in Uzbekistan the share of industrial output in the national economy added up to over 67 per cent, in Kazakhstan to 57 per cent, in Tajikistan to 62 per cent (1940) and in Kirghizia to 50 per cent (at the close of 1940), while its total heavy industry output increased 95.5-fold over the 1913 level. At the end of the Second Five-Year Plan period, the total industrial output in Turkmenistan increased almost 54-fold over the 1913 figure.

The above data prove that the formerly backward agrarian colonies of tsarist Russia became industrial and agrarian countries

Industrial development was galvanised by the Central Asian republics still greater during the Second World War

and in the post-war period. New industries sprang up as a result of the shifting of numerous industrial enterprises and complete sets of equipment from the western areas, and the building of new workshops, factories, mills and mines.

A large number of factories was evacuated to Kazakhstan. These factories as well as reconstructed and newly built enterprises gave the republic engineering, oil refining, zinc, ferrous metallurgical and agricultural fertiliser industries, i.e., industries it never had before. Many towns in Kazakhstan became important industrial centres. Tajikistan, Kirghizia and Turkmenistan also built new enterprises. Electrical farm machines and tractor components plants, cement, glassware and tobacco factories, several creameries and a weaving mill were built in Tajikistan. Its textile industry received a further boost with the completion of the first section of the huge cotton mill in Dushanbe, which brought the production of cotton textiles up from 200,000 metres in 1940 to 3,000,000 metres in 1945. There was also an increase in the production of coal and ores of non-ferrous rare metals.

The share of the heavy industry in the economy of Uzbekistan rose from 13 per cent in 1940 to 40 per cent in 1946, while such branches of the heavy industry as metal-working and engineering expanded 4-fold and 11.4-fold respectively. There was also a very substantial rise in the output of oil and coal in the republic. In Tajikistan nearly 20 per cent more coal was mined in 1945 than in 1940. In Kazakhstan the coal output in 1945 increased by 75.2 per cent, the output of electricity by 93 per cent and the production of petroleum

by 150 per cent over the pre-war level.

As in all other republics of the Soviet Union, post-war industry developed at an unprecedented rate in the Soviet Eastern republics. A number of operating enterprises were remodelled, new equipment was installed in them and the technology of production was brought up-to-date.

Parallel with the commissioning of new factories and mills, the production of many new items was started. Shortly after the war, Uzbekistan began producing rolled steel, linters, excavators, compressors, diesel engines, cranes, machines for the textile and food industries, cotton-pickers, cotton stem cutters, chemical equipment, horse-drawn cotton seeders, fertilisers, centrifugal and vacuum pumps, high-tension and control wires, transformers, and many other items.

In Uzbekistan industrial output increased by 61 per cent in 1950-55. In that period the output of electricity rose by approximately 45 per cent, steel production climbed by 77 per cent, rolled metals by 88 per cent and the output of the metal-working and engineering industries by 80 per cent. The light and food industries made substantial headway. Like the heavy industry they received modern plant, started the production of new items and considerably exceeded the planned quota for the output of consumer goods.

In Kirghizia a further boost was given to the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical, engineering and mining industries during the First and Second post-war five-year plans. The large Frunze Agricultural Machine-Building Plant was commissioned. During the Fifth Five-Year Plan alone, 30 big industrial enterprises and electric power stations were built

and commissioned.

The light and food industries also developed rapidly. The production of silk fabrics during the Fifth Five-Year Plan period grew by 60 per cent, leather footwear by 70 per cent

and knitwear by 100 per cent.

The notable advance recorded by industry in Uzbekistan in the past several years is illustrated by the following statistics on output in 1963: electric power-8,000 million kwh; coal-4,716,000 tons; petroleum-1,792,000 tons; steel-343,000 tons; diesel engines-9,160; centrifugal pumps-9,330; cottoncleaning machines-9,552; tractors and tractor-hauled seeders-18,078; chemical equipment-12,800,000 rubles' worth; cotton and silk fabrics-216,900,000 square metres; raw silk-959,000 tons, etc. Currently, extensive work is in progress to supply the republic with all the gas it needs. In 1963 Uzbekistan produced 2,989,000,000 cubic metres of gas, and in the first six months of 1964 its output increased to 3,845,000,000 cubic metres. The new 650-kilometre Jarkak-Bukhara-Samarkand-Tashkent trunk gas pipeline has been commissioned. This pipeline transports gas to many towns. Natural gas from Bukhara is being used for the giant Chirchik Electro-Chemical Plant and other industrial enterprises.

The 4,000-kilometre Gazli-Chelyabinsk and Gazli-Sverd-lovsk pipeline is under construction, and it is planned to lay gas pipelines in Kazakhstan, Kirghizia and Turkmenistan.

In the other Central Asian republics industrial development was just as rapid. In Turkmenistan, for example, an oil

refinery, petroleum pipeline, a cement, an extraction and cart factories were built and put into operation, and the capacity of the ginneries was increased during the Fourth Five-Year Plan.

Turkmenistan, which was one of the most backward colonies of tsarist Russia, started manufacturing bulldozers, centrifugal oil pumps and technological equipment for the trade and public catering networks. The first powerful Soviet ventilators for oil refineries, metallurgical and chemical plants and big power stations were made in Turkmenistan.

During the Fifth Five-Year Plan, more than 20 large industrial establishments were built in Turkmenistan with the result that industrial output increased by 79 per cent as compared with 1950 and 70-fold as compared with 1913. The oil, chemical, light and food industries continued to expand at a rapid pace, substantially increasing their output.

In 1963 the republic produced 5,716,000 tons of petroleum, 145,000 cubic metres of prefabricated reinforced-concrete parts and units, 42,000 square metres of carpets and rugs and 145,000 square metres of silk fabrics. There was also a rise in the output of mineral fertilisers, sulphuric acid, steel, rolled metal, ferrous metals, cement, cotton-picking machines, etc. Recently commissioned important industrial enterprises include the superphosphate mill in Charjou, an oil-equipment plant in Ashkhabad, Bezmein District Heat and Power Station and large oilfields in Kattur-tepe and Okarem. Turkmenistan accounts for 80 per cent of the oil extracted in Soviet Central Asia or considerably more than is produced by France, Italy and Britain taken together. It exports petroleum to many foreign countries, Cuba included. Large gas deposits have been discovered in the central and eastern areas of the Kara Kum Desert. A giant pipeline will carry Kara Kum gas to the central regions of the country. The first section of the pipeline will transport 18,000 million cubic metres of gas annually.

Almost in all branches of industry in Tajikistan new big factories and mills have been built, including the Kanibadam casting and engineering plant, the Takob fluor-spar mill, several ginneries, a woodworking plant, a sewing and knitwear mill, two jute factories and a plant manufacturing prefabricated reinforced-concrete parts and units in Dushanbe.

The output of many industries has surpassed the pre-war

level, and there has been a sharp rise in the output of the light and food industries. For example, during the Fifth Five-Year Plan period, as compared with the Fourth Five-Year Plan period, the output of cotton fibre increased by 240 per cent, cotton fabrics by 150 per cent, silk fabrics by 160 per cent, leather footwear by 40 per cent, meat by 50 per cent, butter by 20 per cent, vegetable oils by 70 per cent and confectionery by 150 per cent.

Several large hydropower stations have been built in Tajikistan in the past few years. The annual output of the Friendship Among Peoples (Druzhba Narodov) Development alone is 100 times greater than the total quantity of electricity generated in the whole of Turkestan in 1913. In 1965, the power stations of Tajikistan will produce as much energy as was generated by all the power stations in tsarist Russia

in 1913.

The post-war years have witnessed unparalleled development of the socialist industry of Kazakhstan. Simultaneously with the increase of production capacities of the functioning enterprises, important new ones, primarily of the engineering and ferrous metals industries, have been built. For the first time in its history Kazakhstan has begun to produce rolled metal, equipment for the ferrous and non-ferrous metallurgical, mining and coal industries, farm machines, forging and press machines and machine tools. Large mines, an oreprocessing plant, big hydropower stations, creameries, meatpacking plants, a macaroni factory, a champagne distillery, a sewing factory, a cotton mill and other projects have been commissioned. Hundreds of industrial projects have been built in the past decade, including such important ones as the Sokolovsko-Sarbai Ore-Dressing Mill, the Karaganda Metallurgical Plant, the Aktyubinsk Chrome Compounds Mill, the Temir-Tash Synthetic Rubber Factory, the Chimkent and Semipalatinsk cement mills, the Bukhtarma Hydropower Station and the Karaganda District Heat and Power Plant.

Already in 1955 industrial output was nearly 300 per cent

above the pre-war figure.

In Soviet years Kazakhstan has become a major industrial republic, ranking third among the other Soviet republics for the volume of industrial output. Kazakhstan gives the Soviet Union 75 per cent of its lead, 40 per cent of its zinc and 40 per cent of its copper. Like in the other Central Asian

republics, its level of industrial output is much higher than in many European states, let alone countries like Pakistan, Turkey and Iran with which it was once on the same rung of development. In 1960, for example, it surpassed Turkey in the output of steel, electricity and coal by 50 per cent, 300 per cent and 400 per cent respectively, and Pakistan 23 times, 11 times and 50 times respectively.

Even these incomplete data irrefutably prove that the industry built in the Central Asian republics in Soviet years fully reflects the social changes that have taken place and that its power capacity cannot be compared with the primitive industry of pre-Revolution Turkestan, where cotton-ginneries and creameries accounted for 90 per cent of the total industrial product. The tiny "heavy industry" enterprises made up only two per cent and the output of electricity was only

a fraction of one per cent of the total product.

The high level of industrial development in the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan is shown by the substantial annual increment in the volume of industrial output. In 1962, industrial output in Uzbekistan increased 21 times, in Kirghizia 66 times, in Tajikistan 41 times and in Turkmenia 24 times over the pre-Revolution level. In Kazakhstan today the industrial output is 72 times greater than in 1913. As an industrial producer Kazakhstan ranks third after the Russian Federation and the Ukraine. Uzbekistan holds fourth place.

Before the Revolution a big producer of cotton and silk like Central Asia did not have a single textile mill, but today it holds a leading place in the Soviet Union in the manufacture of cotton fabrics and is one of the world's major producers of cotton fibre. Uzbekistan produces 60 per cent of Soviet Central Asia's cotton. Its output of silk cocoons is 50 per cent greater than that of Brazil, France, Turkey, Iran, Greece, Spain, the Lebanon, Indo-China and the Congo taken together.

The Central Asian republics, which have a population of about 23,000,000, generate 200 per cent more electricity than Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan and the U.A.R., whose population totals nearly 170 million. The output of electricity in Uzbekistan, for instance, increased approximately 1,300-fold as compared with 1913.

Uzbekistan has more than 100 industries with more than 1,500 large state enterprises, including 56 engineering plants

(of which 15 are electrical engineering and instrument-making plants, 12 are general engineering plants, seven are tractor and farm machine factories, four manufacture heavy equipment and road-building machinery), large ferrous and nonferrous metallurgical plants, chemical works, buildingmaterial factories, ginneries, coal mines and oilfields. At the close of 1961, the republic's industries employed 365,000 persons. The heavy industry alone has nearly 600 per cent more workers than were engaged in all the industries of pre-Revolution Uzbekistan. Paul K. Cook in The Administration and Distribution of Soviet Industry, Dimensions of Soviet Economic Power, published in Washington in 1962, writes that the industrial output per worker in Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenia and Uzbekistan is above the country's average.

Before the Revolution Central Asia imported from Russia items such as bread, confectionery, crockery, footwear, clothes, soap, matches and so forth, besides fuel, machines, equipment for the primary processing of cotton. Today these republics manufacture almost everything they need and even export light and heavy industry products to fraternal republics of the U.S.S.R. and to foreign countries. Uzbekistan exports cotton fibre, cotton down, cotton cakes, farm machinery, compressors, equipment for the textile and chemical industries, cranes, excavators, suction dredges, diesel engines, pumps, wire, electrical equipment, medicines, and food and light industry products to 55 countries, including 27 in Asia and Africa.

Here is what Holland Roberts, President of the American Russian Institute in San Francisco, writes in this connection: "At the turn of the century builders in that primitive land imported such simple necessities as nails. Now Uzbekistan exports complex farming machinery and mining and construction equipment for electrical, radio and chemical industries to Asia and Europe."*

Agriculture in Central Asia also underwent radical changes. The agrarian policy of the Communist Party and Soviet Government, and the legislative acts on the land problem which were passed in the interests of the peasants, gave wide

scope for the development of the new socialist relations in agriculture and for revolutionary reforms.

Lenin said that in a peasant country such as Russia "it was the peasantry as a whole who were the first to gain, who gained most, and gained immediately from the dictatorship of the proletariat. The peasant in Russia starved under the landowners and capitalists. Throughout the long centuries of our history, the peasant never had an opportunity to work for himself.... For the first time the peasant has seen real freedom-freedom to eat his bread, freedom from starvation."*

What Lenin said about the peasants of Russia in general, in full measure was true of the peasants of Turkestan, where in addition to their backbreaking labour, illiteracy, poverty and constant hunger they were robbed and oppressed by landowners, capitalists, bais, tsarist and local officials, traders and money-lenders. Soviet rule freed them from the chains of feudalism and capitalism, and helped them to build a new life.

"The Soviet Government," said V. I. Lenin, "gives all the aid it is capable of to the labouring peasants, the poor and middle peasants, who make up the vast majority."**

The Soviet Government has always given its closest attention to raising the living standard of the dekhans and promoting agriculture in Central Asia. In 1919 the credits extended to the peasants totalled 300,000,000 rubles, and in 1920 to 5,000,000,000 rubles. Aid to the peasants increased steadily.

Notwithstanding the difficult economic situation in those years, the Soviet Government allocated large funds (502,000,000 rubles in April 1918) for cotton-growing, the rehabilitation and enlargement of the irrigation system and the textile industry. On May 17, 1918, Lenin signed a decree allocating 50,000,000 rubles for irrigation in Turkestan. Construction was started on large irrigation canals in the Hungry Steppe and the Uch-Kurgan Steppe in Ferghana Province, a water reservoir in the Zeravshan River valley, and an irrigation system in the Chu River valley. When these projects were completed they made it possible to sow cotton on hundreds of thousands of hectares of new land. Shortly afterwards the construction of new canals was started in areas requiring artificial irrigation.

Review, New York, November 1959, p. 38.

* Holland Roberts, "Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Today", New World

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 30, p. 112.

^{**} Ibid., p. 125.

But that was only the beginning. In keeping with Lenin's instructions that irrigation is needed most of all, "for more than anything else it will revive the area and regenerate it, bury the past and make the transition to socialism more certain",* the peasants of Central Asia, assisted by the Russian and other peoples of the Soviet Union, worked unstintingly to restore and enlarge the old irrigation canals. They built new canals and huge reservoirs in record time. When the Seven-Year Plan (1958-65) was started, Uzbekistan alone had more than 830 irrigation canals whose length totalled 160,000 kilometres. Soviet successes in irrigation have been noted by many impartial observers in the West and East. K.P.S. Menon, a prominent political figure in India, writes: "The Soviet Government have been paying great attention to the problems of irrigation in Central Asia. Many canals have been built, and more are projected. The resources of the Syr Darya, the largest river in Central Asia, which flows through Kirghizstan, Uzbekistan and Turkestan, are being fully utilised."**

As a result of large-scale improvement, desalination and drainage 250,000 hectares of land were reclaimed for exploita-

tion in the Hungry Steppe.

Irrigation has proceeded rapidly in the past decade. Many large reservoirs have been built, including the Angren, Kuyumazar, Chimkurgan and Uchkizyl reservoirs. Many old reservoirs and canals have been enlarged. In Uzbekistan 434,000 hectares of new land were put to the plough in 1953-63, and intense work is in progress to develop the

Hungry Steppe.

Immense irrigation canals have been also built in other Central Asian republics. Tens of thousands of hectares of fertile soil in Tajikistan are watered by the 270-kilometre Grand Ferghana Canal (it runs across North Tajikistan for a distance of 94 kilometres), the 50-kilometre Grand Hissar Canal, the Vakhsh irrigation project (which irrigates 60,000 hectares in the Vakhsh River valley), the 48-kilometre gravity-flow canal in the Dalverzin Steppe and other irrigation systems, all of which were built after the Revolution. The 800-kilometre Kara Kum Canal, Turkmenia's largest man-

made waterway, which was completed recently, made it possible to develop tens of thousands of hectares of virgin land for cotton and other crops.

Agricultural development in the Central Asian republics was given a further impetus when the peasants united in large collective farms. The tiny, scattered farms merged together to form large-scale, mechanised economies. Instead of 800,000 small individual farms, Uzbekistan now has 1,403 collective farms. In Tajikistan 200,000 small households merged into 453 large collective farms. Today Tajikistan has 33 state farms, including 11 livestock-breeding farms, six fruit-growing farms, five cotton-growing farms and four

karakul sheep farms.

In Central Asia agriculture now gets most of its equipment from local heavy industries. In 1956, for example, Tashkent's industrial enterprises supplied agriculture in Uzbekistan with 6,200 cotton-seeders, 15,797 cultivators, 752 cotton-picking machines, 270 suction dredges and a large quantity of other farm equipment. In 1957-58, the farms received 15,000 tractor-drawn cultivators, about 10,000 rowcrop tractors, 12,000 seeders, 2,000 tractor-ploughs, 5,500 lorries, 172 excavators and hundreds of other machines. Everincreasing number of machines, most of which are manufactured in Tashkent, are appearing at the collective and state farms in Uzbekistan. For instance, in 1963 they were supplied with more than 11,000 tractors, approximately 5,000 cottonpickers, 23,000 tractor-drawn mowers, more than 1,700 grain, ensilage and other harvester combines, 7,700 seeding machines, 9,300 cultivators, more than 2,100 lorries and a lot of other equipment.

Tashkent's importance as an industrial centre is noted by many unbiased foreign observers. "I was surprised," writes Holland Roberts, "to find it nearly as large as San Francisco. Like my home city, it is the main business and cultural core of the surrounding region. Its busy factories and skilled workers make cotton harvesters, electrical and chemical equipment, excavators, spinning machines and looms. Shoes, clothes, furniture, crockery, canned goods and cotton and silk

cloth are all made here."*

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 32, p. 318. ** K. P. S. Menon, Russian Panorama, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 167.

^{*} Holland Roberts, "Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Today", New World Review, New York, November 1959, p. 38.

At the close of 1956, there were 7,124 tractors, about 500 harvester combines and thousands of other farm machines in operation in Uzbekistan. That year the republic had 11 tractors per 1,000 hectares of arable land, while in France and Italy there were correspondingly 7 and 4 tractors. In Tajikistan one tractor works 90 hectares of land, while in Pakistan and Iran there is one tractor for 9,000 and 18,000 hectares respectively.

This enormous difference further increased in recent years because in Tajikistan and the other Central Asian republics agriculture is annually replenished with new farm machinery. At the beginning of 1963, Tajikistan had 12,000 tractors of the latest types, 7,000 lorries, 1,500 harvester-combines and

more than 20,000 other farm machines.

In the first six months of 1964 the collective and state farms in all the Central Asian republics received a considerable quantity of modern equipment, including 13,000 tractors (in terms of 15 h.p. units), 2,270 grain harvester-combines, nearly 2,800 cotton-picking machines, 2,187 lorries, 7,200 cultivators, 808 ensilage, 596 maize and 219 beet harvestercombines, 2,172 mowers, 452 general-purpose loaders and many other farm machines.

There were more than 28,000 tractors, 19,000 grain and other harvester-combines, more than 13,000 wind-row harvesters, approximately 27,000 seeders and other machines

operating in Kazakhstan.

Huge tracts of virgin and disused land have been opened up. Twenty-eight million hectares of virgin land have been developed in Kazakhstan. In 1962 alone, the collective and state farms of that republic ploughed up more than 1,200,000 hectares of fallow land, using 9,000 hectares for fruit orchards, 800 hectares for berries and 900 hectares for vineyards. In 1963, the area under cereals was increased to 24,900,000 hectares (an increase of 2,700,000 hectares as compared with 1961).

The large fleet of farm machines has helped to step up farm output. In Uzbekistan, for example, the cotton output grew from 518,000 tons in 1913 to 3,690,100 tons in 1963. Today Uzbekistan alone grows as much cotton as Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and Brazil taken together, producing twothirds of the cotton grown in the U.S.S.R., more than 50 per cent of the silk cocoons, approximately 40 per cent of the astrakhan pelts, 85 per cent of the best fibre, kenaf and jute. Uzbekistan is also an important producer of wool, rice,

fruit, grapes and other agricultural produce.

The area sown to cotton in Tajikistan has increased 6.5 times and the total cotton harvest 12.6 times as compared with 1913. The large increase in cotton yields is due to the better varieties of cotton, application of modern farm practices and large-scale mechanisation of field work. Previously the highest cotton yield in Turkestan was never above 12 centners per hectare, but today it averages 20 centners per hectare throughout Central Asia. The biggest harvests are gathered in Khoresm Region, where in 1963 the cotton yield averaged 30.2 centners per hectare.

Cotton-growing is the leading branch of agriculture in the Central Asian republics and is the source of their wealth and national pride. But that does not imply that cotton-growing is promoted to the detriment of other crops, as some

bourgeois falsifiers claim.

In every republic agriculture is a diversified economy, growing in addition to cotton, jute, kenaf, maize, sorgho, wheat, barley, grapes and melons and raising cattle and

sheep.

In Uzbekistan, for example, the grain crop harvest increased from 1,046 tons in 1913 to 304,900 tons (state purchases figure) in 1963, silk cocoons from 3,764 tons to 17,500 tons, cattle from 1,331,000 head in 1916 to 2,411,000 head in 1963, and sheep and goats from 3,764,000 to 8,760,000. In 1964, the state bought 346,900 tons of potatoes and other vegetables, 271,100 tons of kenaf and jute, 114,700 tons of fruit and grapes, and 7,300 tons of tobacco.

In 1963, Kazakhstan had 6,139,000 head of cattle and more than 36,000,000 head of sheep and goats (in 1954 there were only 16,900,000). In 1962, the grain harvest in the republic increased 4.7-fold, state purchase of meat 4.8-fold, of milk 4-fold, of eggs 7.1-fold and of wool 5.9-fold as compared

with 1954.

The signal successes in agriculture in the other Central Asian republics are shown by the substantial increase in their farm output. In 1953-63, the cattle population of Turkmenistan increased by 27 per cent, sheep by 24 per cent, pigs by 400 per cent; the output of meat (slaughter weight) rose by 140 per cent, of milk by 36 per cent, of eggs by 19 per cent, of wool by 51 per cent, of astrakhan pelts by 60 per cent and of silk cocoons by 40 per cent. In Kirghizia the total agricultural produce in 1962 was 41 per cent greater than in 1958, stock-raising, in particular, growing by 65 per cent. In 1962 alone, the number of cattle in the republic increased by 24,000 head, of pigs by 21,000 head, and of sheep and goats by 422,000 head.

In the Soviet Eastern republics agriculture is steadily expanding. More and more virgin land is being developed, the livestock and poultry population is growing, modern agronomical techniques are used, mechanisation is spreading rapidly and the irrigation systems are being

enlarged.

All this proves that since the Revolution the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan have made remarkable progress in developing their industry and agriculture. In a short period these formerly backward outskirts of old Russia became countries with a high level of development. They have completely surmounted their political, economic and cultural backwardness. The living standard, the way of life and customs, and the appearance of the towns and villages have changed beyond recognition.

The impressions of Averell Harriman about his trip to Dushanbe and Tajikistan in general are interesting in this respect. He writes: "When the republic was founded thirty years ago and Stalinabad (Dushanbe-Kh. I.) selected as its capital, the latter was a typical Central Asian village of only a few thousand inhabitants living chiefly in mud huts without sanitation, water, hospitals, or even schools.... The Soviet Government had invested heavily in the area not only to stimulate the local economy but also to develop its educational health and a signal health a signal health and a signal health and a signal health and a signal health a signal health and a signal health and a signal health and a signal health and a signal health and a signal health a signal h

tional, health and agricultural systems.

"Today Stalinabad is a bustling town of two hundred thousand inhabitants and the republic itself boasts a rapidly expanding industrial and agricultural economy. The low-yield short-staple cotton which formerly produced only a few thousand tons yearly has been replaced by long-staple varieties with yields which, Tajik officials claim, compare favourably with those of California and last year produced for the republic an income of over two hundred million dollars.

In addition, new dams and irrigation canals were designed with the help of three American engineers to provide almost a million acres of new cultivated land. A textile mill was built in Stalinabad which today turns out over fifty million vards of fabric for the Soviet market.

"Besides the textile plant, Tajikistan has a number of foodprocessing plants, a silk factory and a plant to manufacture cotton gins. It boasts thirty-six electric power plants, and in recent years large deposits of petroleum as well as of coal,

zinc and lead have been discovered."*

A correspondent of La Voz de México, who visited Uzbekistan with a group of foreign journalists in the second half of July 1964, gave the following description of Samarkand and Bukhara: "I always wanted to visit Samarkand and I must admit that I was afraid I would see a museum or a town in which time had stopped. But the sight that unfolded before my eyes against the background of old Samarkand was of a new, modern town with a shining present and future....

"Bukhara is beautiful! The huge cupolas preserve memories of the ancient times. And how symbolic it was to see 'the tower of death', which was a reminder of the horrors of the past, and the 'tower of life', a water tower built during the

first years of Soviet rule."

During Soviet years the old towns and villages changed their appearance, and new towns and settlements sprang up. Many of them, including Chirchik, Angren, Almalyk, Yangiyul, Nukus, Leninsk, Yangier (Uzbekistan), Balkhash, Temir-Tau, Ken-Tau, Khram-Tau, Tekeli, Jezkazgan, Svetobad (Kazakhstan), Neftebad, Sovetabad, Shakhrinau, Regar (Tajikistan), Nebit-Dag, Kum-Dag and Cheleken (Turkmenistan), have become industrial and cultural centres.

Many foreign observers correctly assess the flowering economy of the Soviet East. The United Nations *Economic Bulletin for Europe* carried an article entitled "Regional Economic Policy in the Soviet Union", which said in part: "The First and Second five-year plans (1928-37) brought extremely rapid industrial progress . . . industrial production (excluding private handicrafts) increased more than twelve-

^{*} Averell Harriman, Peace with Russia?, New York, 1959, pp. 26-27.

fold between 1926 and 1940, nearly doubled between 1940 and 1950, and rose by a further two-thirds between 1950 and 1955."* The Bulletin admits that "the region (Central Asia-Kh. I.) is by now much more industrialised than neighbouring Asian countries, India not excepted".** The article further says: "The spectacular increase in Central Asian cotton production was obtained by trebling the area under cotton and raising yields by about two-thirds. The increase in the cotton area was achieved partly by a number of large irrigation projects."***

An extremely interesting observation about the development of the Central Asian republics was made by William Mandel, who wrote: "Now there are tractor experts instead of veiled women, schoolgirls instead of child wives, mechani-

sation instead of back-breaking toil."****

A member of an African trade union delegation that visited Uzbekistan in the summer of 1955 said that in Uzbekistan they saw a highly developed industry, advanced agriculture and a high cultural standard, and pointed out that the delegation was amazed at the size and the technical level of the metallurgical plant in the town of Begovat, the Farkhad Hydropower Station, the textile mill and the farm machines plant in Tashkent. He stressed that his group saw for itself that the Uzbek people have their own technical intelligentsia and their own skilled workers.

A group from the Austro-Soviet Friendship Society, after inspecting Uzbekistan's industry and agriculture, expressed the view that the republic, which was a backward colony not so long ago, has in many respects overtaken Austria, a country with a highly developed industry. Martin Grünberg, a member of the delegation, said in this connection that what they saw in Uzbekistan in the sphere of agriculture is beyond compare with the situation in Austria. In one cottongrowing collective farm, which they visited, nearly 90 per cent of all work is mechanised. Thus, in agriculture as well,

Uzbekistan ranks among the most advanced countries in the world.

The U.S. writer and journalist Joseph North, describing his trip from Tashkent to Samarkand, said that he knew how difficult life was for the Uzbek people before the Revolution. But when his eyes, which had seen much in his lifetime, beheld the factories and mills of Uzbekistan, its orchards and collective-farm fields, it gave him further proof that the Uzbek people had made a great leap forward.

Henri Alleg, the prominent Algerian publicist, who visited the Soviet Union at the close of 1963, wrote in the Alger républicain that Uzbekistan had accomplished a giant leap from the Middle Ages to the summit of the most advanced civilisation. Now the bright banner of socialism is waving over Uzbekistan. A former poverty-stricken and illiterate colony has become one of the most advanced countries of

the world.

In a very interesting series of features called Red Road to Samarkand, Sam Russel, a British journalist, wrote that during his journey he found that the Central Asian republics, whose peoples a 1914 tourist guide derogatively called "native tribes" with the lowest level of development, had become centres of civilisation with a mechanised agriculture and industry, centres of profound social and cultural achievements. He said that this picture of equality and rapid development of the colonial territories of the old tsarist empire, especially in Central Asia, cannot but awaken the minds of all colonial peoples. In his opinion this picture inevitably gives rise to bitter comparisons, and at the same time it sustains the hopes and convictions that there will be a bright future for the peoples of any colony.

Thomas Driberg, the well-known British journalist and public figure, draws a similar conclusion. Speaking to a correspondent of New Times about his trip through Uzbekistan, he said that in his opinion the basic socialist principle, i.e., common ownership of means of production, was not merely an abstract theory, but an effective foundation

for a happy society.

These are not isolated statements. True accounts of all the achievements of the Central Asian peoples are given in books and statements by a great number of foreigners who visited Uzbekistan. They include Paul René Tubert's L'Ouz-

** Ibid., p. 55. *** Ibid., p. 56.

^{*} United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe, November 1947, Vol. 9, No. 3, Geneva, p. 51.

^{****} William Mandel, The Soviet Far East and Central Asia, New York,

békistan, République Soviétique and Jean Rogissart's De Paris à Samarkande, both published in Paris; Soviets in Central Asia by William P. and Zelda K. Coates, which was printed in London; Tashkent Poppies by Artur Lundkvist, the Swedish journalist; I'll Remember You, Uzbekistan by the Bulgarian poetess Lilyana Stefanova; statements by such prominent public leaders and statesmen as Pandit Onkar Nath Tkahur, Vice-President of the All-India Peace Council; Saifuddin Kitchlew, Chairman of that Council; Vittorino Veronese, UNESCO Director-General; Lev Schjöds, member of a delegation from the Norway-U.S.S.R. Society; Ib Norlund, Danish public leader; Dr. Phyllis Dobbs, head of a delegation of British women; D. Darja, leader of a Mongolian trade union delegation and editor-in-chief of the newspaper Khudulmur, and William Lamgert, member of a U.S. agricultural delegation.

Geoffrey Wheeler points out that "today Central Asia is not only self-supporting in most respects ... but it makes considerable contributions to all-Union economy",* and then tries to make the reader believe that notwithstanding these

achievements, Soviet policy remains colonialist.**

We shall not debate the issue of Soviet "colonialism" with Mr. Wheeler, inasmuch as sufficient arguments have been put forward in the previous chapter to disprove such fabrications. It is enough to cite briefly from a statement by the Arab writer Ali Ahmed Bakasir. He said: "I know Uzbekistan as well as my native Egypt. Deserts here are transformed into blossoming orchards, and if the Americans call Uzbekistan a colony, well, I should like to live in such a colony."

Impartial witnesses of the economic and cultural achievements of the peoples of the Soviet East also found that "every nationality (of the Soviet Union-Kh. I.), while maintaining its individual character, is an integral part of a greater unit and has a definite role to play in that unit. The achievements of the more advanced republics in science and tech-

nology are made available to all other republics.... The Russians make no attempt to impose their domination. Their attitude is one of assisting the development of all parts of the country".* This statement was made by Hiten Chawdhury, a representative of the Seksaria Industrial Group, after a tour of the Central Asian republics.

Showing every concern for the people's well-being, the Soviet Government has, in recent years, considerably increased the wages and salaries of industrial, office and other workers. An impressive manifestation of this concern was the latest law adopted by the Fourth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. (sixth convocation), held in mid-July 1964, providing for a wage increase for workers in public education, health protection, trade catering and other public services, the government apparatus, the local procurator's offices and courts, and also for pensions for collective farmers. Under the new law the wages of one-fourth of all the working people in the country were increased by an average of 21 per cent. In other words, the wages fund has been increased by 3,300,000,000 annually. Large sums are allocated annually for social insurance, the building of hospitals, health and holiday homes, holiday resorts and housing. In Uzbekistan, for example, 900,000,000 rubles were spent on social welfare in 1963, which is 80,000,000 rubles more than in 1962. In 1956-58 a total of 748,000 square metres of floor space were built in the towns of Kirghizia, and 30,000 houses were built for collective farmers and the rural intelligentsia. In the six years following the Government's decision to expand housing construction in the U.S.S.R., i.e., in the period 1957-63, a total of 3,122,000 square metres of floor space were built in the towns and workers' settlements of Kirghizia and 53,000 houses were built in rural communities. The 2,792,000 square metres of housing built in Turkmenia in the same period were tenanted by more than 105,000 families, i.e., by 464,000 persons or 28 per cent of the republic's population. More than 61,200,000 rubles were invested into the building of over 390,000 square metres of housing in Tajikistan in 1961-62. In 1958-62, a total of 25,500,000 square metres of floor space were built in Kazakhstan; this was 50 per cent more than in 1953-58. In the same period the state built 1,742,000

^{*} Geoffrey Wheeler, "Recent Developments in Soviet Central Asia", The Geographical Journal, London, June 1957, Vol. CXXIII, Part 2, pp. 140-41.

^{**} Geoffrey Wheeler, "Colonialism and the U.S.S.R.", Political Quarterly, July-September 1958, Vol. 29, No. 3, p. 222.

^{*} New Times, Moscow, 1952, No. 20, p. 14.

square metres of housing in Uzbekistan. Moreover, in the post-war period, the state helped the workers and employees to build more than five million square metres of floor space, and collective farmers to build approximately half a million houses. In 1960, Samarkand Region alone invested 211,000,000 rubles in the building of 4,200 apartment houses, 170 public service establishments, 210 livestock and 280 production premises. In 1963, 1,835,000 square metres of floor space (21 per cent more than in 1962) were tenanted in Uzbekistan. In addition, 18,000 houses were built in rural areas. A total of 11,000 modern apartments were built in that republic in the first six months of 1964.

The increasing sales of consumer goods is an important indication of the growing purchasing power of the popula-

tion and of the rising living standard.

In 1962, the retail and co-operative trade showed a total turnover of approximately 500,000,000 rubles in Turkmenia, 573,400,000 rubles in Tajikistan, 4,020,400,000 rubles in Kazakhstan and 2,626,000,000 rubles (in 1963) in Uzbekistan. Compared with 1962, savings-bank deposits by the population of Uzbekistan in 1963 increased by 15,000,000 rubles, and the number of depositors rose by 75,000.

In Tajikistan the retail trade turnover in 1962 rose by 7.8 per cent over the 1961 figure, in Kazakhstan by 8.4 per cent and in Uzbekistan (in 1963) by 7 per cent as compared

with 1962.

The substantial increase in the sales of and the large demand for manufactured products is likewise an indication of the rising standard of living. This is also confirmed by the natural increment of the population in Central Asia. The birth-rate in Uzbekistan per 1,000 of population is 60 per cent higher than in the U.S.A., 110 per cent higher than in Britain and 130 per cent higher than in France, while the death-rate in Uzbekistan is from 33 per cent to 50 per cent lower than in these countries.

Even bourgeois specialists, when they assess living standard in Central Asia on the basis of per capita consumption of non-food products, admit that in the cotton-growing republics of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenia "living standards ... are distinctly higher (by some 15 to 20 per cent) than what would have been expected.... They are on much higher levels than those in the neighbouring Asian

countries and they have improved very considerably in the three decades since the end of the Civil War".*

In an article "Russia and Asia in 1960", published in January 1961 by the *Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society*, Geoffrey Wheeler acknowledges that the material position of the Central Asian peoples today is much better than ever before in their history. He continues by saying that probably they are better off materially than the majority of the peoples of the Middle East and South Asia.

The London Eastern World says the following about the standard of living in the Central Asian republics: "Contrary to expectations, living standards in the 'cotton' republics are distinctly higher (by 15 to 20 per cent) than in other non-

industrial areas of the Union."**

Numerous foreign visitors bear witness to the high living standards of the peoples of the Central Asian republics. Visitors, who impartially appraise the life of Soviet people, see that the material position of the Central Asian peoples is much higher than that of many peoples in capitalist countries, whose level of economic development is the same as in

the Central Asian republics.

Delegations and tourists who come to the Soviet Union, and to the Central Asian republics in particular, and tour factories, mills, hospitals, polyclinics, servicing establishments, and collective and state farms, and visit the homes of workers, employees and collective farmers, see for themselves that the Soviet Government is giving the utmost attention to the welfare of the people. The great achievements in health protection, in disease fighting are an expression of this attention.

The following statements by impartial observers from abroad speak of the secure material position of the Soviet people and of the strengthening of Soviet statehood. Jessie and James G. Miller write in *Behavioral Scientists Visit the Soviet Union* that the Soviet citizen can deposit his savings at three per cent interest in a savings-bank. But he does not need to save money to pay the doctor's bill, or for old age, or for the education of his children. He does not save for

^{*} United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe, November 1957, Vol. 9, No. 3, pp. 64, 68.

^{**} Dr. L. Delgado, "Soviet Central Asian Republics", Eastern World, March 1958, Vol. XII, No. 3, London, p. 14.

a rainy day but for a sunny day-for his vacations, for recreation, for better clothes.

"I visited many collective-farm homes," writes Toma George Maiorescu, a Rumanian journalist, in Journey Through Time published in Bucharest. "What particularly impressed me in Uzbek houses was the two ways of life which have come face to face with each other and become intertwined and mutually complementary. There were also elements of ancient culture that were constantly being enriched by elements of a new, socialist content. A sewing machine stood next to a trunk, a bookshelf was next to several national string instruments, bicycles, motorcycles and cars were taking the place of the donkey in the everyday life of the people. . . . Everything was clean and neat. Enclosures swarmed with domestic fowl; there were milch cows and sheep in the barns."

There is no end to the examples that can be cited. They testify to the profound economic changes that have taken place in Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Kirghizia, Tajikistan and Turkmenia. Former backward colonies of tsarist Russia, they became modern industrial and agricultural countries after the Revolution.

Cultural Development

In Soviet years, the peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan have made great strides in developing their culture.

The October Revolution unfettered the creative powers of peoples who had been exploited for centuries. In a relatively brief period they wiped out illiteracy, created their own national intelligentsia and raised science, literature and art to a high level.

Every nationality had its own ancient rich culture, but for millions of ordinary people culture was forbidden fruit. The masses of tsarist non-Russian territories were "robbed ... of education, light and knowledge".*

Soviet rule opened for the masses the door to the treasurestore of ancient cultures, and created conditions for studying the legacy of world-famous Central Asian scientists and poets, including Abu Nasr Farabi, Abu Raihan Biruni, Abu Ali ibn-Sina (Avicenna), Ulugbekh, Alisher Navoi, Abu Abdullach, Rudaki, Abu'l Kasim Firdousi, Mirza Abdukhadir Bedil, Babur, Abjaafar, ibn-Musa al-Khoresmi, Ahmad Donish, Berdakh, Mukhimi and Avaz Otar. Soviet rule promoted the rebirth of the Central Asian cultures, which were in a state of decline, and opened a wide road for their further development.

Inheriting from tsarism the grim legacy of almost total illiteracy, Soviet power had to devote special attention to public education. For without first abolishing mass illiteracy it was useless to talk of a cultural revolution.

The Soviet Government carried out the herculean task of reforming the old schools, with their theological scholasticism, in which "the younger generation of workers and peasants were not so much educated as drilled in the interests of the bourgeoisie".* The new, Soviet school, whose doors were thrown wide open for the children of the working class, the urban and rural poor, took the place of the old, bourgeoislandowner school, which, being a tool of the feudal lords and the bourgeoisie, was designed to train orthodox Muslims. For the first time in the history of Turkestan, women were granted equal rights with men to education. That opened for them the way to a totally different world.

An average of about 700 schools were opened annually in Turkestan during the first three years of Soviet rule; the tsarist government used to open not more than nine schools every year, and all of them were for the children of the ruling classes.

Today, in all the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, where before the Revolution only two per cent of the population were literate, illiteracy has been completely wiped out. Describing the public education system in the republics of Central Asia, Sam Russel wrote that when he was preparing for his trip to Uzbekistan he came across a book which quoted data from an issue of the magazine *Education Herald* published in 1908. Under the education system of those days it would have taken 4,600 years to abolish illiteracy. Russel wrote that in Tashkent, Bukhara, Samarkand and

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, p. 139.

^{*} Ibid., Vol 31, p. 285.

Dushanbe he saw how the Soviet Union had been able to solve this problem 200 times faster.

Today one can say that illiteracy has been wiped out and that a national culture resting on a broad network of schools, institutions of higher learning, theatres and academies of sciences has been created in these formerly backward areas.

"The standards of ... education in Central Asia," Dr. L. Delgado wrote in the *Eastern World*, "have improved so strikingly in the period of Soviet rule that the relevant comparison is no longer with neighbouring Asian countries, but with countries of western Europe."*

K.P.S. Menon, who toured Uzbekistan and other Central Asian republics, makes a similar assessment of the development of education in these areas. He writes: "The Revolution has brought great benefits to this region. Of these, none is more remarkable than education. . . .

"It is interesting to compare the state of education as it was in British India with what it was in tsarist, and is in Soviet, Russia. Though the percentage of literacy in British India was low enough in all conscience, British India was once held up as a model for Russia to follow in Central Asia.

"... Thus, in 1866, Uzbekistan lagged behind British India, but by 1947, the position had changed. At the end of British rule in India, 87 per cent of the people of India were still illiterate, whereas illiteracy has, under Soviet rule, been practically eliminated. There cannot be a more eloquent commentary on the benefits which the Revolution of 1917 has brought to the people of Central Asia."**

On the eve of the Revolution, Uzbekistan had only 160 schools with 17,229 pupils. Today there are more than 6,300 schools with 2,092,000 pupils, of whom 79.4 per cent are non-Russian children. In Kirghizia the number of schools rose from 107 in 1914 to 1,745 in 1960, the number of pupils increased almost fiftyfold, reaching a total of 340,000; in the 1962-63 school year there were 488,000 school pupils in the republic. Correspondingly the number of schools in Turkmenistan increased from 58 to 1,534, and the number of

pupils from 6,800 to 399,000, most of them being non-Russian children. Tajikistan has more than 2,500 schools providing general education to 470,000 children. In Kazakhstan there are more than 10,000 schools which had 2,286,500 pupils in 1962-63 school year.

In the Central Asian republics, all children of school age, regardless of nationality, go to school where they receive an education under a single programme. Of interest is the observation made by Jessie and James G. Miller in Behavioral Scientists Visit the Soviet Union. They wrote that be it a Russian child in Moscow or an Uzbek child in Tashkent, all have the same curriculum and teaching methods are the same.

In the republics schools are staffed with highly trained teachers, of whom Uzbekistan alone has more than 75,000 today. I. K. Kadyrov, Minister of Education of Uzbekistan, gave a striking example in his report at the second conference of the republic's intelligentsia. Describing Faziabad, once a poor village in Ferghana Province, where there was not a single teacher before the Revolution, he said that now it has several schools, including a secondary school, with a staff of 87 teachers, i.e., as many as in all the village schools of Uzbekistan in tsarist times.

The same may be said of all other villages, where before the Revolution and in the first years of Soviet rule the only way people signed documents was by leaving a thumbprint on them. Take another example, that of the village of Tez-Guzar, Bukhara Province. In an essay on this village, Y. Mukimov writes that thirty years ago, when a collective farm was formed, there were only two or three persons who could sign their names at the foot of the minutes of the general meeting.

All that has receded into the past. Many of the people born in Tez-Guzar have become scientists, actors, teachers, engineers, agronomists, doctors and so on. Among them, Mukimov names the three Muminov brothers, sons of an illiterate dekhan. One of them, Ibraghim, is a Doctor of Philosophical Sciences, an Academician and Vice-President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, his brother Musso is a Candidate of Physical and Mathematical Sciences, a reader and head of a department at Samarkand State University; the third, Arraboi, is an instructor of agrotechnics at the Bukhara Teachers' Training College.

^{*} Dr. L. Delgado, "Soviet Central Asian Republics", Eastern World, March 1958, Vol. XII, No. 3, London, p. 15.

^{**} K. P. S. Menon, Russian Panorama, Oxford University Press, 1962, pp. 168-69.

Bakajan Mavlyanberdyev first began to learn to read and write at the age of 20. Later he received a higher technical education and became an engineer. His two sons Akhmat and Nigmat followed in his footsteps and are engineers in the textile industry, and Nigmat's wife is a doctor. Abdurakhman Khamrayev, who finished the Tez-Guzar general education school, is now a Candidate of Historical Sciences and head of the Department of History at Tashkent State University, while his brother, Razzak, is a talented stage and screen actor and a State Prize winner.

There was not a single institution of higher learning in Central Asia before the Revolution. Today Uzbekistan has 31 higher schools, Kazakhstan has 30, Tajikistan and Kirghizia seven each and Turkmenia five. There are 139,000 students in Uzbekistan, 98,000 in Kazakhstan, 22,000 in Tajikistan and 23,000 in Kirghizia. Over 30,000 students attend the higher and secondary specialised educational institutions

of Turkmenia.

For the number of students per 10,000 of population, Central Asia has outstripped the United States. Uzbekistan has more students than Britain, or twice as many as France, more than three times as many as Italy, five times as many as Spain, nearly ten times as many as Turkey, 26 times as many as Iran. Tashkent University alone has as many students as there are in all the institutions of higher education in Iran. There are 85 students per 10,000 of population in Turkmenia, while in Iran there are only nine, in Pakistan 14, and in France 44.

In the Uzbek Republic 2,310,000 persons are studying in the secondary schools, technical schools and institutions of higher learning. That means that every fourth person in the republic is studying. At present Uzbekistan's national economy employs nearly 290,000 specialists with a higher or secondary education. Of these 13,000 have a higher educa-

tion and most of them are non-Russians.

Bourgeois slanderers are endeavouring to prove that in the U.S.S.R. there is discrimination against the non-Russian peoples. Regardless of the awkward situation in which it had placed itself, *The New York Times* printed the groundless assertions of Bylinsky and his ilk. Little effort is needed to unmask the falsifiers. In all the Soviet republics, the national composition of the students is proportionate to the

numerical size of the peoples inhabiting them. A total of 75 per cent of the student body at the Tashkent Financial Institute is non-Russian. Students representing 50 nationalities, of whom 50 per cent are Kazakhs, study at the University of Kazakhstan.

Victor Perlo, the well-known U.S. economist, who recently visited the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan, was shown Bylinsky's slanderous article. Outraged, he sent a denial to *The New York Times*, but, as was to be expected, the paper did not publish it. Victor Perlo's letter appeared

in the magazine Sovremenny Vostok.

He furnished irrefutable data to show that in the Central Asian republics the overwhelming majority of the students and scientific workers are non-Russian. Comparing the number of students, he demonstrates that in 1928-59 the number of Russian students increased ninefold, while the number of students of the Central Asian nationalities increased 61-fold. Analysing the national composition of the students and teachers at institutions of higher learning, Perlo gives the names of the directors of the institutions of higher learning; with few exceptions they are representatives of local nationalities.

Describing Soviet achievements in higher education, the British Central Asian Review writes: "In general the statistics confirm the enormous strides that have been made in higher education among the Muslim nationalities, particularly in the years since 1940. At present the Russians have a relatively greater number of specialists working in the Muslim republics than their percentage in the population but this disparity should disappear in the near future with the increased number of students of the Muslim nationalities now attending

a VUZ*."**

9-755

The Central Asian republics have their own engineers, technicians, doctors, teachers and farm specialists. Higher educational institutions are major centres for promoting science. Uzbekistan has 14,500 scientific workers, of whom 270 have a doctorate and more than 3,000 are candidates of science. At the beginning of 1963, there were 12,700 scien-

* A higher educational establishment.

^{** &}quot;Some Statistics on Higher Education in the Muslim Republics", Central Asian Review, Vol. X, No. 3, 1962, London, p. 229.

tific workers in Kazakhstan, approximately 3,000 in Kirghizia, 2,800 in Tajikistan and 1,400 in Turkmenistan.

All the Central Asian republics have their own Academies

of Sciences.

The following are the names of some prominent Central Asian scientists, who have won renown both in the Soviet

Union and abroad:

Uzbekistan: Kh. M. Abdullayev, corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences: U. A. Arifov, Academician, President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences: E. I. Atakhanov, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R. and the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Medical Sciences; J. G. Gulyamov, corresponding member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences, distinguished archaeologist; T. N. Kary-Niyazov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; G. A. Mavlyanov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Geological Sciences; A. M. Muzafarov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Biological Sciences; I. M. Muminov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Vice-President of the Academy, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences; Y. Kh. Turakulov, corresponding member and Vice-President of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Biological Sciences; A. S. Sadykov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, rector of Tashkent State University, Doctor of Chemical Sciences; T. A. Sarymsakov, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Minister of Higher and Specialised Secondary Education of Uzbekistan, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; M. Z. Khamudkhanov, corresponding member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Academician-Secretary of the Academy, Doctor of Technical Sciences; S. Y. Yunusov, corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Chemical Sciences.

Kazakhstan: N. U. Bazanov, member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Academician-Secretary of the Department of Biological and Medical Sciences, Doctor of Sciences, physiologist; S. B. Baishev, member and Vice-President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economic Sciences;

A. Bekturov, member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Director of the Chemical Institute, Doctor of Chemistry; R. A. Borukayev, member of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Academician-Secretary of the Department of Mineral Resources, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences; K. I. Satpayev, member of the U.S.S.R. and Kazakh Academies of Sciences, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences; Sh. Ch. Chokin, member and President of the Kazakh Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Technical Sciences.

Tajikistan: A. A. Adkhamov, corresponding member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; A. M. Bogoutdinov, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences; B. G. Gafurov, corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Director of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, Doctor of Historical Sciences; A. M. Mirzayev, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philological Sciences; M. N. Narzikulov, corresponding member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Biological Sciences; B. N. Niyazmukhamedov, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philological Sciences; Z. Sh. Rajabov, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Historical Sciences; S. A. Rajabov, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, rector of the Tajik State University, Doctor of Juridical Sciences; S. Y. Yusupova, member of the Tajik Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Geological and Mineralogical Sciences.

Turkmenistan: P. A. Azimov, member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, linguist; R. G. Annayev, member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; A. A. Berdyev, corresponding member of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Physical and Mathematical Sciences; T. B. Berdyev, member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Pedagogical Sciences; S. K. Karanov, member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Medical Sciences; A. K. Karryev, corresponding member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, head of a department at Ashkhabad State University, Doctor of Historical Sciences; O. O. Mamedniyazov, member of the

Turkmen Academy of Sciences, biochemist; K. K. Mashrykov. member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences, geologist.

Kirghizia: A. Altmyshbayev, member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philosophical Sciences; D. Alyshbayev, member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Economic Sciences; I. K. Ahunbayev, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R., member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Medical Sciences; B. M. Yunusaliyev, member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences, Doctor of Philological Sciences.

Many Central Asian scientists are honorary members of

academies in other countries.

In Central Asia, research is conducted in many spheres of science and technology. Scientists are helping to discover mineral deposits, design and manufacture machines, machine tools, and instruments, and develop high-yielding varieties of cotton. The scale of research is growing from year to year.

The first Nuclear Physics Institute in the Near East has been opened in Uzbekistan. Its atomic reactor has become

operational.

In Soviet years great strides have been made in health protection. The tsarist government paid no attention to the health of the working people. The monstrous exploitation and low standard of living gave rise to epidemics and a high death-rate. Before the Revolution, Uzbekistan had only 128 doctors, not one of whom was a representative of the local nationalities. Its 57 hospitals with their limited number of beds could not satisfy even the minimum requirements of the population.

In 1913, Turkmenistan had only 70 doctors and 13 hospitals with something like 300 beds, of which only 13 were for women and children. Tajikistan had just one hospital with 40 beds, and 11 medical stations run by doctor's assistants. The situation was no better in Kirghizia and Kazakhstan.

Health protection has made spectacular progress in all the Central Asian republics during Soviet years. The number of hospital beds in Uzbekistan has increased 60-fold and the number of doctors 90-fold, while in the Kara-Kalpak Autonomous Republic their number has risen 170-fold. Today Uzbekistan has 14 doctors per 10,000 of population, which is considerably more than in many highly developed capitalist states.

In countries such as Iran, Turkey and Pakistan, for instance, there is only one doctor per 30,000 of population, and in some regions per 40,000 or even 50,000 of population. Diseases that once plagued the peoples of colonial Turkestan are still prevalent in these countries, where the life expectancy is less than 30 years and there is a high child mortality rate. Of the 800,000 children born in Turkey every year, 400,000 die before reaching the age of one. In Iran, and this fact is admitted by that country's press, out of 1,000 children, 850 die before reaching the age of fifteen.

In all the Soviet Central Asian republics, there is not a single locality where people cannot get free medical attention. We stress the word "free" because even in a rich capitalist country like the U.S., the cost of medical attention cuts deep into the budget of the vast majority of the people.

A wonderful achievement of the Soviet health protection system was the eradication of malaria, dracunculosis, smallpox, cholera, the plague, ulcer, trachoma and other diseases that were the scourge of the Central Asian republics.

The admiration of many members of foreign medical delegations that visited these republics was evoked by the scale of the medical services and the numerous facilities at

the disposal of Soviet medicine.

Brooks Cardew, General-Secretary of the British Union of Medical Workers and editor of a medical magazine, spoke of the cleanliness of the streets in Tashkent, of the healthy appearance of men, women and children. He was especially impressed by the polyclinics and the way they are operated, by the working conditions at the Tashkent textile mills, and the first-class medical institutions at the collective farm of Orjonikidze District, Tashkent Region, which he visited.

Faud Muhieddin, an Egyptian X-ray specialist, was struck by the facilities used by Soviet doctors. He said that in the X-ray Clinic of the Tashkent Medical Institute he saw modern equipment such as he had never seen in clinics in Europe. He said that Soviet clinics were well equipped and had many beds, and was impressed by the large number of doctors and trained nurses.

Ignoring unquestionable facts, some spiteful bourgeois historians in Britain, France, the U.S.A. and other countries seek to prove that in the Central Asian republics cultural development is directed by the Soviet Government and promoted through the assimilation and Russification of the non-

Russian peoples.

Certain bourgeois historians, in particular Ann Shukman, while recognising the cultural achievement of the Central Asian peoples, say that "the whole of this cultural development stems from Communist ideology and aims primarily at creating good and obedient citizens of the Soviet state as a whole".*

The author of the article "The Peoples of Central Asia" writes that some sort of "impersonal culture is imposing itself on the life of the peoples of Central Asia and is substituting uniformity for variety".**

It should be mentioned that the editorials of the Central Asian Review often allege that Soviet historians do not understand the position of the magazine, misquote its articles and

do not mention their positive evaluation of events.

True, the magazine writes sometimes about the economic achievements of the Central Asian republics only when these achievements are too great to be ignored, but follows up with conclusions that contradict reality. In 1956, in its third number, for instance, the Central Asian Review speaks of the substantial rise of the living standard in the Central Asian republics, but sums up by saying that the tsarist government could have also achieved similar, if not greater, successes had it pursued a more liberal policy.

Impartial observers think differently. "While religion is not encouraged in Central Asia, culture certainly is," writes K. P. S. Menon. "The people are encouraged to study their old art and civilisation. We visited the art gallery which exhibited the whole panorama of Uzbek culture, beginning

with cave drawings."***

At the other end there are people who completely distort reality. Take the latter half of the article "The People of Central Asia" in the London Central Asian Review. In the section on cultural progress in Soviet years, the author "studies" the Soviet school system, which, he says, is the government's main machine for imposing standardised Soviet culture upon the Central Asian peoples.

He gloats over the shortcomings in school education mentioned in the Soviet press criticisms. There were certain shortcomings in some schools, otherwise they would not have been criticised. But they cannot be attributed to the entire school system. Nonetheless, that is the impression the author wants to create.

Further, the author meticulously picks out shortcomings in various spheres of culture as reported in the Soviet press, and uses them to try and convince his reader that the aesthetic level of children is extremely low, that there is very little culture in the countryside, where, he claims, the authorities are endeavouring to plant Soviet culture. The libraries named by him had been criticised for their inefficient services. However, he ignores this and offers the conclusion that there is no demand for books in the collective-farm village and so on and so forth.

That is an old method and it can fool no one.*

The author had a special reason for calling this part of his work "Cultural Development", though it contained only excerpts from Soviet press criticisms. He was out to stress that there was no cultural development whatsoever and by doing so demonstrated his biased position on the question.

If this author sees nothing but shortcomings in cultural development, there are others, who, in an effort to distort the essence of cultural development in the Central Asian republics, raise a hue and cry about alleged assimilation of their peoples, the obliteration of their national cultures, customs and so forth. Togan also writes about "forcible assimilation". In an afterword to Features and Objectives of Russian Colonialism, he claims that by mixing in kindergartens, schools, youth and sports organisations, by means of settling Russian together with the local inhabitants, resettling non-Russians into areas inhabited by Russians ... millions of non-Russians within a few years are assimilated and become Russians.

But life itself proves the opposite.

Mr. Togan evidently "overlooked" the fact that in all the Soviet Eastern republics, pupils and students in schools and

^{* &}quot;The Peoples of Central Asia: Cultural Development", Central Asian Review, London, 1960, Vol. VIII, No. 1, pp. 5-13.

^{*} Ann Shukman, "The Muslim Republics of the U.S.S.R.", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XLVII, April 1960, Part II, p. 107. ** "The Peoples of Central Asia: Cultural Development", Central Asian Review, Vol. VII, No. 4, London, 1959, p. 320.

^{***} K. P. S. Menon, Russian Panorama, Oxford University Press, 1962, p. 170.

in higher and secondary specialised educational institutions are taught in their native language. The study of Russian and a foreign language in the native schools, and the study of national languages in Russian schools, only promotes culture of the peoples, does not in the least estrange the native language and does not wound the national pride and self-esteem of the peoples.

The following facts prove this point.

Not a single nationality inhabiting Turkestan had its own national theatre before the Revolution. Today there are theatres in all the Central Asian republics and Kazakhstan. In Uzbekistan 22 theatres and concert organisations out of a total of 28 perform in the Uzbek language. The majority of the actors in Kazakhstan's 25 theatres are Kazakhs.

Amateur art is very popular in all the Soviet Eastern republics. A large number of people representing local nationalities perform in people's theatres and in dramatic circles in clubs. Kazakhstan, for instance, has 40 people's theatres and 100 clubs operating on a voluntary basis; 600,000 persons

take part in stage productions.

The successes in the development of all facets of theatrical art which have won recognition throughout the Soviet Union and abroad are a vivid indication of the growth of the national culture of the peoples of Central Asia. Plays by Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Kirghiz and Turkmen dramaturgists have successful runs. Many operas, ballets, musical plays and comedies, lyrical and choral songs have been written by non-Russian composers.

People's Artists of the Soviet Union Tamara Khanum, Khalima Nasyrova, Sara Ishanturayeva, A. Hojayev, Sh. Burkhanov, L. Zakhidova, T. Fazylova, Shaken Aimanov, Khalybek Kuanyshpayev, Rosa Jamanova, Yermek Serkebayev, M. Kuliyeva, T. Muradova, M. Kasymov and others are popular throughout the country. Many of them have performed in the U.S.A., Britain, India, the U.A.R., Iran and other count-

Holland Roberts has high praise for Uzbek art. He writes: "In Moscow I had gone to the famous Uzbek Dance and Song Festival at the Bolshoi at the close of the Bureau meeting of the World Peace Council and joined the Muscovites in applauding the notable, varied creative work of this talented people. If it could be brought to the United States, the Uzbek

Festival would match the appeal of the Bolshoi Ballet, the Moisseyev Dance Troupe and the Soviet Folk Dance Festival."*

The literature of the non-Russian nationalities has blossomed forth in Soviet years under the invigorating influence of Russian classical and Soviet literature. The Central Asian republics have many popular writers and poets, including S. Aini, Hamza Hakim-zade Niyazi, M. Tursun-zade, M. T. Aibek, Gafur Gulyam, S. Ulug-zade, Abdulla Kahhar, Sharaf Rashidov, Genghiz Aitmatov, A. Muhtar, K. Yashen, Khamid Alimjan, Zulfiya, M. Auezov, Sabit Mukanov, Gabit Musrepov, S. Kenesbayev, Kh. Yergaliev, Berdy Kerbabayev, T. Sydykbekov, Muhamajon Rahimi, Jalol Ikromi, Boki Rahim-zade, Fotekh Niyaze, Abdulla Tajibayev, A. Tokombayev, A. Usenbayev, and K. Malikov. Most of the works of Central Asian authors have been translated into Russian and into languages of other Soviet nationalities, and have been published abroad including China, India, Czechoslovakia and Hungary. Sharaf Rashidov, the distinguished Uzbek writer, has been translated into English, French, Indian, Chinese, Arabic and other languages.

National literature in all its forms began to flower only in Soviet years. It adheres to the best traditions of its classics, studying the rich legacy of the past as the only way to promote Soviet culture, which is national in form and social-

ist in content.

Appreciating the importance of enabling the people to benefit by all the accomplishments of human thought, artistic masterpieces and cultural values of the past, the Soviet Government has done much to preserve cultural relics. In addition to organising their preservation, it has from the first days of its inception been allocating considerable sums for the rehabilitation, restoration and genuine scientific study of ancient literature, art and architecture.

"It must be said," wrote Henri Alleg, the Algerian publicist, "that the Soviet authorities are scrupulously preserving the magnificent architectural relics of the past. In Bukhara I saw

extensive restoration and repair."

Public libraries, archives, museums and research institutes of the republics (primarily institutes of Oriental studies)

^{*} Holland Roberts, "Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Today", New World Review, New York, November 1959, p. 36.

possess, study and give publicity to many, including rare, Eastern manuscripts.

The entire legacy of the past, all the wealth of culture and classical creations have been placed at the disposal of the

people.

Book publishing and the press in the non-Russian republics have been vigorously developed in Soviet times. Before the Revolution only a few periodicals came out in Turkestan and practically nothing was published in the languages of the peoples inhabiting it. Today 312 newspapers are issued in Uzbekistan alone, of these 200 in the Uzbek language. Of the 177 newspapers published in Kirghizia, 69 are in Kirghiz. Kazakhstan's 268 newspapers are published in the Kazakh, Russian, Uigur, Chechen, Korean and other languages. Most of the 75 newspapers of Turkmenia come out in the Turkmen language. Since the Revolution, Turkmenia has published books with an aggregate edition of 53,000,000 copies. Of these nearly 47 million have been published in the Turkmen language.

Enormous as are the funds the Soviet Government is allocating for the advancement of culture in the non-Russian republics, they are being annually increased. The per capita expenditures for social and cultural requirements before the Revolution were only 25 kopeks in Turkestan; in Uzbekistan in 1924 they amounted to 2 rubles 80 kopeks. Today Uzbekistan is allocating 75 rubles per head of population for these

purposes.

Though these figures are incomplete they show that the national culture of the peoples of the Soviet Eastern republics began to make genuine progress only in Soviet years.

The rapid cultural development of the Central Asian peoples has been noted by impartial foreigners, whose statements refute the slanderous allegation that the Eastern peoples of the U.S.S.R. are being forcibly assimilated and Russified.

A delegation of British cultural workers that toured Uzbekistan and Tajikistan declared that each Soviet people has its own national traditions and culture which it is solicitously preserving and promoting.

They also said that concern for the national costume, theatre, architecture and language is demonstrated in the most diverse ways. For instance, the national language of a given people gets preference over the Russian language. The delegation did not see anything even remotely resembling Russification, and on the other hand there were no signs of nationalism.

The United Nations *Economic Bulletin for Europe* wrote: "The religious views and practices of the local nationalities may have been modified by the events of the last forty years, but in essence the local culture remains Mohammedan."*

Geoffrey Wheeler pointed out that there was a distinctly Eastern atmosphere in Bukhara and Samarkand, "more so

than in, say, Teheran or Istanbul".**

London University Professor S. M. Manton, describing Uzbekistan's remarkable achievements in all spheres of the national economy, particularly in national culture, admits that he did not expect to see in Tashkent such first-class performances of operas and of Shakespeare's plays, a modern industry, palaces of culture, polyclinics and research institutes.

"On leaving the Opera House," he wrote, "we felt very humble ... and full of admiration for the heights to which Uzbek dramatic art and architecture have advanced in so short a time under the Soviet regime. It is hard to believe that these people had no theatre of any kind in 1918."***

The high level of culture and the absence of discrimination in the Central Asian republics are discussed by other foreign-

ers professing diverse political convictions.

In Impressions of Soviet Tour, a brochure published in Karachi in 1958, Muhammad Abdul Hamid Qadri Badayuni, Chairman of Djamiyati Ulema Pakistan, a Muslim religious organisation, describes the Tashkent Medical Institute, founded in the first years of Soviet rule, as a superb educational institution whose student body consists chiefly of Muslim young men and women. He writes that the Soviet Government is doing a great deal to promote culture and education. It is training engineers, doctors, and fliers. Speaking of cultural progress, he cites Samarkand as an example, calling it a wonderful town and centre of science and culture.

^{*} United Nations, Economic Bulletin for Europe, November 1957, Vol. 9, No. 3, p. 73.

^{**} Geoffrey Wheeler, "Russia and Asia in 1960", Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society, Vol. XLVIII, January 1961, Part I, p. 22.

*** S. M. Manton, The Soviet Union Today: A Scientist's Impressions, London, 1952, p. 70.

Foreign visitors see and say that cultural values are equally enjoyed by peasants and workers, the road to culture and art is open wide to all peoples without exception and that Soviet people use the cultural facilities to the utmost.

The Soviet national policy in the field of linguistics is

discussed at length in bourgeois literature.

The change of the written language of the Central Asian peoples from the Arabic to Latin and then Russian alphabet came up for a great deal of discussion by foreign historians and publicists. Some try to portray it as "forcible assimilation" of the national languages with the Russian with a view to "Russifying" the peoples, "keeping them apart" and "isolating" them from the other Muslim peoples.

The Central Asian Review condemns the appearance of Russian words in the vocabulary of the Central Asian peoples, and considers it a stage in the "Russification" of the

languages.

But in this particular case the authors of these "studies" of the linguistics of the peoples of Central Asia forget, for some reason or other, that the enrichment of one language by another is not a singular phenomenon. All the European languages, for example, have elements of Latin in them.

Cultural and economic ties, and intercourse and friendship between the Russian people and the other peoples of the Soviet Union, which resulted in unprecedented economic development, could not but leave an imprint on the vocabularies of these peoples. Their languages were enriched with new terminology as economy, culture, literature and art proaressed.

All the nations of the U.S.S.R. not only welcome the new terminology, using it in their spoken languages, but also eagerly study Russian. The peoples of Central Asia, just as the peoples of the other Union Republics, consider Russian

their second native language.

The language of the great Russian people, who played a historic role in abolishing the rule of the landowners and capitalists and in doing away with national oppression and inequality, is a powerful means of intercourse between all the peoples of the Soviet Union. It is a means of studying the wealth of Russian culture, science and technology and a medium through which the achievements of every republic are placed at the disposal of all peoples. Moreover, the study of

the Russian language is in no way detrimental to the native languages of the peoples. National terminology is steadily developing. Its main source of enrichment is the spoken folk language.

Consequently all the more ridiculous are the slanderous fabrications of Tahir Çagatay that Russian is taught in schools with the aim of Russifying the people, or of Charles Warren Hostler who says that the Russian language was instituted

mainly for the purpose of "Russification".

Many examples can be given of peoples carrying out linguistic reforms, discarding an obsolete alphabet in favour of a new and more convenient one. For instance, during the reign of Peter I, a new alphabet was introduced in place of the old Russian church Slavonic. Then there was the linguistic reform in Turkey in 1928; and now the Chinese are preparing to reform their old, inconvenient and cumbersome written language.

But it cannot be said that the Russian, Turkish and Chinese people were forced or are being forced to do so by someone wishing to impose his domination over them. Then why do reactionary foreign historians perceive in the linguistic reforms in the Soviet Central Asian republics an act of mali-

cious intent on the part of the Soviet Government?

The change from the Arabic alphabet first to Latin and then to the Russian alphabet, which is more convenient for the Central Asian peoples, in many ways facilitated the study of the native languages and greatly promoted cultural development in the Soviet East, enabling its peoples to benefit by advanced culture and technology.

With regard to the claims that linguistic reforms were forcibly imposed, they are absolutely groundless. In the Soviet Union, where state power belongs to the people, nothing is ever done that is contrary to its interests or to its detriment. All important measures planned by the Party and the Government are first publicly debated. Such was the case with the replacement of the Arabic alphabet by the Latin and especially by the Russian alphabet. This issue was discussed and whole-heartedly approved by linguists, teachers and other educationalists, by parents' committees and by the whole people.

The greatest achievement of Soviet rule in cultural development is the emancipation of the women of Central Asia and

Kazakhstan from political, economic and cultural oppression. The right to work, education and leisure to the women of the Soviet East radically changed their position and was of tremendous significance to the formation of socialist society. Central Asian women have risen to prominence in industry, farming, science and culture and are actively participating in running the affairs of the state.

In the U.S.S.R. women are equal members of society and as such they are not chained to the household. They are active in building the new communist society. Some bourgeois historians, however, misrepresent the position of women in Soviet

Central Asian republics.

Vincent Monteil in Chapter Six of his book misinterprets the issue of the emancipation of women. In this work, filled with contradictory statements, the author, while conceding that the women of the local nationalities participate in the industrial, cultural, social and political life of the country (an undeniable fact), makes the unfounded conclusion that this caused the disappearance of female handicrafts (rugmaking, embroidery).

On the basis of Soviet press criticisms of survivals of the past among a few backward people, the author claims that some women are still enslaved despite the 40 years of Soviet rule. But this, he says, does not prevent sensational achievements, and mentions as examples two women, the Minister of Education of Tajikistan and a winding-machine operator at the Margelan Textile Mills, who has been elected Deputy

to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.*

But is there only one woman minister or woman deputy to the Supreme Soviet? In all the Central Asian republics many government and Party posts are held by women representing local nationalities. They include, to mention a few, Y. S. Nasriddinova, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republic and the first woman president in the U.S.S.R.; Z. R. Rahimbabayeva, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Minister of Culture of Uzbekistan; V. S. Sadykova, Minister of Social Insurance of Uzbekistan; M. A. Hojinova, rector of the Textile Institute, Doctor of Technical Sciences, corresponding member of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; Kh. S. Sulaimanova, member of

the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; Z. Umidova, corresponding member of the Academy of Medical Sciences of the U.S.S.R., Doctor of Medical Sciences, head of a department at the Tashkent Medical Institute; S. Kh. Mirkamalova, Doctor of Geological Sciences, Head of the Department of Palaeontology at Tashkent State University; S. A. Azimjanova, Candidate of Oriental Studies of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; R. H. Aminova, Doctor of Historical Sciences, Head of the Department of the History of Socialist Construction at the Institute of History of the Uzbek Academy of Sciences; S. Y. Yusupova, Doctor of Geological Sciences, and S. E. Hakimova, Doctor of Medical Sciences (Tajikistan); B. P. Palvanova, corresponding member of the Turkmen Academy of Sciences and Deputy Minister of Education of Turkmenia; Z. B. Muhamedova, corresponding member of Turkmen Academy of Sciences; K. R. Ryskulova, corresponding member of the Kirghiz Academy of Sciences.

The women of the Central Asian republics, just as the women of the other Soviet republics, occupy leading posts in government bodies and work in public education, health protection, science, culture, industry and agriculture.

Out of the 458 deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the Uzbek Republic, 139 are women. This is more than in the parliaments of the U.S.A., Britain, the Federal Republic of Germany, Japan and Argentina taken together, where the aggregate population is 50 times greater than in Uzbekistan. Thirty thousand women are deputies to local Soviets; 18 Uzbek women are deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R. In Uzbekistan, 39 per cent of the workers and employees are women; in Kazakhstan-39 per cent; in Kirghizia -42 per cent; in Tajikistan-37 per cent; and in Turkmenia-38 per cent. In some fields, women comprise the majority of the specialists. In Uzbekistan, 80 per cent or almost 90,000 of the teachers are women; 75 per cent, or over 85,000, are doctors or doctor's assistants; of the 183,000 women working in industry, 15,000 are engineers or technicians; almost 900,000 are employed in agriculture, among them are 960 collective-farm chairmen and brigade-leaders, nearly 700 are field team-leaders. More than 16,000 women are employed in state administration and approximately 18,000 in scientific institutions. More than 30 Uzbek women are Doctors of Science, and nearly 750 are Candidates of Science. As in the

^{*} Vincent Monteil, Les Musulmans Soviétiques, Paris, 1957, pp. 115, 116.

other republics, the women of Tajikistan hold many high government and Party posts. They include Nizorollo Zaripova, Deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R., Secretary of the Central Committee of the Tajik Communist Party; Maryam Bazarbayeva, Chairman of the State Control Commission of Tajikistan; Mahkfirat Karimova, Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers of Tajikistan; Munavar Kasymova, Vice-Chairman of the Economic Council; Ibodat Rahimova, Vice-Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Tajikistan; and Khamro Tahirova, Chairman of the State Planning Commission of Tajikistan.

The women of Turkmenia, Kirghizia and Kazakhstan are prominent in economic, cultural and public activities. In Tajikistan 12 women are deputies to the highest organ of state power, the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; 99 are deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the republic; 672 are deputies to local Soviets. The industrial enterprises of the republic employ 42,513 women; 7,300 women are engaged in construction, 23,394 work in schools, kindergartens and crèches; more than 19,000 are doctors and nurses; approximately 10 head important collective farms; 121 are brigade-leaders; and 664 are scientific workers.

In Kazakhstan, the Vice-Chairman of the Council of Ministers is Zaure Omarova; Leila Galimjanova is Minister of Culture; Baiman Bultrikova is Social Insurance Minister. A total of 146 women are deputies to the Supreme Soviet of Kazakhstan; 28,556 are deputies to the local Soviets. Of the republic's 156 women Heroes of Socialist Labour, 89 are Kazakh. Over 50 per cent of all specialists are women, of whom 20 per cent are Kazakh.

The national economy employs 1,486,000 women of whom 404,000 work in industry, construction, transport and communications; 601,000 in agriculture; 268,000 in science, education and health protection; 55,000 in trade and public catering and technical supplies; 205,000 women have a higher or secondary specialised education.

In the Supreme Soviet of Turkmenia there are 99 women deputies or 35 per cent of the total number of deputies; in the Supreme Soviet of Kirghizia 34.8 per cent or 106 deputies are women. In Turkmenia 7,800 women have higher education and 186,600 have an unfinished higher, or secondary, or incomplete secondary education. In Kirghizia there are

over 12,000 women with a higher education, and 222,600 with either an unfinished higher or secondary education. In Turkmenistan 47,000 women are engaged in industry and transport, 100,000 in agriculture and 39,000 in education, science and health protection. The corresponding figures for Kirghizia are 69,000, 212,000 and 54,000. Of the total number of people employed in the economy of Kirghizia, 40.9 per cent are women; nine are deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the U.S.S.R.; 109 to the Supreme Soviet of Kirghizia; and 6,670 are deputies to local Soviets.

Before the Revolution the women of Central Asia were doubly oppressed. They had no social rights and no say in the family. Women were not allowed to participate in social and political life, and had no right to education and work. This oppression stemmed from the rules of the Shariat, ancient customs and state laws.

The drastic changes that have taken place in the position of women after the Revolution have excited the admiration of many foreign delegations.

"It is a notable fact," writes Holland Roberts in "Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Today", "that in Uzbekistan, where before the Revolution women were imprisoned in harem walls ... and kept in deepest ignorance and subjection, a woman is now president. She is Yadgar Nasriddinova, Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. I learned about this remarkable woman at first hand in Tashkent, where her story, typical of the strides Uzbek women have taken from serfdom to equality, proves to every girl and woman the meaning of Soviet democracy."*

Women, who were formerly forced to spend their lives cooped up in a house, raise numerous children without medical assistance and fulfil all the caprices of their husbands, have become absolutely free with no one to prevent them from living the way they want. They get equal pay for equal work with men, and hold responsible posts. Such are the impressions of a delegation of British women.

Jasvant Singh Raidhava, a member of a delegation from the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society, who visited the Soviet Union in 1956, wrote in his travel notes "Several Days in the Land of Soviets", published by the *Soviet Land* magazine,

^{*} Holland Roberts, "Tamerlane's Uzbekistan Today", New World Review, New York, November 1959, p. 33.

that not only in the European part of the U.S.S.R., but also in the Eastern republics, where before the Revolution women were not allowed to appear in public with their faces uncovered, they are now riding in trains and buses and working at factories and in collective farms. The heads of the majority of educational institutions and cultural establishments are women.

Foreign observers are amazed at the fact that women quickly dispensed with such ancient customs as wearing the paranjah and living in isolation and attained the level of

modern knowledge.

Many foreigners who had been to the Soviet Eastern republics refute the erroneous and anti-Soviet positions of some bourgeois historians and "prominent travellers" concerning the stand of the Soviet Government towards Islam, Muslim culture, and customs of the Muslim peoples, its alleged persecution of the Muslim religion, destruction of mosques, medressehs, Muslim religious books, etc.

This vilification of the Soviet national policy is absolutely groundless. There is full freedom of religious worship, though the church in the U.S.S.R. is separated from the state and every religion is considered a reactionary world outlook of

the backward sections of the people.

This right of every citizen is legally secured in the Constitution of the Soviet Union and in the constitutions of the Union Republics. On the other hand, every atheist has the right to conduct anti-religious propaganda and explanatory work.

In Central Asia the mosques are freely attended by believers, and all those who wish to devote themselves to religion,

can get the corresponding education at medressehs.

The assertions of bourgeois ideologists about the "confiscation and burning" of valuable religious books are also false. It was mentioned earlier with what loving care the Soviet Government is preserving the relics of ancient culture, and this includes ancient editions of the Koran, works by Muslim theologians, etc. The rarest manuscripts are stored partly in ecclesiastical institutions and mosques, and partly in archives and institutes of Oriental studies. Muslim ecclesiastical institutions also publish religious literature such as calendars. decretals and new editions of the Koran. In 1963, for example, that venerable relic of Arabic, Muslim and world culture, the Koran, was issued in a Russian translation by the Oriental Languages Publishing House in Moscow. The translation, made by I. Y. Krachkovsky, was edited at the Institute of Asian Peoples of the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences.

M. Badayuni in Impressions of Soviet Tour writes that the Soviet Government in no way abuses the religious feelings of believers, granting them full freedom of religious worship. He continues by saying that all mosques, with one or two

exceptions, are well preserved.

Dwelling on the people's living standard, he points out that he and his delegation did not see a single beggar during their tour of the U.S.S.R. The Muslims live well, all having their affairs to attend to. Most of the people employed in the industrial enterprises of Tashkent, Samarkand, Dushanbe are Muslims. The author points out that farmers also live well, and that the Government has adopted measures to further enhance their standard of living. He writes that most of the collective farms are being run efficiently and stresses that education is universal and free everywhere.

After visiting the U.S.S.R., more and more foreigners are truthfully depicting Soviet reality. That is the best possible reply to the slanderous fabrications of reactionary bourgeois

historians.

CONCLUSION

Far-reaching social and economic changes have taken place in the republics of Central Asia during Soviet years. In the period since the Revolution to the present day, there have been stirring achievements in all fields of economy, social

development and culture.

The most outstanding of the many accomplishments of the new Soviet system has been the emancipation of the formerly downtrodden peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan from social and national oppression. The Uzbek, Kazakh, Tajik, Turkmen and Kirghiz peoples have become complete masters of their destiny, independently deciding all problems of their social and state organisation. The successful implementation of the Communist Party's national policy, based on Marxist-Leninist ideology, proletarian internationalism, equality and friendship, has brought the peoples of Central Asia to the road of independent creative activity. They are actively participating in the political life of the country, and have established their own national Soviet statehood.

The republics of Central Asia are equal members of the multi-national Soviet state. They have their own territories. legislative and executive bodies of state administration, citizenship, constitutions, flags and coat-of-arms, unlimited rights to resolve internal problems and to establish international

contacts and relations.

Under Soviet rule, the republics of Central Asia with their formerly extremely backward agriculture, underdeveloped industry and poverty-stricken and illiterate peoples have become powerful industrial and agrarian countries with a highly developed industry and mechanised agriculture. The peoples of the Soviet East, availing themselves of the disinterested aid of the more advanced nationalities of the Soviet Union, particularly of Russian people, have accomplished an unprecedented leap which took them from the patriarchalfeudal system of economy to the road of socialism, by-passing the capitalist stage of development.

Lenin's prophetic words, spoken on the first day of the Revolution, have come true. He said: "From now on, a new phase in the history of Russia begins, and this, the third Russian revolution, should in the end lead to the victory of

socialism."*

The peoples of Central Asia and Kazakhstan are rightfully proud that together with the fraternal peoples of the Soviet Union they have been active in building socialist society.

Socialism has wrought a genuine transformation in the appearance of the country, created an advanced economy and culture, brought the working people new conditions and led to the establishment of unexampled relations between the working classes and between different nationalities. The high level of economic and cultural development achieved in a brief period has turned the Soviet East into a gigantic beacon illuminating the road to a free and happy life for the peoples of foreign Eastern countries.

Formerly backward colonies, where tsarism deliberately cultivated patriarchal and feudal oppression and impeded the development of industry and agriculture, have become a land of universal literacy, with a highly advanced national litera-

ture, art and science.

The magnificent programme for the building of communism in the U.S.S.R. adopted by the Twenty-Second Party Congress has opened up still greater prospects for a mighty upsurge in economy, culture, revolutionary reforms and

knowledge for the benefit of the working peoples.

In national relations, the Party considers as the main task "the all-round economic and cultural development of all the Soviet nations and nationalities, ensuring their increasingly close fraternal co-operation, mutual aid, unity and affinity in all spheres of life, thus achieving the utmost strengthening of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics; to make full use of, and advance the forms of, national statehood of the peoples of the U.S.S.R....

^{*} V. I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 26, p. 239.

"The Party will continue its policy ensuring the actual equality of all nations and nationalities with full consideration for their interests and devoting special attention to those areas of the country which are in need of more rapid development."*

With the aim of successfully carrying out all the tasks of communist construction, enormous funds are being allocated for the further promotion of the economy, culture and ma-

terial welfare of the Central Asian peoples.

The notable successes in the building of socialism, attained by the peoples of Central Asia in the fraternal family of Soviet peoples, were possible only as a result of the victory of the October Socialist Revolution. They became possible only in conditions of free development of the peoples, who had liberated themselves from oppression and exploitation, thanks to the implementation of the Leninist national policy and as a result of the disinterested aid of the great Russian people.

Under the guidance of the Communist Party, the peoples of the Central Asian republics are confidently advancing to the triumph of communism. No matter what lies and slander reactionary bourgeois historians heap on the Soviet Union and its non-Russian republics, they will not be able to stop the onward march of history. As the saying goes: "The sun will not stop shining simply because it is disliked by the bat."

REQUEST TO READERS

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^{*} The Road to Communism, Moscow, pp. 560-61.